Volume 5, Issue 2 by The Modern American
The Modern American
Volume 5
Issue 2 Fall 2009 Article 1
2009
Volume 5, Issue 2
The Modern American
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma
Part of the Law and Society Commons
This Entire Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Modern American by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Modern American, Fall 2009, 1-64.
Volume 5, Issue 2





















LAWWASHINGTON COLLEGE of LAW
Volume 5 n Issue 2 Fall 2009
The Modern AMericAn
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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
This year we have finally seen the appointment of a 
female Latina justice to the Supreme Court- Sonia Sotamayor. 
Her appointment was long overdue, but should be considered as 
a step forward in the push for diversity and equality in our judi-
cial system.  As Senator Leahy stated in Justice Sotamayor’s con-
firmation hearing, “there’s not one law for one race or another, 
there’s not one law for one color or another, there’s not one law 
for rich and a different one for poor. There’s only one law.”  It 
is our hope that Justice Sotomayor’s appointment will move us 
closer to this ideal.  
There is still much progress to be made.  The makeup 
of the Court is still predominantly white men particularly.  The 
lengths we need to go can be seen in the Court’s decision in Ricci	
v.	DeStefano, where the Court upheld a racist hiring practice that 
Justice Sotamayor had ruled against as a judge on the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals.   In this issue, we are excited to show-
case an article by Professor Girardeau A. Spann examining the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in deciding Ricci and the continued 
and far-reaching implications of the decision.
This fall, The	 Modern	American, in conjunction with 
the Women’s Bar Association, hosted our second annual event, 
Preserving the Past, Celebrating the Future: A Continued Com-
memoration of Our Shared History, on October 29, 2009–pic-
tures of the event can be found throughout this issue. This year’s 
program focused on the relationship between women and the law, 
specifically, the intersection between immigration and violence 
against women.  This was a timely issue, 2009 marking the 15th 
Anniversary of the Violence Against Women Act.  To highlight 
that relationship, this issue features the winning essay of the 
joint WBA-TMA writing competition, authored by our incoming 
Editor-in-Chief, Richael Faithful.
We are also proud to announce that our readership base 
continues to expand; subscribers will now be able to access The	
Modern	American	 through V.lex, LexisNexis, HeinOnline, and 
the Westlaw database.  In the spirit of environmentalism, we 
are pleased to continue to offer a green publication.   The next 
year promises to be an exciting one for our publication.  Our 
Fifth Annual Symposium will bring together renowned scholars 
explore how the legal community can better serve marginalized 
communities.  We will also be welcoming a new Executive Board 
for 2010.  
As the old editorial board says goodbye, we want to 
thank our advisors and staff for all of their help and support 
throughout our tenure.  It has been a pleasure working with an 
such amazing group of people and we are incredibly excited to 
see where the new leadership takes The	Modern	American.  Our 
school is one of the most diverse in the nation and with this in 
mind, we believe that The	Modern	American should become one 
of the most important diversity publication in the United States. 
It is with this mentality that we leave the publication to the new 
leadership.
In closing, we hope our issue inspires you to continue 
fostering the discourse on diversity and embracing everyday 
change in your community. 
  Sincerely yours,
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Beginning in the 19th century, as many as 200,000 chil-
dren across New York City’s overcrowded boroughs, often from 
immigrant homes, were removed from their families and relo-
cated to settlements in the American West. Contemporary views 
have credited this massive relocation as the impetus for Ameri-
can adoption laws, improved foster care practices, child labor law 
reform and the child welfare movement. To the contrary, records 
show this forced resettlement of primarily immigrant children 
slowed and opposed many child welfare reforms.
Laws and social views regarding the care and treat-
ment of dependent children have evolved, grown and changed 
in tandem with the development of America as a whole. Ameri-
can practices and treatment of children have shifted from overt 
oppression to eliminating oppressive laws in order to define and 
implement successful child welfare policies and practices. This 
legal and social evolution has been and continues to be accom-
plished through various laws, policies and programmatic changes 
involving adoption, child labor and child welfare programs 
directed at public and private institutions that care for and inter-
act with dependent children.
Part one of this article explores the orphan train move-
ment, emphasizing the historical and legal context of the care of 
dependent children in the United States beginning in the colonial 
era and extending through the 19th century. Part two of this article 
assesses the legal impact of the unique century-specific orphan 
train movement on child-related laws and legal institutions in the 
United States. This examination challenges the accepted view 
that orphan trains contributed to child welfare and posits that, to 
the contrary, orphan trains were a detriment to the children the 
movement sought to protect. The forced relocation of 200,000 
children, primarily from vulnerable immigrant families, worked 
against proper recognition of the rights of a child by substituting 
a “quick fix” for increased immigration and broader economic 
troubles. This article concludes with recommendations for 21st 
century child welfare practices and policies that, but for the 
orphan train movement, might have developed naturally in the 
United States.
PART I–THE ORPHAN TRAIN MOvEMENT
Charles Loring Brace has been credited with initiating 
the orphan train movement in the United States through his Chil-
dren’s Aid Society of New York.1 Brace’s plan to move destitute 
and homeless children from the streets of New York to Western 
farms has been characterized as an unusual and inventive child 
care solution.2 This is not, however, an accurate characterization. 
Placing large numbers of children into other homes was a com-
mon European practice.3 This English process of placing chil-
dren in homes as apprentices or indentured servants, the so called 
“putting out” or “placing out” of children, was later adopted in 
the American colonies.4 Records indicate that as early as 1627, 
Virginia-bound English ships carried between 1400 and1500 
children across the Atlantic and into child labor apprenticeship 
in the colonies.5
In England as well as the American colonies, children 
had no legal say in whether they were placed out. This authority 
rested with their parents or even local authorities, such as over-
seers of the poor.6 If a parent died and the local authorities deter-
mined the surviving parent could not support the child, that child 
would be placed as an indentured servant or as an apprentice with 
a family who, in return for service, would provide food, clothing 
and training for the child. Local authorities made their determi-
nations in conformity with pre-existing perceptions of gender 
and so were more likely to remove a child from the care of a 
surviving mother than from a surviving father. Colonial govern-
ments and predecessor states enacted laws to control this process 
and to regulate agreements involving indentured servitude and 
apprenticeships.7
As the population in the United States increased, alms-
houses, or charitable facilities that provided care for the destitute 
were established to house both indigent adults and children.8 But 
this was not a preferred system as it imposed a financial burden 
on the jurisdiction that created the facility. During colonial times, 
the town level of government was generally responsible for the 
care of indigents in their jurisdiction, though the responsibility 
of indigent care sometimes shifted to the county.9 State govern-
ments began assuming support of public charitable institutions 
in the 19th century.10 Even with state support, local governments 
were expected to financially contribute to care efforts.11During 
this period, an early form of paid foster care also existed for 
infants who were placed with families.12 Beginning as early as 
1866, orphanages were established to remove children from 
almshouses and to care for them separately from adults. These 
publicly funded orphanages attempted to indenture or apprentice 
older children and place younger children in paid foster care.13
Private charities were also established to care for 
orphans and destitute children. The New York Orphan Asylum 
Society (“NY Society”) was founded in 1806 as the first private 
U.S. children’s charity.14 The NY Society required that children 
be placed out as soon as they received a basic education.15 Simi-
lar institutions were created in Baltimore, Maryland and Boston, 
Massachusetts.16 In total, at least 62 private charities were created 
between 1800 and 1850,17 most of which strove to place children 
in their care into apprenticeships or indentured servitude.18
Informal adoptions were also common where, for exam-
ple, a relative would take in an orphaned child. Sometimes these 
adoptions were made official through private legislation or court 
proceedings.19 The first modern adoption statute was passed by 
Massachusetts in 1851.20 Even with statutory authority, some 
courts were reluctant to apply laws that conferred a right of 
inheritance on children adopted under these state statutes.21
Beginning in the mid-19th century, these public and 
private institutions faced three major obstacles in their work to 
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provide for the children in their care. First, jobs were scarce due 
to an economic recession. Second, jobs in labor-intensive cot-
tage industries were cut as development in industrialization led 
to mass production. 22 Third, the influx of immigrant families in 
urban centers like Boston and New York expanded an already 
large labor pool while the need for apprenticeships diminished 
with so many immigrant adult laborers vying for work. 23 The 
combined effect of these conditions left many children from 
immigrant and some non-immigrant families destitute, neglected 
or orphaned. The needs of these children strained local public 
resources. George W. Matsell, New York City’s first Chief of 
Police, provides a description of these conditions in his 1849 
semi-annual report on “the problem of vagrant and delinquent 
children”. He describes “the constantly increasing number of 
vagrants, idle and vicious children . . . who infest our public thor-
oughfares, hotels, docks, &c. [sic.].” He saw these children as 
“destined to a life of misery, shame and crime, and ultimately to 
a felon’s doom.”24 Matsell points out that “a large proportion of 
these juvenile vagrants are in the daily practice of pilfering wher-
ever opportunity offers, and begging when they cannot steal.”25
There are no reliable records as to the exact number of 
the affected children. The 1854 First Annual Report of the Chil-
dren’s Aid Society, drawing on numbers from Matsell’s report, 
identifies 10,000 “vagrant children” in New York City. 26 Other 
contemporary accounts indicate as many 
as 30,000 primarily immigrant children 
roamed the streets in New York and Boston 
in the mid-19th century.27
Publicly funded programs failed 
to adequately address these conditions. As 
a result, over 100 private charities were 
organized from the 1850’s to the 1860’s to 
meet child care needs.28 Following prac-
tices established by previous organizations, 
most of these charities provided assistance 
to children through indentured servitude, 
generally indenturing boys by the age of 
12 and girls by the age of 14.29 Given the 
depressed economic conditions and lack of employment opportu-
nities in the East, charities began to place and indenture affected 
children in rural areas where child labor was needed and wel-
comed.30 This grew into the orphan train movement.
In 1849, the board of governors of the New York Alms-
house favored placing children in families and sought legisla-
tion allowing children to be indentured outside the State of New 
York.31 In 1855, New York State authorized “trustees, directors 
or managers of any incorporated orphan asylum, or institute or 
home for indigent children” to “bind out” any male orphan or 
indigent child under 21 and any female orphan or indigent child 
under 18.32 Under this authority, the Boston Children’s Mission 
sent a total of 150 children to out-of-state placements in 1850.33
The phrase “orphan train” was first used in 1854 to 
describe the transportation of children outside of their home 
localities on the railways.34 There were no geographic restric-
tions for these indentures — the children could be placed any-
where. Other states enacted similar provisions giving charities 
the authority to indenture children in their custody without geo-
graphic restrictions. 35 While the first charities to use orphan 
trains were in the East, charities farther West also placed children 
out in this manner.36 Organizations in Missouri, Iowa, Texas and 
Nebraska also placed children across their states and in neigh-
boring states. 37 Expansion of railway systems into the American 
frontier had a two-fold effect: children were placed on trains in 
transit to faraway cities while railroad companies made efforts 
to draw immigrants to the United States. For example, railroads 
advertised the United States throughout Europe as “the land of 
opportunity” and the “land of a second chance.”38 These same 
railroad companies offered reduced or free fares to charities seek-
ing to transport children westward. Orphan train trips were also 
sponsored and financed by charitable contributions and wealthy 
philanthropists such as Mrs. John Jacob Astor III who, by 1884, 
had sent 1,113 children west on the trains.39 Implicitly, various 
levels of government sponsored these trips as well, the govern-
ment underwriting railroad companies using public funds.40
Reports provide various estimates of the number of chil-
dren riding these trains. One conservative report estimated that 
106,246 children were placed.41 The most consistent estimates 
suggest that between 150,000 to 200,000 children were placed 
in 48 states, the District of Columbia and Indian Territory loca-
tions. 42 Various factors give rise to the differences in estimation: 
institutional records were not always well maintained; some chil-
dren were counted multiple times; and records have been lost or 
destroyed.43
For purposes of placing the chil-
dren, the charities could be granted guard-
ianship in a variety of ways. In many 
cases, destitute parents would temporarily 
surrender child care responsibilities to a 
charity until the parents could sufficiently 
improve their financial circumstances to 
reassume child care responsibilities. A 
document transferring guardianship to the 
charity would be signed by at least one par-
ent, typically transferring guardianship for 
a specified number of years. Guardianship 
would vest in the charity only upon expi-
ration of the term when the child would 
be considered abandoned due to the parent’s failure to claim the 
child.44 A charity could also be given guardianship over a child 
by order of a magistrate, an officer of the court or an overseer of 
the poor. This was the general practice when police or public offi-
cials found a vagrant or abandoned child on the streets.45 A pub-
lic institution could also transfer guardianship to a private charity 
if the public charity was overcrowded or if the private charity was 
determined to be better able to place out children for indenture or 
adoption.46 In some instances, state laws granted charities guard-
ianship over charges committed to their care.47 In rare instances 
charities could petition for guardianship where the charity or its 
agent found an abandoned child.48 Children with no surviving 
parent had the authority to agree to a charity guardianship.49
Charities generally asked the receiving family to sign an 
agreement accepting the child into that family to be cared for as 
a member of the family.50 These agreements contained different 
provisions depending on the child’s age.51 Some organizations 
required formal indenture agreements for placed children and 
transferred guardianship as part of the indenture process, some-
times designating a trial period before transferring guardianship 










with a transfer of guardianship while a failed trial period would 
terminate the agreement.53
Children not already preplaced with a family or busi-
ness were placed on trains traveling on a predetermined route. 
Placement committees composed of prominent members of 
towns along the orphan train route were formed to help place 
transported children. Advertising space, for instance in news-
papers, was purchased to advertise the children’s arrival, urg-
ing prospective adopters to contact committee members or to 
simply be present in town when the orphan train was scheduled 
to arrive.54 Committees arranged for the children’s lodging and 
meals while overseeing placement applica-
tions. The committee frequently requested 
community applications in advance of the 
train’s arrival and were responsible for 
investigating those seeking a child. Agents 
either accompanied children on the train or 
met them upon arrival, and were to inves-
tigate placements before releasing the 
child. Agents were also expected to work 
with local committees in making periodic 
follow-up visits, typically a year or half-a-
year after the initial placement.
Children were constructively split 
into two groups at every stop of the train along its route: chil-
dren who were selected for adoption and children that were not. 
Selected children whose placement was approved by the local 
committee would go home with their new family. Children who 
were not selected would re-board the train and go to the next 
stop, where the process would be repeated. In this manner, sib-
lings who were already taken from their parents would frequently 
be separated for placement in different geographic locations. 
Sometimes these children were reunited, but in many cases they 
never saw each other again.55
Children pre-placed for adoption were also placed on 
orphan trains and delivered to the adopters who sent requests to 
the charities. These requests usually included detailed require-
ments specifying the child’s age and physical characteristics. If 
a child matching the description was found, a “receipt” for the 
child would be sent to the requesting fam-
ily stating where and when the child would 
arrive by train. The family would present 
the notice of arrival receipt to the agent 
accompanying the child and if the numbers 
matched, they would take the child home.56
During its 75 year existence, the 
orphan train movement generated both 
supporters and critics. Criticisms of the 
orphan train movement focused on con-
cerns that initial placements were made 
hastily, without proper investigation, and 
that there was insufficient follow-up on placements.57 Chari-
ties were also criticized for not keeping track of children placed 
while under their care. Some placement locations charged that 
orphan trains were dumping undesirable children from the East 
on Western communities.58 In 1874, the National Prison Reform 
Congress charged that these practices resulted in increased cor-
rectional expenses in the West.59 Catholic clergy maintained 
that some charities were deliberately placing Catholic children 
in Protestant homes to change their religious practices. Similar 
charges were made concerning the placement of Jewish chil-
dren.60 Another concern of critics was that not all orphan train 
children were true orphans, but were made into orphans by forced 
removal from their biological families to be placed out in other 
states.61 Some claimed this was a deliberate pattern intended 
to break up immigrant Catholic families.62 Some abolitionists 
opposed placements of children with Western families, viewing 
indentureship as a form of slavery.63
Orphan trains were the target of law suits, generally filed 
by parents seeking to reclaim their children.64 Suits were occa-
sionally filed by a receiving parent or fam-
ily member claiming to have lost money 
or been harmed as the result of the place-
ment. A more complicated lawsuit arose 
from a 1904 Arizona Territory orphan 
train placement in which the New York 
Foundling Hospital sent 40 Caucasian 
children between the ages of 18 months 
and 5 years to be indentured to Catholic 
families in an Arizona Territory parish. 
The families approved by the local priest 
for placement were identified in the sub-
sequent litigation as “Mexican Indian.”65 
Nuns escorting these children were unaware of the racial tension 
between local Anglo and Mexican groups, and placed Caucasian 
children with Mexican Indian families. A group of white men, 
described as “just short of a lynch mob,” forcibly took the chil-
dren from the Mexican Indian homes and placed most of them 
with Anglo families. Some of the children were returned to the 
Foundling Hospital, but 19 remained with the Anglo Arizona Ter-
ritory families. The Foundling Hospital filed a writ of habeas cor-
pus seeking the return of these children. The Arizona Supreme 
Court held that the best interests of the children required that 
they remain in their new Arizona homes.66 On appeal, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that a writ of habeas corpus seeking the 
return of a child constituted an improper use of the writ. Habeas 
corpus writs should be used “solely in cases of arrest and forcible 
imprisonment under color or claim of warrant of law,” and should 
not be used to obtain or transfer custody 
of children.67 These events were well pub-
licized at the time with newspaper stories 
titled “Babies Sold Like Sheep,” telling 
readers that the New York Foundling Hos-
pital “has for years been shipping children 
in car-loads all over the country, and they 
are given away and sold like cattle.”68
Charities attempted to guaran-
tee successful orphan train placements by 
agreeing to remove children from failed 
placements and, where necessary, trans-
port the child back to the charity’s Eastern office at the char-
ity’s expense.69 Many children placed out west had survived on 
the streets of New York, Boston or other large eastern cities and 
generally were not the passive, obedient, respectful children that 
some families expected; this prompted placement changes and 
returns to the East.70 Older boys wanted to be paid for their labor, 
sometimes asking for additional pay or leaving a placement to 
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initiated 80% of the placement changes that occurred as part of 
the movement.71 As one young man wrote, “[a] boy could easily 
find work and set his own wages as a farm hand around here.”72 
These issues added to the perception that New York juvenile 
delinquents were being imported into Western communities.73
Efforts to refute or substantiate these criticisms led to 
several reviews of orphan train procedures and placement prac-
tices. Reviews were conducted by the criticized charities inter-
nally and also by independent organizations. Internal charity 
reviews defined failed placements as those where children were 
subsequently placed in prisons or almshouses. One charity main-
tained that a review of its 1858 placements of children under 15 
indicated a 2% failure rate with a 4% failure rate for placements 
of children under 18.74 An 1874 charity self-review found that 
only five children (four boys, one girl) out of 6,000 Indiana place-
ments were in state reformatories.75 Another charity found that of 
45 children who were placed and identified in their records, 11 
children (24.4%) were not found, while one of the remaining 34 
children had committed a crime and fled the state.76
The Minnesota State Board of Corrections and Charities 
reviewed Minnesota orphan train placements between 1880 and 
1883. The Board found that while children were placed hastily 
and without proper investigation into their placements, only a few 
children were “depraved”77 or abused. The review criticized local 
committee members who were swayed by pressure from wealthy 
and important individuals in their community. The Board also 
pointed out that older children were frequently placed with farm-
ers who expected to profit from their labor. The Board recom-
mended that paid agents replace or supplement local committees 
in investigating and reviewing all applications and placements.78
An independent study from 1900 comparing orphan 
train placements with placements made by a public state charity 
within the same state revealed additional insight into the orphan 
train system. The study found that between 1888 and 1897 the 
state charity made fewer placements than the orphan train move-
ment, but used similar strategies and procedures. Both placement 
groups relied on local advisory boards composed of prominent 
community members and Protestant clergy. Both placement 
groups required regular reports from foster parents, local advi-
sory board members and local agents. In all cases, these reports 
were frequently late or missing entirely. State charities, the study 
concluded, were no more successful than orphan train charities 
in placing children.
There were no real differences between the placement 
practices and placement results of orphan train charities and an 
in-state charity. This highlights the frequently overlooked real-
ity of the orphan train movement. Trains allowed large numbers 
of children to be transported farther than would other means 
available at the time. Using trains as a placement tool has been 
characterized and perhaps romanticized as the “orphan train 
movement.” This overlooks the fact that orphan train transport 
was just one child placement strategy among many used in the 
period. A comparison between state charity and orphan train 
placement illustrates the common shortcoming of both systems: 
the placement of older children was more difficult and gener-
ally for shorter duration than the placement of younger children. 
Child placement success, then, did not vary according to the 
vehicle used to accomplish the placement.79
THE END Of THE ORPHAN TRAINS
Numerous factors came together to end the orphan train 
movement in 1929.80 One factor was that railroad expansion in 
the United States was complete and most railroads ended sub-
sidized fares provided to charities moving children.81 Another 
critical and underlying factor was that the need for labor which 
drove the initial success of orphan train placements in the West 
was no longer as great. The trains had relocated children to rural 
areas where their labor was needed on the frontier. Movement of 
children to the Midwest and West paralleled settlement patterns. 
Laws like the Homestead Act of 1862 encouraged the migration 
of settlers, offering 160 acres to any settler who would farm and 
build a shelter upon received land. Thousands of settlers sub-
sequently moved west to claim their land.82 Railroads received 
government land, which was sold to finance further construction 
of railroads needed to connect the country. These settlers needed 
laborers to work their homesteads, build houses and farm their 
land purchases.83 Orphan train children provided this labor. As 
the West was settled, the labor demand declined. In 1893, Freder-
ick Jackson Turner presented his thesis that the American frontier 
had ended and the West had become civilized.84 The orphan train 
children were no longer needed to settle the West.
Another factor that contributed to the end of the orphan 
train movement was the backlash from the Western states. They 
reacted to their role as “a dumping ground for dependents from 
other states”85 by passing legislation limiting or prohibiting 
placement of out-of-state children. Many of these states had 
become urbanized and were facing their own child care and child 
placement issues. Cities such as Chicago and St. Louis began to 
experience the same problems in caring for neglected and desti-
tute children that New York, Boston and Philadelphia had expe-
rienced in the mid-1800s.86 These cities began to seek ways to 
care for their own orphan populations. In 1895, Michigan passed 
a statute prohibiting out-of-state children from local placement 
without payment of a bond guaranteeing that children placed in 
Michigan would not become a public charge in the State.87 Sim-
ilar laws were passed by Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri and Nebraska. Negotiated agreements between one or 
more New York charities and several western states allowed the 
continued placement of children in these states. Such agreements 
included large bonds as security for placed children. In 1929, 
however, these agreements expired and were not renewed as char-
ities changed their child care support strategies.88
Lastly, the need for the orphan train movement decreased 
as legislation was passed providing in-home family support. 
Charities began developing programs to support destitute and 
needy families limiting the need for intervention to place out 
children.89 State and local governments funded foster care for 
orphans while compulsory education and anti-child labor statutes 
were also being passed.90 Social work had become a profession 
and social workers began to focus on keeping families together.91 
Hull House and other similar programs were established in urban 
areas to provide in-home assistance for families and children.92 
In 1909, Theodore Roosevelt called the first White House Con-
ference on Children, which directed state and federal bodies to 
implement programs designed to aid destitute children and their 
families.93 The Federal Children’s Bureau was established in 
1912 with Julia Lathrop of Hull House as its first chief.94 These 
20th century laws and initiatives focused on keeping families 
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together first and paths such as foster care second. While a few 
states were continuing to allow indentured servitude, the national 
trend was moving away from child labor.95 Orphanages and even 
almshouses were still used to provide care when needed, but fam-
ily care and foster care were becoming the accepted preference.96 
Urbanization of the western states together with the growth of 
other programs, and strategies to support these needy children 
eliminated the need to use railroads to move children to the west. 
In 1929 the orphan trains stopped running.
PART II–THE LEGAL IMPAcT Of THE  
ORPHAN TRAIN MOvEMENT
The orphan train movement has been described as the 
driving force for changes to American adoption law, the creation 
of child labor laws, and reforming child welfare and foster care 
practices.97 Beginning in 1854 and ending in 1929, the orphan 
train movement was but one aspect of these evolving legal and 
societal changes. A careful review of legal history indicates that 
it was not the driving force for these changes.
ADOPTION LAw
The orphan train movement has 
been credited with establishing American 
adoption laws.98 One author maintains 
that the increasing number of farmers who 
wanted to legalize the placement of orphan 
train children in their families resulted in 
states enacting adoption laws.99 This prop-
osition is not supported by the timeline of 
enacted state adoption laws. In 1846, Mississippi passed a law 
that authenticated and made a public record of private adoption 
agreements.100 Texas passed a similar statute in 1850.101 Mas-
sachusetts enacted the first general adoption law in 1851.102 The 
Massachusetts statute mirrors modern adoption statutes in having 
a number of requirements such as written consent from the natu-
ral parents or guardian and the child’s consent where the child 
was 14 years of age or older. In 1853, Pennsylvania followed 
suit.103 All of these statutes were enacted before 1854, the date 
credited as the beginning of the orphan train movement. Given 
the dates of these adoption laws, the orphan train movement can-
not be wholly credited with the establishment of American adop-
tion law. A more likely cause was an effort to reduce requests for 
private legislation to formalize adoptions. Other states, recogniz-
ing adoption statutes as a way to reduce their own private legisla-
tive burdens, began to pass adoption statutes similar to those of 
Mississippi, Texas, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.
No legislative history has been located indicating the 
role of orphan trains in the passage of state adoption laws. In 
fact, one author maintains that adoption laws were passed for 
the purpose of “securing to adopted children a proper share in 
the estate of adopting parents who should die intestate.”104 Even 
without orphan trains, it is reasonable to conclude that the pre-
1854 trend in enactment of adoption laws would have led most 
states to promulgate similar laws by the early 20th century. There 
is no substantiation for the proposition that the influx of orphan 
train children resulted in greater urgency for some states to pass 
adoption laws. It does not follow that the orphan train movement 
was central to the creation of adoption laws across the United 
States.
By 1925, every state and U.S. territory had some form 
of adoption law.105 A guide to American adoption laws prepared 
in 1925 by the Department of Labor Children’s Bureau identified 
a trend away from adoption by deed to a “procedure in which 
human values are carefully considered and the supervisory duty 
of the State is recognized.”106 This study identified Minnesota, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon and Virginia as having the most 
modern adoption laws, with provisions focusing on the best inter-
ests of the child, and providing for notification and termination 
of the rights of natural parents.107 Recognizing the need for clari-
fication in adoption practices, states such as New York and Ore-
gon enacted statutes that specifically addressed complex issues 
in adoption law like consent from the natural parent or from an 
institution regarding the adoption. For instance, under a 1923 
New York statute, a parent who was unable to care for a child 
could place that child with an institution or children’s aid soci-
ety, and the institution or society could then place the child for 
adoption without any further consent from the natural parent.108 
In contrast, the 1920 Oregon statute allowed natural parents to 
place children with institutions or organizations, but required 
additional specific consent before a child could be placed for 
adoption. Courts addressed adoption prac-
tices by determining that adoption statutes 
required strict construction.109 Courts also 
struggled with the question of whether 
adoption laws provided a right of inheri-
tance for adopted children.110
Despite the wave of newly 
enacted adoption statutes, not all children 
were formally adopted. Authors tracing adoption law history and 
the orphan train movement generally overlook the doctrine of 
equitable adoption. Equitable adoption, a judicial remedy which 
existed in colonial times and continues to be used today, is a rem-
edy to establish inheritance or other rights for someone who has 
not been formally adopted. The court in	 Johnson	v.	Johnson111 
discussed the doctrine as arising from the “‘placing out’ of home-
less and indigent children from urban areas in the East to the 
western United States.”112 The court recognized that “[m]ost of 
these placements were memorialized only with an oral agreement 
made at the train platform and few children were ever formally 
adopted leaving them in” legal limbo.”113 Drawing on a chain of 
equitable adoption cases, the court identified the equitable rem-
edy as one grounded in a valid contract to adopt. Such a contract 
establishes the same rights for a child that would exist if the child 
is legally adopted, and these rights include both child support and 
a right to inherit.114
During the 75 years of the orphan train movement, 
adoption laws grew and evolved as part of society’s growing rec-
ognition of a need to protect and nurture children. The orphan 
trains served as a placement vehicle for thousands of children 
who found homes in at least 45 states.115 Studies indicate that 
only a small percentage of these children were formally adopted, 
despite enacted statutes and equitable adoption, and “the great 
majority of placements seemed to be characterized by a desire 
for a teenager’s labor, even if warm feelings subsequently devel-
oped between the parties.”116 The greater percentage of non-
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not recognized until one or both “adopting” parents died, and the 
child, who was not legally adopted by the deceased, was barred 
from administering or inheriting the estate.117 The relatively low 
percentage of orphan train adoptions together with the greater 
emphasis on placements to provide farm labor, might indicate 
that far from fostering American adoption law, the orphan train 
movement was actually a negative force in the process.
cHILD wELfARE REfORM
Conflicting views exist regarding the orphan train move-
ment’s role in child welfare reform. Some authors see improve-
ments in child welfare as a reaction to poor orphan train placement 
practices,118 while others see child welfare reforms resulting from 
positive and progressive orphan train practices.119 Nineteenth 
and early 20th century child welfare organizations engaged in a 
variety of activities and programs they believed would promote 
the welfare of children; the orphan train movement was just one 
of these programs. When considered in the context of other child 
welfare programs at the time, it becomes clear that the orphan 
train movement was only a single part of a broad legal and 
 social movement focusing on child welfare and child welfare 
reform.120 In this light, it appears that other child welfare pro-
grams and laws may have had a more central role than the orphan 
train movement.
Many other strategies have been used to provide for the 
welfare of children and these strategies have varied to reflect 
changing ideas about childhood and what is best for children. 
In the 18th century, almshouses were constructed to care for des-
titute, ill or mentally deficient children and adults. As early as 
1800, child welfare reformers recognized that children should be 
housed separately from adults and provided with different types 
of care. One almshouse recommended that children “should be 
kept as much as possible from the other paupers, habituated to 
decency, cleanliness, and order, and carefully instructed in read-
ing, writing, and arithmetic. The girls should also be taught to 
sew and knit.”121 Private charities were developed to care for chil-
dren by supplementing the child welfare efforts of almshouses. 
Gradually, in the 19th century, facilities were established to house 
only children.122 These residential institutions focused on provid-
ing children with discipline, work and education.
Contrary to the proposition that the orphan train move-
ment drove child welfare reforms, various states’ legislative 
imperatives to address child welfare concerns may have driven 
the orphan train movement. Even from before the use of orphan 
trains, the preferred and most common publicly funded child 
welfare practices involved indentureship, apprenticeship, or plac-
ing out.123 Growing awareness of child welfare issues in these 
unregulated practices led to legislative action to examine and 
change their child welfare strategies.
An 1869 Michigan commission examined the state’s 
child welfare practices and based on their recommendations, the 
Michigan legislature created a state public school for dependent 
children and mandated that all public charges be transferred 
there. All children in this institution were to be placed out with 
private families as soon as possible.124 Other states adopted simi-
lar laws, requiring the removal of children from almshouses or 
limiting the time that children could remain in state institutions 
before being placed with families.125 These institutions and laws 
developed contemporaneously with the orphan train movement 
and the legislative imperatives to place out institutionalized chil-
dren may have played a driving role in the use of orphan trains. 
Increased awareness and concern for child welfare reform led 
to increased state and federal involvement in child welfare and 
family placement programs, independent of any implications of 
the orphan train movement. Governments created state charity 
boards charged with overseeing all public and private charitable 
institutions within the state.126 These state charity boards rep-
resented a significant departure from earlier practices in which 
private charities were incorporated within a state and then left to 
their own devices with limited or no state oversight. Such state 
oversight was met with resistance. The New York Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [Society] refused to allow 
the New York State Board of Charities to inspect their facilities, 
maintaining that they were not a charity as defined by under New 
York law. By 1899, state charity boards were established in 30 
states.127
On the national level, the National Child Labor Com-
mittee was created and, together with other child welfare orga-
nizations, lobbied for a federal children’s bureau to collect and 
disseminate information affecting the welfare of children. Leg-
islation introduced in 1905-06 was endorsed by President Theo-
dore Roosevelt, members of the Cabinet and members of both 
the House and Senate, but failed to reach the floor for a vote.128 
The bill was introduced again in 1908-09 and 1909-10.129 Dur-
ing this period, the first White House Conference on Children 
and Youth was held in Washington, D.C. With almost 200 people 
in attendance, this conference emphasized the harm children 
incurred from institutionalization.130 The conference reinforced 
the importance of family and home life, stating that “[h]ome life 
is the highest and finest product of civilization. It is the great 
molding force of mind and Children should not be deprived of it 
except for urgent and compelling reasons.”131
Creation of a federal children’s bureau was a central 
focus of the conference and President Roosevelt together with 
conference attendees endorsed the pending legislation. President 
Roosevelt sent a message to Congress urging favorable action on 
the Children’s Bureau bill, stating:
There are few things more vital to the welfare 
of the nation than accurate and dependable 
knowledge of the best methods of dealing with 
children, especially with those who are in one 
way or another handicapped by misfortune; and 
in the absence of such knowledge each commu-
nity is left to work out its own problem without 
being able to learn of and profit by the success 
or failure of other communities along the same 
lines of endeavor.132
Legislation establishing the Children’s Bureau was 
passed and signed in 1910-11 and became effective in 1912 
under President Taft.133 The bill emphasized that the Children’s 
Bureau would investigate and report on issues and furnish infor-
mation regarding children’s issues from all parts of the country. 
The Bureau was not to encroach on the rights of the states and 
would not eliminate the duty of the states to deal with child wel-
fare issues within their jurisdictions. The Bureau would effectu-
ate the federal government’s duty to make information available 
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to the various states, supporting them as they cared for children 
within their boundaries.134
The national child welfare movement continued as 
President Wilson hosted a second White House Conference in 
1919, declaring the same year as “Children’s Year”. The Confer-
ence focused on child welfare standards, beginning as a series of 
meetings in Washington, D.C. and continuing across eight cit-
ies throughout America. Small committees determined minimum 
standards in the areas of child labor, health care for children and 
mothers, aid for special needs children, and general child wel-
fare minimum standards. These standards were published by the 
Children’s Bureau and concluded with a charge to the individ-
ual states to review and evaluate state legislation in light of the 
standards.135
As a result of the 1919 White House Conference and 
the efforts of various child welfare organizations, state regulation 
of public and private child placement practices gained impor-
tance. In his 1919 work, Child-Placing	in	Families, Slingerland 
observed “[t]here seems to be a strong conviction among experts 
in social work that the public authorities, representing all the peo-
ple should not only supervise and standardize all private agen-
cies, but should enter directly into many phases of child-helping 
work.”136 Slingerland proposed that this process be accomplished 
“a step at a time,” beginning with a general child welfare law. 
Using this approach, “reasonably advanced child welfare laws” 
could be passed in a number of states suffering from obsolete, 
inadequate and sometimes contradictory laws regarding child 
welfare and family placement.137
By the early 20th century, it was widely accepted that 
child welfare was best accomplished through family placement of 
dependent children. Despite contrary views, the concept of fam-
ily placement for children did not originate with the orphan train 
movement. Family placement for children was practiced before 
and during colonial times. Between 1854 and 1929, large scale 
in-family placement of neglected and dependent children hap-
pened to be facilitated by the railroads. As child welfare became 
a more prominent subject of concern nationwide, state govern-
ments assumed responsibility for child welfare within their 
boundaries, creating and regulating the structures necessary to 
meet this responsibility, thus ending the orphan train movement.
fOSTER cARE
While some claim the Children’s Aid Society was the 
first to offer foster care and that the modern concept of foster care 
evolved directly from the orphan train program, this view is not 
supported in the legal and social history.138 It is important to first 
recognize the relationship between placing out and foster care. 
Legally, the term “‘place out’ shall mean to provide for the care 
of a child in a free home, in a family other than that of a relative 
within the second degree.”139 A legal definition for foster care 
can be found in the Code	of	Federal	Regulations,	which defines 
foster care as “. . . 24-hour substitute care for children placed 
away from their parents or guardians and for whom the State 
agency has placement and care responsibility. This includes, but 
is not limited to, placements in foster family homes, foster homes 
of relatives, group homes, emergency shelters, residential facili-
ties, child care institutions, and pre-adoptive homes.”140
Though placing out and foster care both allow for the 
placement of a child in another family, the differences are found 
in payment for the care provided. Placing out usually involved a 
formal or informal indentureship whereby a child would work for 
a family in return for care.141 Foster care generally involves pay-
ments to the foster family to provide for the child’s care, eliminat-
ing the need for the child’s labor as a form of payment.142 Orphan 
train placements were almost always grounded in the assumption 
that the child would work in return for care, with or without an 
actual indenture agreement and the institutions did not pay the 
receiving families for the child care.
Not only were placing out and paid foster case fun-
damentally different in practice but paid foster care existed in 
the colonies and so cannot be uniquely attributed to the orphan 
train movement. Historically, paid foster care was described as 
“boarding out” and was essentially the equivalent of modern fos-
ter care. Infants were boarded out in colonial days at the cost of 
$1.50 per week.143 Boarding out became a more frequent practice 
in the late 19th century as states mandated the removal of children 
from institutions and their placement in families. Both public 
and private charities expanded their boarding out practices. One 
example, the Boston Temporary Home for the Destitute, which 
for a number of years had used the promise of “light service” to 
induce families to accept children, began, in the 1880s to make 
board payments in lieu of labor-service. By the 1890s, payment 
for board replaced all “light service” placements.144
While paid foster care existed independent of the orphan 
train movement, it also had a great impact on the movement itself. 
This growing practice of paying families to care for dependent 
children became a factor in reducing unpaid, labor-based orphan 
train placements. The system of payment for boarding out or fos-
ter care also increased emphasis on both pre-placement and post-
placement investigation and supervision. Organizations making 
on-going placements for the care of children adopted improved 
policies and procedures for placement supervision.145 As state 
governments became more involved in the placement of children 
within their jurisdictions, state regulations were promulgated to 
ensure adequate child placement supervision.
cHILD LAbOR
The orphan train movement has been described as a 
primary factor in child labor reform, but in light of history the 
orphan train movement seemed to contribute more to the prob-
lem of child labor rather than the push for child labor reform. 
As states adopted stricter regulations regarding child placement, 
child welfare and foster care, the casual placement and supervi-
sion practices of orphan train charities failed to meet regulatory 
standards thereby impacting the use of child labor which was the 
driving force of the orphan train movement. In the early 19th cen-
tury with the expansion of the frontier, children were employed 
in mining, fishing, lumber, agriculture and almost every other 
industry.146 Though society’s view of children changed in the mid 
to late 19th century, the driving force for these changes in child 
labor reform came from factory workers and educators. In 1832, 
the New England Association of Farmers, Mechanics and Other 
Workingmen adopted a resolution that “children should not be 
allowed to labor in the factories from morning till night, without 
any time for healthy recreation and mental culture” because such 
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work “endangers their . . . well-being and health.”147 Massachu-
setts adopted the first state child labor law in 1836, linking man-
datory education to a requirement that children under 15 working 
in factories must attend at least three months of school a year.148 
In 1876, the Working Men’s Party proposed banning employment 
of children under the age of 14,149 and in 1881, the first national 
convention of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) passed a 
similar resolution.150 The National Child Labor Committee was 
formed in 1904 to address the need for child labor legislation, 
and by 1909, primarily through their lob-
bying efforts, 43 states passed some sort 
of legislation prohibiting employment of 
children under a certain age.151 However, 
state exemptions were numerous and var-
ied significantly between states. Some 
of the most common exemptions from 
the prohibition on child labor were made 
for orphans, children of widowed moth-
ers or disabled parents and for farm and 
domestic labor.152 Special permits exempt-
ing children from the application of child 
labor laws were also available.153 Parents 
and farmers complained that child labor was essential to their 
survival and opposed child labor restrictions.154 Enforcement of 
these child labor laws became a significant problem.155 Individ-
ual states complained that variations between state child labor 
laws created unfair competition resulting from the allowed or 
disallowed employment of children in various state industries.156
These concerns resulted in federal legislation passed in 
1916, establishing national labor standards.157 Declared uncon-
stitutional,158 legislation was again passed in 1918 and was also 
declared unconstitutional.159 This resulted in an organized move-
ment for a constitutional amendment giving the federal govern-
ment authority to regulate child labor. While the constitutional 
amendment passed, it failed to be ratified by the necessary num-
ber of states.160 Federal legislation regulating child labor was 
finally enacted in 1938 when the Fair Labor Standards Act was 
expanded to include a prohibition on the employment of children 
under 16 in industries whose products were shipped in interstate 
commerce.161
The orphan train movement found its utility in providing 
child labor and successful placement of children hinged on the 
need for the child labor in the Midwest and West. The founder 
of the Children’s Aid Society of New York commented on the 
success of orphan train placement: “[it] helps to solve, in the 
only feasible mode, the great economic problem of poverty in 
our cities, for it sends future laborers where they are in demand, 
and relieves the over-crowded market in the city.”162 Orphan train 
placements, especially for children 12 and older, were made in 
response to the western need for farm labor. It is important to 
note that opposition to child labor laws came from the agricul-
tural community dependent on child labor as was supplied by the 
orphan trains. Children were employed on their own family farms 
and hired out as extra hands on neighboring farms. In 1910, when 
major efforts were underway to limit child labor, 72% of children 
ages 10 to 15 were employed in agriculture.163
This agricultural opposition to child labor legislation 
is reflected in existing labor laws. American labor law includes 
significant exemptions allowing the employment of children 
in agriculture. The Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum age 
requirements do not apply to minors employed by their parents 
or guardian, or to children working on a farm owned or operated 
by a parent or guardian. Children ages 10 and 11 may harvest 
short season crops outside of school hours, and children under 
12 may work in nonhazardous farm jobs with parental consent or 
if their parents are also employed on that 
farm.164 The Human Rights Watch charges 
that agricultural work is the “most hazard-
ous and grueling area of employment open 
to children in the United States.”165 The 
19th and 20th century child labor movement 
focused on protecting child workers, but 
was unable to secure protections for chil-
dren working on farms and in agriculture, 
the very locations where orphan train chil-
dren were being placed. Far from being a 
factor in securing protections against child 
labor, the orphan train movement rein-
forced the use of children as farm laborers, a practice that 21st 
century laws protecting children has failed to prevent.
cONcLuSION
Orphan trains and the orphan train movement have 
become a romanticized legend. Children’s books have been writ-
ten extolling the successes of orphan train placements. Docu-
mentaries have been filmed capturing orphan train nostalgia. 
Modern depictions show happy children in new clothes hang-
ing out of train windows, a stark contrast to the image of “street 
rats” adorned in rags that were also taken at this time. A pic-
ture of what appears to be hundreds of children, all waiting to 
be adopted, standing on and around a railroad train catches the 
modern imagination.
The reality of the orphan train movement is very dif-
ferent. Orphan trains ran from 1854 through 1929, a period in 
American history of the greatest changes in views regarding 
childhood and laws affecting children. It is understandable that 
the orphan train movement would be linked to these changing 
views and laws, and that 21st century authors would see the emi-
gration of 150,000 to 200,000 children, accompanied by dramatic 
photographs and other memorabilia, as the driving force in these 
changing views and laws. But a review of era generated records 
does not support this fantasy that the orphan train movement was 
the positive driving force in modern adoption law, child welfare 
laws, foster care practices and child labor laws.
Historical records, relevant legislation and case law 
provide an authoritative foundation in assessing the nature and 
extent of the orphan train movement’s role in these changes. The 
orphan train movement and orphan train placements were not the 
driving force for modern adoption laws, foster care practices and 
child welfare laws. Instead, many of these reforms came about to 
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I. INTRODucTION
On April 16, 2008, the Maryland Court of Appeals, 
the highest court in the state, ruled that a woman may withdraw 
consent for vaginal intercourse after penetration has occurred. 
After consent has been withdrawn, the continuation of vaginal 
intercourse by force or threat of force may constitute rape.1 The 
ruling caused a news sensation because the 
defendant, Maouloud Baby, was convicted 
of first degree rape and related charges 
after his female victim testified that he 
“continued to have sex with her for five or 
ten seconds after she asked him to stop.”2 
The over-reaching implications of what 
has been termed “The Five-Second Rule” 
are obvious, because the most difficult 
legal elements to prove in any rape crime 
case are force and non-consent.3 A vic-
tim’s ability to change his or her mind dur-
ing intercourse could effectively remove 
the problem of consent as a barrier to rape 
convictions and give rise to a host of criminal prosecutions.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines rape as “unlawful sexual 
activity with a person without consent and by force or threat of 
injury.”4 At common law, the crime of rape consisted of unlawful 
sexual intercourse by a man with a woman who was not his wife 
through force and against her will and required at least slight 
penetration of the penis into the vagina.5 Currently, Maryland 
statutorily defines the crime of “rape in the first degree” as the 
act of “[engaging] in vaginal intercourse with another by force, 
or the threat of force, without the consent of the other.”6 The 
applicable punishment is “imprisonment not exceeding life.”7 
In contrast, “post-penetration” rape8 describes a situation where 
two people initially engage in consensual sexual intercourse, but 
during intercourse one person “communicates to the other the 
revocation of consent and the other party forces the continuation 
of intercourse against the will of the non-consenting person.”9 
One person decides to stop and the other person does not. Only 
one state has explicit legislation criminalizing post-penetration 
rape: Illinois.10 Until Baby, Maryland was one of two states that 
expressly held that post-penetration continuation of intercourse 
after withdrawal of consent did not constitute rape.11
II. THE BaBy cASE
At trial in 2004 Baby was convicted not only of rape 
in the first degree, but also of committing a sexual offense in 
the second degree and two counts of sexual offense in the third 
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degree, both felonies.12 During deliberation, the jury came to the 
court with questions specifically concerning the effect of post-
penetration withdrawal on consent. The pertinent note read, “[i]f 
a female consents to sex initially and, during the course of the sex 
act to which she consented, for whatever reason, she changes her 
mind and the man continues until climax, does the result consti-
tute rape?”13 The defense argued that the court should respond to 
the note in the negative on the theory that 
the woman consented to penetration.14 The 
prosecution argued that any slight intru-
sion into the vagina is rape.15 The judge 
was confused by the question and avoided 
making a factual determination by telling 
the jury to re-read the initial instructions.16 
The jury submitted another note which 
read, “[i]f at any time the woman says stop 
is that rape?”17 The defendant’s counsel 
requested that the court repeat the prior 
answer. The judge agreed and instructed 
the jury, “[t]his is a question that you as 
a jury must decide. I have given the legal 
definition of rape which includes the definition of consent.”18 The 
jury returned with a guilty verdict, and on February 17, 2005, 
Baby was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment with all but 
five years suspended and five years probation upon release.19
On appeal, Baby argued that the lower court erred in 
refusing his request to instruct the jury to return a verdict of “not 
guilty” if persuaded that the complaining witness consented to 
sexual intercourse but withdrew her consent after penetration. 
Baby also argued that the court erred in denying his motion to 
exclude expert testimony concerning “rape trauma syndrome.”20 
The Court of Special Appeals agreed, overturning Baby’s rape 
and sexual offense convictions and holding that the trial court 
erred in not answering the jury’s questions on consent. Based 
upon its interpretation of the English common law behind Mary-
land’s statutory definition of rape, and relying on Battle	v.	State,21 
the Court of Special Appeals ruled that “if a woman consents to 
sexual intercourse prior to penetration and withdraws the consent 
following penetration, there is no rape.”22
On certiorari, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed 
the reversal of Baby’s convictions but articulated a new standard 
of consent. The highest state court held that the language in Bat-
tle stating, “ordinarily, if [a woman] consents prior to penetra-
tion and withdraws the consent following penetration, there is 
no rape,” is properly characterized as obiter	dictum and will not 
be afforded precedential weight.23 After a lengthy discussion of 
the history of rape and its original emphasis on punishing those 
who de-flower virgins, the court turned to recent cases in other 
states on the withdrawal of consent post initial penetration. For 
[i]f a female consents to sex 
initially and, during the course 
of the sex act to which she 
consented, for whatever reason, 
she changes her mind and the 
man continues until climax, 
does the result constitute rape?
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example, in State	 v.	 Bunyard,24 under a rape statute similar to 
Maryland’s, the Kansas intermediate appellate court held that 
“a participant in sexual intercourse may withdraw consent after 
penetration has occurred. The continuation of sexual intercourse 
after consent has been withdrawn, and in the presence of force 
or fear, is rape.”25 The Maryland Court of Appeals found the rea-
soning in similar cases in Kansas, Connecticut, and Maine per-
suasive and held that the Maryland rape statute “punishes the act 
of penetration, which persists after the withdrawal of consent.”26 
The court further held that initial penetration does not complete 
the act of intercourse.27 Therefore, a woman may withdraw con-
sent for vaginal intercourse after penetration has occurred, and 
after consent has been withdrawn, the continuation of vaginal 
intercourse by force or the threat of force may constitute rape.28
The court also agreed with the Court of Special Appeals 
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the issue 
of consent and by simply sending the jury back to review previ-
ous instructions.29 The seven-judge panel was split over the sec-
tion of the opinion addressing a victim’s withdrawal of consent, 
with four judges signing on to the opinion and one concurring.
III. cOMPARISONS wITH OTHER STATES
Although the recent Baby ruling created a firestorm of 
local media coverage in the Washington, DC metropolitan area, 
seven other states ascribe to similar laws on consent in rape cases: 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, South Dakota, 
and Illinois.30 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recognized 
a woman’s right to withdraw consent to 
sexual intercourse as early as 1985. Dur-
ing that time, feminists and legal reform-
ists were attacking states’ statutory marital 
rape exemptions as well. Advocates of the 
right to withdraw consent approve of out-
comes such as that in Baby, arguing that 
holding otherwise only serves to deny 
women basic civil rights31 and perpetuates 
social myths about men, women, and sex.
Failure to recognize a person’s ability to withdraw con-
sent to sexual intercourse denies that person dignity and auton-
omy under the law. For example, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has declared, without any citation to legal authority, 
that “if the actual penetration is accomplished with a woman’s 
consent, the accused is not guilty of rape.”32 Therefore, once a 
woman consents to penetration there can be no rape during that 
act of intercourse, even if the penetration continues subsequently 
by use of force or coercion.33 A woman in North Carolina may 
have a right to say ‘no’ to sex, but she has no right to say ‘stop’. 
Courts addressing the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of 
consent have pointed out the absurd implications of holding that 
post-penetration rape is something less than rape. The Maine 
Supreme Court reasoned that
“if rape occurs only when a male’s entry of the 
female sexual organ is made as a result of com-
pulsion, [rape cases] would turn on whether 
the prosecutrix, on revoking her consent and 
struggling against the defendant’s forcible 
attempt to continue intercourse, succeeds at 
least momentarily in displacing the male sex 
organ.”34
In other words, the court’s reasoning was a very polite 
way of saying that a female victim would have to temporarily 
separate her partner’s sexual organs from her own after asking 
him to stop in order to have legal recourse. Along a different line, 
Judge O’Connell, writing for the Appellate Court of Alaska, has 
also noted that if the crime of rape depended on proof of non-
consent prior to initial penetration, there could be no rape if a 
male penetrated a sleeping victim.35
Feminist scholars claim that judicial and legislative fail-
ure to recognize a person’s right to withdraw consent to sexual 
intercourse at any time exposes adherence to social myths and 
antiquated attitudes underlying rape laws. One such myth is that 
of “The Unstoppable Male,” or the idea that “once a man engages 
in sexual activity, it is physically impossible for him to stop.”36 
The modern articulation of this reasoning is that a man should be 
allowed “reasonable time to withdraw” after hearing a woman’s 
withdrawal of consent.37 Feminist advocates concede that there 
may be a need for a reasonable time analysis and that this would 
be a proper question of fact for a jury.38 Another social myth 
reflected in the debate on withdrawal of consent is that “promis-
cuous women suffer less harm,” or that someone who has already 
put herself in a compromising position is not harmed.39 Finally, 
the most prominent myth in discussions of post-penetration rape 
is the idea that “initial consent waives autonomy.”40 This myth is 
the law in North Carolina, where once a woman initially consents 
to sexual intercourse or penetration, she has, for the purposes 
of a rape prosecution, waived the right to 
withdraw consent.
On the other side of the debate, 
critics point to the danger and uncertainty 
the issue of post-penetration withdrawal 
of consent raises for men. Specifically 
addressing the Baby	 ruling, Pennsylvania 
litigator Julia Morrow argued in a tele-
vised interview with CNN Prime News 
that “this law is literally climbing into 
bed with people and seeking to micromanage the entire sexual 
experience. This law is incredibly dangerous and will open up 
the floodgates.”41 Morrow continued to harp that women should 
take responsibility for “who they bring home” so that innocent 
men will not become victims of this new law.42 Morrow’s con-
cerns about the holding’s implications for men are well-founded. 
Particularly because the specific facts in Baby	refer to a five to 
ten second continuation of sex after protest, men may have to be 
educated to acknowledge that this translates into the need to stop 
immediately when a sexual partner does communicate a wish to 
stop in order to avoid criminal penalty.
Aside from this, Morrow’s reaction reflects a common 
willingness to ignore the real harms suffered by actual rape vic-
tims by preferring hypothetical concerns for men. Additionally, 
the law does climb into bed with people, and always has. Out of 
necessity, and in order to protect people from harm, state legis-
latures define what constitutes a punishable offense, and courts 
interpret matters that come before them. Legislatures and courts 
thereby establish legal definitions of acceptable sexual behavior 
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person may freely withdraw consent to sexual intercourse before 
penetration.43 Even in North Carolina, in situations involv-
ing multiple acts of sexual intercourse, consent for a prior act, 
whether with the defendant or a third party, does not constitute 
consent for a subsequent act of intercourse.44
In the same CNN Prime News interview, former Florida 
prosecutor Mark Eiglarsh opined that Baby should only be used 
as precedent “in the most limited of circumstances by both pros-
ecutors and law enforcement [officials].”45 In Eiglarsh’s opinion, 
“no jury in the world will convict” a man for simply not stopping 
for five seconds during consensual sex.46 Eiglarsh seems to have 
been correct, for the time being. In over a year since the final 
ruling, Baby has not been the basis for any successful prosecu-
tions of rape defendants.47 During this time, the case has been 
cited twice, but only as precedent for criminal procedure mat-
ters.48 In Hutchinson	v.	State, Baby	clearly applied as precedent: 
the complaining witness claimed forcible rape by a stranger and 
the defendant admitted to penetrating the witness “digitally” but 
claimed he stopped when she changed her mind.49 However, the 
decision failed to address the issue of post-penetration with-
drawal of consent entirely and only cited Baby for the Maryland 
standard of evaluating harmless error to a defendant on an evi-
dentiary ruling.50
Iv. IMPLIcATIONS
Understandably, the “five to ten seconds” timeframe 
upon which Baby was convicted is the key source of public out-
cry. However, the facts of the case were 
more complicated than the media would 
suggest. Baby testified that he placed him-
self between the victim’s legs while the two 
were in the backseat of the victim’s car and 
merely attempted to penetrate her with his 
penis, but failed.51 The complaining wit-
ness testified that Baby did penetrate her 
vagina with his penis.52 The victim testi-
fied that first another man forced him-
self upon her in the car. Then Baby made 
advances towards her and verbally made it clear that she could 
not leave until he was finished with her.53 The victim said that 
Baby’s attempts to penetrate her with his penis hurt her, so she 
yelled at him, told him to stop, and even attempted to push him 
off of her but Baby continued to push his penis for about five sec-
onds after the witness asked him to stop.54 Only a construction of 
the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant could negate 
a clear indication that an unwanted sexual assault occurred upon 
an unwilling victim.
Most cases involving the issue of post-penetration with-
drawal of consent consist of a similar fact pattern. The complain-
ing witness makes allegations of forcible rape and the criminally 
accused claims that there was no sexual intercourse, or if there 
was, that it was consensual and he stopped after she asked him to. 
Prosecutors almost never pursue rape charges in cases involving 
the purely hypothetical “we knew each other, we were both into it, 
now she’s claiming rape because she’s angry with me or embar-
rassed about what she did” scenario against which opponents of 
post-penetration withdrawal of consent in rape laws warn.
Most interestingly, the media did not pick up on the fact 
that the defendant walked away as a free man. In order for the 
Maryland Court of Appeals to articulate a new rule that effectu-
ates a human being’s right to exercise free will and choose to stop 
engaging in intercourse, it had to release a previously convicted 
rapist onto the streets. Indeed, “The Five Second Rule” does raise 
a host of concerns such as abuse of litigation and Constitutional 
Due Process concerns for perpetrators who have to be put on 
notice of the law. However, such concerns are beyond the scope 
of this article. As the public record indicates, future rape convic-
tions are unlikely in instances where the victim changed his or 
her mind in the throes of sex. Further, this kind of conviction 
will depend on the ability of the prosecu-
tion to show that the perpetrator continued 
with intercourse despite the victim’s clear 
verbal or behavioral cues to stop. As in 
Baby, a complaining witness may have to 
assert that the defendant caused her pain in 
order to aid in successful prosecution. The 
ability to withdraw consent can be viewed 
either as a triumph for women’s rights or 
as a potential floodgate for litigation that 
infringes upon the rights of innocent men. 
In over a year, the predicted “flood” has 
been less than a leaky faucet. The effects of the “new” Maryland 
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SEEkING PROTEcTION fROM THE LAw? 
ExPLORING cHANGING ARGuMENTS fOR u.S. DOMESTIc 





In July 2009, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (“DHS”) argued in a supplemental Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) brief that under certain circumstances, female 
domestic violence (“DV”) survivors may have a cognizable asy-
lum claim in the United States.1 The DHS brief breaks nine years 
of executive level silence on the issue,2 as the Obama administra-
tion ignites advocates’ imaginations about the future of domestic, 
gender-based asylum.
The administration’s new position is significant on two 
levels. First, domestic violence has become the miner’s canary 
issue for gender-based asylum. Gender-based claims occupy an 
ambivalent area in United States asylum law but in recent years, 
female genitalia mutilation (“FGM”), also known as female cir-
cumcision,3 has been the basis under which women bring suc-
cessful asylum claims.4 The BIA’s treatment of the DHS brief has 
the potential to clarify the gender question, marking its relevance 
and meaning in asylum law today.
Second, the BIA’s response is a potential turning point 
for women’s issues within international law. The United States, 
like many other countries, is conflicted on the gender question 
because it is still influenced by historical tensions between male-
centered norms and modern challenges to them. Domestic vio-
lence, as a quintessential women’s issue on one hand, exposes 
the human rights law evolution that is beginning to fully embrace 
violence against women as an issue, and on the other hand, 
exposes its shortcomings as an area that still fails to adequately 
protect women from gendered persecution. Thus, a successful 
effort to recognize DV claims may align emerging values with 
ancient practices to further legitimize women’s issues within 
human rights law.
This essay intends to offer context to the executive 
branch’s new position, and to evaluate proposed ideas in order 
to better establish gender-based asylum claims. Part One of this 
essay briefly provides a background for the development of inter-
national human rights law related to women’s issues. Part Two 
observes the ways in which embedded male bias within United 
States common law creates persistent barriers for domestic vio-
lence claims. Part Three evaluates the executive’s position and 
alternative proposals for reform under governing law. Finally, 
Part Four concludes by arguing that at this stage, devising com-
prehensive strategies for systemic reform is the most important 
contribution that human rights scholars can make to strengthen 
future DV and other gender-based claims.
II. fREEDOM fROM GENDERED vIOLENcE AS A  
HuMAN RIGHT
Women’s citizenship within international human rights 
law is a new phenomenon. International human rights law is 
the culmination of evolved shared values and aspirations by the 
world community that “corresponds only partially to the histori-
cal reality: the rights of women and of non-white persons, in fact, 
arose relatively late in history.”5 This area of law is humanizing 
its treatment toward women to meet a “standard of citizenship,”6 
as conditions surrounding women are increasingly recognized 
as inhumane. More recently, feminism and human rights have 
formed a rich dialectical relationship. This relationship relies on 
each field’s strengths to fill in theoretical gaps to develop more 
inclusive and relief-driven principles.7 The result is tangible 
improvements in legal citizenship for some poor women, women 
of color, and women living in the global south.
Refugee law must be viewed within this broader interna-
tional human rights history and legal framework. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the basis of international human 
rights, is often criticized for excluding social and economic 
rights, such as the right to work, right to control one’s posses-
sions, and the right to be free from violence. Women are dispro-
portionately impacted by these fatal exclusions,8 but a multitude 
of conventions and agreements now expressly recognize women’s 
legal citizenship. The most notable international commitment is 
the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (“CEDAW”).9
CEDAW is generally hailed as a pivotal international law 
effort to enfranchise women. One Latina feminist scholar claims 
that CEDAW “takes a holistic approach towards women from all 
walks of life attaining full personhood by recognizing the impor-
tance not only of civil and political rights but also of social, eco-
nomic, cultural and solidarity rights.”10 She further argues that 
“[t]his treaty, along with other gender specific documents and 
perspectives recently embraced by the global community as well 
as the recognition of the need for gender perspectives in general 
documents (such as the International Criminal Court statute), are 
(can be) the foundation for making women’s equality an acces-
sible reality.”11 Other feminist scholars, however, criticize what 
they view as CEDAW’s practical futility with the consideration 
that “rights only exist to the extent states recognize and enforce 
them.”12 The area of asylum law uniquely feels the absence of 
accountability mechanisms to enforce CEDAW.
United States asylum law is based on the Immigration 
and Nationality Act revision after adoption of the 1951 United 
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Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refu-
gees Convention”) and the corresponding 1967 United Nations 
protocol.13 Gender is not an enumerated asylum ground under 
the Refugees Convention, which includes race, religion, nation-
ality, political opinion or a “particular social group.”14 In 1991, 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (“UNHCR”) attempted to address this omission by issuing 
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women that explained 
“women refugees who are persecuted on account of their oppo-
sition to social traditions need protection and therefore should 
qualify as members of a [particular social group].”15 Several 
countries, including the United States, issued their own guide-
lines to further clarify the role of gender in refugee cases.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 
issued Considerations	 for	Asylum	Officers	Adjudicating	Asylum	
Claims	 from	 Women	 (“INS Guidelines”) in 1995.16 Domestic 
advocates heralded the INS Guidelines as a “significant step for-
ward for women in asylum law[.]”17 In terms of DV claims, the 
INS Guidelines are helpful because they affirm that “private” 
persecution in which the government is unwilling or unable to 
intervene is a cognizable asylum claim.18 At the same time, how-
ever, the INS Guidelines failed to establish domestic violence 
itself as a form of persecution and instead regarded it merely as 
evidence of past	persecution.19 Most importantly, the INS Guide-
lines do not assume the force of law. 20 This essential issue will 
be discussed more in the final section.
Efforts by international law-making bodies to establish 
violence against women as a cognizable asylum claim within 
its member-states clearly fall short. The United States (“U.S.”) 
rarely grants asylum for gender-based violence against women, 
even though 80% of the world’s 27 million 
refugees are women and children.21 The 
legal authority around domestic violence is 
clear, yet “its operation still depends on the 
political will of those who interpret it.”22 
Simply put, U.S. immigration courts and 
executive officers lack the political will to 
enforce the law.
III. READING bETwEEN THE LINES: cRITIcAL GENDER 
PERSPEcTIvE IN ASYLuM cOMMON LAw AND 
PREcEDENT cASES
Feminist legal scholars have long-argued that DV survi-
vors deserve asylum protection as a “particular social group”23 
(“PSG”). These analyses generate explanatory force behind argu-
ments that violence against women is tolerated within asylum 
law throughout the world.24 Interestingly, however, even though 
gendered violence remains a rare basis on which to grant asylum, 
two new trends have emerged. First, DV claims tied to religious 
or political persecution are increasingly successful. Second, 
“uncivilized” violence against women, specifically FGM, is gain-
ing favor within courts as a basis for asylum. I argue that these 
two patterns do not reflect significant improvement in attitudes 
toward female survivors; rather, these patterns reveal systemic 
male bias within the asylum legal framework in its common law 
and interpretative rationale.
Scholars address male bias within asylum law in both 
a general and a specific context. Generally, scholarship on DV 
asylum describes its legal framework as heavily reliant on male-
centered experiences.25 Specifically, many of these critiques 
appropriately point out that certain persecution-defined harms, 
such as domestic violence, are often regarded as “private” issues 
that are unworthy of foreign intervention.26 Beyond this specific 
observation, male bias also appears within the common law tests 
for defining persecution. These tests premise “rational” presump-
tions about violence on a limited set of realities faced by a minor-
ity of applicants. For this reason DV is an exceedingly difficult 
claim to prove within the governing law.
It is worth noting that gender violence is not synony-
mous with violence against women. Historically, among feminist 
writers, domestic violence had been conceptualized as spousal 
or heterosexual partner violence.27 Contemporary feminist writ-
ers and advocates prefer the term, “intimate-partner violence,” 
to capture abuse within non-legally recognized relationships 
(such as relationships between non-married people or between 
lesbian, gay, or transgender-identified individuals).28 Others pre-
fer “gender-based violence” to broaden this perspective even 
more because gender non-conformity (sometimes perceived as 
homosexuality) and other gender-related human rights abuses 
occur outside the law’s current scope.29 This discussion is framed 
within the context of domestic violence for analytical purposes.30 
Generally speaking, relationship violence, regardless of form, 
remains on the outskirts of the law because male-centered per-
spectives continue to dominate asylum law.31
It is also important to understand DV as a social, politi-
cal, and moral pandemic. The international statistics are stagger-
ing. One-quarter to one-half of all women are abused by intimate 
partners, and 40 to 70% of all female murder victims are killed 
by intimate partners.32 Sadly, U.S. statis-
tics reflect similar trends. A 1995-1996 
survey found that nearly 25% of women, 
and 7.6% of men, were raped or physi-
cally assaulted by an intimate partner in 
their lifetime.33 Intimate partner violence 
constituted 20% of all non-fatal violence 
against women in 2001, and 3% of all non-
fatal violence toward men.34 Almost half 
of all 3.5 million crimes committed against 
family members were spousal abuse between 1998 and 2002.35 
DV exhibits a pattern of violence and oppression that is inherent 
in any reasonable notion of persecution. The international com-
munity’s impression of persecution in the 1950’s, however, does 
not reflect our modern realities, and those seeking to expand the 
definition of DV have faced a decades-long legal challenge that 
has proven more difficult than ever imagined.
Domestic violence does not fit neatly into the current 
refugee legal regime. In order to be eligible for a discretionary 
grant of relief, a petitioner must show a well-founded fear of per-
secution based on a protected status and must meet three criteria: 
1) the pervasiveness of the act in the individual’s home country; 
2) a lack of existing refuge within the individual’s home country; 
and 3) the government’s unwillingness or inability to intervene. 
Two requirements specifically pose challenges for domestic vio-
lence claims: proving persecution (clear probability that one’s 
life or freedom is threatened)36 and demonstrating that such 
persecution is attributed to a statutorily protected status, such as 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or a PSG.37 Many 
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their membership in a PSG or based on their political opinion 
against women and girl violence. 38
Ironically, without gender as an enumerated ground, 
PSG DV claims are not viable at all because “defining what con-
stitutes such a group for purposes of the INA remains elusive 
and inconsistent.” 39 The PSG category is sometimes referred to 
as a Refugee Convention drafting “after-
thought,”40 only added on a whim by a 
single delegation wishing to have a miscel-
lany category. One scholar described the 
Refugee Convention’s provisions, which 
he believes mirrors post-World War II era 
politics, as “frozen in time.”41 U.S. immi-
gration judges and the United Nations have 
construed this category to mean selective 
persecution, 42 meaning that a PSG cannot 
be significantly defined by its past or future 
persecution. For instance, the Sixth Circuit 
Court found that young, attractive Albanian 
women who fear being forced into prosti-
tution are not a PSG because they constitute a self-defined or 
“impermissibly circular” (IC) group.43 DV claims are arguably 
most vulnerable on this point because “domestic violence survi-
vors” are interpreted as an “impermissibly circular” social group 
that is defined by its membership. The IC application discussed 
in the next section will address how the three PSG tests pose dis-
tinct barriers for DV claims.
MALE bIAS EMbEDDED wITHIN LEGAL TESTS
There are three PSG tests: immutability, visibility, and 
particularity. Each test contains subtle, insidious male-bias in 
its common law construction that leads to an unnecessarily nar-
row interpretation. The outcome is that legitimate DV claims are 
rejected almost per se because PSG tests are construed narrowly 
and heighten the burden of proof for petitioners.
The first test is the Acosta standard, which establishes 
that a social group must share a common, immutable “ charac-
teristic that either is beyond the power of the individual members 
of the group to change or is so fundamental to their identities 
or consciences that it ought not be required to be changed.”44 
Some courts have slightly expanded this definition to include 
an innate characteristic or shared past experience.45 The Acosta 
standard is favorable to DV claims. For example, a female DV 
survivor who suffers persecution at the hands of a male lover 
who hurts her because of his belief that women are subordinate 
to men, and because he has the physical ability to do so, may eas-
ily meet the Acosta standard on account of her identity as female 
or her history of abuse.46 Overall, the flexibility around the 
Acosta standard accommodates DV claims. It is the other two 
requirements—visibility and particularity—that are the most dif-
ficult to meet.
Social visibility is the second PSG test. This test is par-
ticularly context-dependent47 since petitioners must provide evi-
dence that they are at greater risk due to their membership in an 
identifiable PSG.48 This test clearly excludes less visible forms 
of persecution like DV or rape. Other scholars have examined 
the exclusion of privatized violence in detail, and this will be 
addressed briefly later in the essay. More significant, however, 
is that this test presents a pernicious epistemological dilemma 
when considered with the non-PSG standards. As noted before, 
there are three criteria for the persecution threshold, including a 
“pervasive” standard and “inability to escape” standard. DV sur-
vivors who may experience “private” violence that is nonetheless 
pervasive, normalized, or honored, face a disadvantage to prove 
that their persecution is visible when it is 
systemically ignored, rationalized, or ritual-
ized. Thus, the “substantial evidence” bar49 
is heightened for DV survivors who must 
show that DV has a high	 occurrence	 rate	
and	is	visible in their home country. Such a 
proposition is counter-intuitive because any 
“rational” state government would address 
widely known harms against its citizens, 
but this presumption is inaccurate when 
applied to DV and other gendered violence. 
The internal tensions built into the visibil-
ity test and other standards starkly contrast 
with the realities of violence faced by a 
large number of women. Further, this dilemma demonstrates a 
narrow common law construction that favors male-experienced 
persecution.
The final PSG test is “particularity” which requires a 
social group to be discerned “in a manner sufficiently distinct 
that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as 
a discrete class of persons.”50 The “particularity” test is intended 
to create a benchmark for objectively determining group mem-
bership.51 Yet its interpretation, like the visibility test, reveals 
implicit male bias. An opinion from the Third Circuit, Fatin	v.	
Immigration	&	Naturalization	Service,52 characterizes this bias, 
stating:
“Limited in this way, the ‘particular social 
group’ identified by the petitioner may well sat-
isfy the BIA’s definition of that concept, for if a 
woman’s opposition to the Iranian laws in ques-
tion is so profound that she would choose to 
suffer the severe consequences of noncompli-
ance, her beliefs may well be characterized as 
‘so fundamental to [her] identity or conscience 
that [they] ought not be required to be changed’ 
(internal citation omitted). The petitioner’s 
difficulty, however, is that the administrative 
record does not establish that she is a member 
of this tightly defined group, for there is no evi-
dence in that record showing that her opposi-
tion to the Iranian laws at issue is of the depth 
and importance required.”53
The Circuit Court rejected Fatin’s petition despite ample 
evidence that she was doubly at risk as a female member of a 
politically targeted family in Iran.54 Moreover, the Court relied 
on an admittedly sparse record to conclude that a reasonable 
fact-finder could not find that the petitioner would face a threat 
amounting to persecution “simply” because she is a woman.55 
The opinion ignored her family’s political status when relevant, 
and her status as a politically-vulnerable woman when important 
to determine that she was at risk for neither reason. This case 










reinforce male bias by privileging male-experienced persecution 
over other types of meritorious persecution.
The three “particular social group” tests create numerous 
barriers for proving persecution outside traditional male norms. 
Perhaps worse than rejecting legitimate 
DV claims vis-à-vis PSG tests, the courts 
have adopted the facially-neutral rule of 
“impermissibly circular,” which adversely 
impacts gender-based claims. Worse still, 
courts inconsistently apply the rule based 
on culturally-loaded, paternalistic beliefs 
about “deserving exceptions.”
THE “IMPERMISSIbLY cIRcuLAR” ARGuMENT AND ITS 
OPPORTuNISTIc RATIONALITY
The “impermissibly circular” (“IC”) rule derives from 
the rationale that a PSG must exist independently of the perse-
cution suffered by the applicant for asylum.56 In other words, a 
PSG must exist before the alleged persecution to avoid defining a 
group within its own “contours.”57 Past persecution, under some 
circumstances, may demonstrate a well-founded fear of future 
persecution; it cannot, however, constitute the substantive claim 
for protection.58 In some cases, previously discussed PSG tests 
are interwoven together to form an IC analysis. For instance, 
at-risk youth within a certain country are unlikely to meet the 
persecution threshold because their membership is based on a 
self-defining, mutable characteristic—age.59 IC, therefore, refers 
to the ways by which a PSG is narrowed in the common law to 
necessarily exclude claims.60 Otherwise, supporters fear that the 
law would “sanction an illogical, circular ‘nexus’ construct, i.e., 
individuals are targeted for persecution because they belong to 
a group of individuals who are targeted for persecution.”61 This 
fear seems to contradict the fundamental purposes for asylum to 
provide refuge to individuals who are persecuted for particularly 
inequitable reasons.
Many gender-based claims, especially DV claims, are 
dismissed for being “impermissibly circular.”62 U.S. courts con-
sistently apply the IC rule, despite international consensus urg-
ing judges to include women as a PSG when appropriate.63 Not 
only is it peculiar that federal courts apply a non-discrimination 
human rights treaty to exclude legitimate claims by women,64 but 
it is even more unsettling when the U.S. is one of the four coun-
tries (out of 41) with a domestic policy that recognizes “women” 
as a PSG.65 If arguably U.S. courts have become more gender-
sensitive in response to the 1995 INS Guidelines, courts still 
embrace IC derivatives to deny DV claims, and to say that bat-
tered women are too large of a social group 
for the purposes of statutory construction.66 
Recent cases continue to show a reluctance 
to recognize freedom from gendered vio-
lence as a civil or political human right.
While there are indications that 
gender-based claims are receiving more 
serious treatment, adjudicators continue 
to perpetuate male bias and, in certain 
instances, substitute cultural bias for gen-
der bias. It appears that the classic “worthy refugee” dilemma is 
only further strained with gender, race, and cultural complexities. 
Judges choose to find sympathetic exceptions among cases rather 
than choosing to embrace gender-based persecution into the law. 
This approach inevitably undermines future domestic violence 
claims. There are three primary areas of analysis ripe for incon-
sistent, biased discretion, which are appro-
priate to call “opportunistic rationality”: 
private/public persecution, state/non-gov-
ernmental actors, and violent experiences. 
Opportunistic rationality reinforces that 
“reason” goes as far as the logician in gen-
der-based asylum cases.
The first area of analysis is the 
distinction between “private” and “public” 
persecution. Domestic violence is essen-
tially a misnomer as violence against partners takes place in both 
private and public view. Its description relates more to an anti-
quated conception of the relationship between perpetrator and 
survivor. Nevertheless, “[t]raditional human rights law (and vir-
tually all other discourses except feminism) has separated out 
acts that occur in the public sector from those that transpire in 
the private sphere.”67 As a result, courts have rejected otherwise 
legitimate asylum claims on the basis that there is no justifica-
tion for state intervention. Over time, “private act” justifications 
have become less accepted, but remarkably it continues to have 
a menacing presence in U.S. asylum domestic violence claims, 
exemplified by a feminist BIA favorite: The	Matter	of	R-A-.
The	 Matter	 of	 R-A-68 is an archetypal example of the 
enduring belief that domestic violence is essentially a private 
matter. In this case, Rodi Alvardo, a native Guatemalan, sought 
refugee status after suffering years of violent physical, sexual, 
and emotional abuse from her husband, which included: her dis-
located jaw for a late period, spinal injuries from a kicking attack 
after refusing an abortion and near physical disability when a 
thrown machete barely missed her fingers.69 Alvardo demon-
strated that domestic violence in Guatemala remains prevalent70 
and that few if any legal organizations could have helped her.71 
She was successful in the lower immigration court in arguing that 
her political opinion, opposing male domination, culminated in 
her well-founded fear of persecution, with which the BIA par-
tially agreed.72 The BIA ruled that the case turned on whether 
Alvardo’s husband had knowledge of her views and abused her 
but	for her views.73 In its determination, the BIA refused to apply 
the imputed political doctrine,74 a device that allows the court 
to affirmatively impute a political opinion through evidentiary 
inferences, such as acts of resistance.75 The imputed political 
doctrine is recommended by the INS Guidelines for cases such 
as this one. Instead, almost in defiance, the BIA dismissed INS 
Guidelines as “not controlling on us”76 and found that “it is diffi-
cult to conclude on the actual record before 
us that there is any ‘opinion’ the respondent 
could have held, or convinced her husband 
she held, that would have prevented the 
abuse she experienced.”77
The BIA’s opinion in The	 Mat-
ter	of	R-A- rendered the petitioner’s belief 
that she deserves to live free from domes-
tic violence as an apolitical viewpoint. In 
other words, although governing law does 
not require political opinions to be articulated in a certain way 
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worthy of intervention because it was not an effective	opinion. 
The de-politicization of Alvardo’s views reinforces the belief that 
domestic violence is not a public matter—it is simply another 
unfortunate private situation over which the state has no power.
The second area of analysis relates to non-state per-
secutors. DV claims reveal the historic reluctance of judges to 
view non-governmental actors as potential 
persecutors in the “safe haven” standard 
(among the three persecution criteria). 
Opponents to broadening the standard 
maintain a misguided belief that “constru-
ing private acts of violence to be qualify-
ing governmental persecution, by virtue 
of inadequacy of protection, would obvi-
ate, perhaps entirely, the ‘on account of ’ 
requirement of the statute.”79 This is a slip-
pery-slope argument that posits that updat-
ing the standard to reflect present-day 
realities will somehow validate any asylum claim. On the con-
trary, broadening the standard does not wash away state sover-
eignty; instead, it more accurately captures the complex violence 
patterns that we see today. There is a real distinction between 
inadequate state protection and unwillingness from the state to 
protect a class. Fortunately, the current U.S. jurisprudential trend 
is to acknowledge negative governmental action as rising to the 
standard. It remains to be seen whether this trend will widely 
apply to gender-based cases, in which petitioners usually do not 
have any practical protection at home. Equally worrisome, the 
modern “safe haven” standard is subject to high levels of discre-
tion without codification. One example is Canada, which treats 
its gender guidelines more seriously, arguing that pain and suf-
fering may result from willful government acquiescence.80 The 
future of the modern “safe haven” standard will appreciably 
depend on the outcomes of current DV cases.
The final “opportunistic ratio-
nality” area of analysis is seen in violent 
experiences for which courts have cre-
ated exceptions. Over the last decade, only 
one area of gender-based asylum claims 
has seen almost universal success: FGM 
cases.81 These cases typify the “worthy ref-
ugee” dilemma where adjudicators choose 
to recognize the brutality of gender-related 
violence in one context while choosing to 
rationalize it in another. Half of the federal 
circuit courts and the BIA have found FGM 
as an act of persecution rising to the level of 
asylum protection during the last several years. Successful FGM 
cases will expose domestic violence claims to increased biased 
scrutiny at best.
FGM is not qualitatively distinct from DV but cultural 
bigotry and racism color the issues differently in some judges’ 
eyes. Courts’ treatment of domestic violence in relation to FGM 
exposes Western feminists’ failure to incorporate strong racial and 
cultural analysis into its advocacy surrounding the issue. Promi-
nent issue scholar Pamela Goldberg’s three-case comparison in 
the Second Circuit found race to be a key distinction among the 
gender-based asylum claims that she studied.82 Notably, in one 
case she describes that a black petitioner’s “exotic ‘otherness’” 
did not reflect negatively against her as much as it supported her 
claim against her black persecutors.83 The problem with charac-
terizing FGM cases as exceptionally violent is that it obscures 
urgency around violent experiences, such as domestic violence, 
that are more familiar to U.S. judges. “Uncivilized” violence 
against women and girls “over there” does not force courts to 
confront gender-based violence as a widespread, complex phe-
nomenon. In actuality, it exacerbates cul-
tural and racial stereotypes in a way that 
isolates and distances them from the issue. 
Inconsistent application of the law creates 
the potential for a racialized, tiered system 
by which violence is evaluated in the asy-
lum law in a way that ultimately does not 
serve human rights law.
Opportunistic rationality is 
defined by false notions about the nature 
of violence, and it is reinforced by legal 
rationalizations about distinctions among 
these false notions. In addition to the PSG test interpretations, 
male bias plays a more subtle role in decision-making through 
arbitrary application that is ironically justified by North Ameri-
can feminist paradigms.
Iv. NEw fORMuLATIONS, NEw PROSPEcTS?
The DHS supplemental brief submitted to the BIA 
on behalf of a domestic violence asylum-seeker seems to be a 
positive outcome for gender-based asylum cases. The brief pres-
ents “alternative particular social group formulations” to the 
respondent’s claim: “Mexican women in an abusive domestic 
relationship who are unable to leave.”84 DHS concedes that the 
respondent’s argument fails under governing legal principles 
because the “central common characteristic” is circular.85 In 
addition to the alternative formulations, the 
brief proposes that if either of its formu-
lations meets the criteria for a cognizable 
claim, then remand is an appropriate mech-
anism to consider where “significant legal 
developments intervene.”86 The last caveat 
outlined by the brief is that some, but not 
all, domestic violence survivors are eligible 
for asylum. However, like any other asylum 
claim, every applicable requirement must 
be satisfied for asylum to be granted.87
There are discernable signs of 
broader advocacy in the brief. In its gen-
eral requirement discussion, the brief stated that the applicant 
may satisfy the safe haven standard by showing that government 
acquiescence is contributing to the respondent’s persecution.88 
This position reinforces the authority of the INS Guidelines 
despite higher courts’ attempts to dismiss their importance. 
Moreover, before laying out the formulations, the brief opined 
“especially given the uneven development of the standards gov-
erning cases like this one, it is important to articulate how a social 
group in such cases might be defined.”89 Both of these statements 
are restrained, yet are striking examples that likely foreshadow 
















DHS articulates its formulations as “Mexican women 
in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican 
women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions 
within a domestic relationship.”90 DHS argues that a PSG claim 
is “best defined in light of the evidence about how the respon-
dent’s abuser and her society perceive her role within the domes-
tic relationship.”91 The brief goes on to detail the evidence on 
record that supports the formulation, including her testimony that 
her husband “used to tell her that he could do anything he wanted 
to her because she belonged to him,” and it suggests that further 
fact-finding may substantiate that “social expectations in Mexico 
do little to disabuse [him] of his views in this regard.”92 These 
formulations, DHS argues, satisfy the immutability, visibility, 
and particularity requirements, in which “complex and subtle” 
fact-finding may be required, and existing statutory definitions 
may be evoked, to reasonably interpret the claims.93
Interestingly, the DHS formulations are identical to 
some feminist scholars’ proposals over the last decade to trans-
form DV into a cognizable asylum. The primary, though not 
exclusive, project by feminists during this time has been to find 
ways to narrow domestic violence claims so that they better fit 
into the three PSG factor tests. Feminists’ proposals can be gen-
erally categorized into three groups: 1) traditional approach: re-
formulating arguments to fit within existing legal interpretations; 
2) feminist approach: arguing that existing interpretations are 
inaccurate or biased against legitimate claims, thus urging new 
rule construction and 3) reform approach: advocating for inter-
national and domestic statutory revisions to more clearly include 
“gender” into refugee law. DHS adopted a traditional approach 
that attempts to narrow the “domestic violence survivor” class 
by combining several elements: geography, political opinion, and 
case-specific facts.
The DHS formulations will test scholars’ proposals that 
were argued to meet judicial scrutiny when initially proposed—
all other factors remaining consistent. One proposal, written by 
Patricia Seith in 1997, argues that domestic violence is analo-
gous to FGM because both practices attempt to “control [ ] 
women’s sexuality,”94 and that “[w]omen living in a particular 
country who are subject to domestic violence, are unable to get 
government protection, and oppose the practice” meet the BIA 
requirements under the seminal decision in Kasigna.95 Another 
prominent scholar on domestic violence 
asylum, Laura Adams, made an argument 
for a doctrinal re-orientation that takes 
two views related to government acqui-
escence. One view is similar to the DHS 
formulation suggesting that a DV claim 
itself may implicate a foreign govern-
ment’s failure to protect its citizen from 
persecution.96 Adams takes the position that shifting the focus 
from the individual batterer to the state’s relationship to the harm 
is the necessary ingredient for a successful DV claim.97 It will be 
interesting to see whether the BIA embraces any of these aspects, 
as both scholars introduced these ideas at least five years ago.
The fundamental belief that guides the traditional 
approach is that the current legal PSG construction is based on 
an honest, intellectual disagreement about proper interpretation. 
The consistent denial of DV claims is not a legal issue—it is a 
political one. Many immigration judges may have a good faith 
belief that DV survivors simply do not meet the existing statu-
tory requirements. However, it is clear that there are systemic 
impediments that influence the confines within which judges are 
able to interpret important legal considerations like statutory 
intent, case-specific facts, and policy issues. There is not much 
optimism for the successful outcome of the DV survivor in this 
particular case, considering the case law trend against DV claims 
and the absence of any significant changes to PSG construction, 
but there is optimism that the DHS brief will create opportunities 
for institutional change on a case-advocacy level.
Ultimately, institutional change is the best assurance 
that DV claims will be fairly adjudicated. There are a variety of 
ways to affect institutional change, even through notoriously con-
servative institutions, such as immigration courts. Attorneys who 
challenge prevailing norms and assumptions in asylum advocacy 
play an important role. Theorists, especially feminist scholars, 
have fulfilled a vital need by forming the basis by which some 
advocates have advanced alternative frames. Policy advocates 
(many of whom fall into the latter categories as well) also target 
the underpinnings that limit future progress for DV claims. Each 
approach, in its persistence and originality, promises that gender-
based asylum claims, in time, will be treated more seriously by 
courts.
v. cONcLuSION
I suggest that scholars concerned about gender-based 
asylum may want to shift their focus from re-thinking legitimate 
arguments about why gendered violence is deserving of asylum 
protection, to discussing systemic changes that can more directly 
affect decision-making. I believe in particular that strengthening 
the INS Guidelines can prove to be enormously beneficial. At 
least one persuasive feminist scholar credits the INS Guidelines 
with successful rape and FGM claims, in which the guidance 
established “a valuable legal framework for asylum claims based 
on domestic violence.”98
Since this assessment was over a decade ago, there are 
questions yet to be re-visited about the INS Guidelines. Should 
they be codified or at least be required reading for judges? If 
they remain nonbinding, is there addi-
tional authority that can make them even 
more persuasive? Based on its success, 
can gender-based violence be considered 
an independent basis (within PSG) upon 
which future persecution will be deter-
mined? With vast opportunity in a human 
rights era, thinkers can move away from 
defending its values to implementing its force.
The political climate toward human rights is ideal for 
engineering fine-tuned legal and policy reform strategies. It is a 
matter of catching up U.S. asylum law with its international com-
mitments which is by no means easy, but it is possible given the 
strong framework outlined by scholars and advocates alike. DV 
survivors deserve asylum protection, as do other gender-based 
violence survivors. Human rights advocates’ chief test is to make 
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In one respect, the 2008 election of Barack Obama as 
the first black President of the United States may turn out to be 
bad for blacks, and for other racial minorities as well. Some have 
sug gested that the Obama election indicates that we now live 
in a post racial society, where discrimination based on race has 
ceased to be a serious problem.1 Others have strenuously con-
tested that claim, arguing that significant racial discrimination 
still exists in the United States notwithstanding the election of 
Presi dent Obama.2 But one thing does seem reasonably clear. The 
Obama presidency has served to embolden those who wish to 
deny claims of current racial injus tice.
Claims of racial injustice can now be challenged sim-
ply by ar guing that the culture obviously makes it possible for 
minorities to compete with whites on a level playing field. Under 
this reasoning, racial disparities that continue to inhere in the 
allocation of societal bene fits and burdens must be caused by 
the attributes of individual mi nority group members themselves, 
rather than by any invidious consideration of their race. Although 
the argument is by no means a new one, the election of President 
Obama now gives that argu ment more apparent plausibility than 
it has had in the past. Indeed, if one were inclined to preserve the 
nation’s tra dition of privileging white interests over the inter ests 
of racial mi norities, it would be strategi cally sensible to frame 
one’s discrimi natory impulses in precisely this manner. That way, 
the nation’s evolution to its sup posed new postracial maturation 
could ironically be utilized as an ingenious device for continued 
racial oppression.
The es sence of this postracial form of dis crimination 
would entail the transfor mation of a conventional dis crimination 
claim asserted by ra cial minorities into a claim of re verse dis-
crimination asserted by whites. That transformation could be 
achieved by stressing the ab sence of any le gally cognizable basis 
for providing remedial re sources to the original mi nority claim-
ants, in order to free up those resource for allocation to worthier 
whites. The tech nique would entail more than just the time-hon-
ored practice of evading a dis crimi nation claim by blam ing the 
victims. It would also re cast the minority vic tims as shameless 
perpe trators of discrimination, with all of the negative connota-
tions that an indictment of unlawful dis crimina tion conveys.
It turns out that this postra cial discrimination strategy is 
far from merely hypotheti cal. Its proponents include a majority 
of the cur rent Jus tices on the United States Supreme Court. The 
Roberts Court, despite its relative youth, has already issued a 
num ber of de cisions that employ the technique of postracial dis-
crimina tion to elevate the interests of whites over the interests of 
racial minori ties. The most revealing is its 2009 deci sion in Ricci	
v.	DeStefano,3 where a divided Court required the City of New 
Ha ven to utilize the results of a firefighter promotion exam that 
be nefitted whites, even though the exam had a ra cially-dispa rate 
impact that ad versely affected Latinos and blacks. The major-
ity opinion depicted historically advantaged white firefighters as 
the victims of unlaw ful discrimination, while depicting histori-
cally disadvantaged mi nority firefighters as the politically pow-
erful perpetrators of in vidious discrimination.4 The governing 
legal doctrines hardly com pelled the Court’s result, or the Court’s 
inversion of the customary categories of perpetrator and victim. 
In fact, both the statutory meaning of Title VII and the Court’s 
own precedents had to be modified so severely that the decision 
amounts to an ex ercise in conservative judicial activism.
In Title VII, Congress outlawed racially disparate 
employment prac tices unless they could be justified by a showing 
of job-relat edness, and by the absence of any less discriminatory, 
job-related alterna tive. In so doing, Congress struck a political 
bal ance be tween its pragmatic interest in protecting settled white 
employment expecta tions and its aspirational interest in dissipat-
ing the en trenched ad vantages that whites continue to have over 
racial mi norities in the em ployment market. Although this was 
a quintes sentially legisla tive judg ment—made by a politically 
accountable Congress, oper ating un der a constitutional form of 
government that assigns dem o cratic policymaking functions to 
its representative branches—the Su preme Court apparently dis-
agrees with the legis lative balance that Congress struck.
The Ricci Court not only mar ginalized the effective-
ness of statutory disparate-impact claims, but it also threatened 
to declare such claims unconstitutional. And the Ricci decision 
does not exist in isolation. When Ricci is considered in conjunc-
tion with other Roberts Court decisions concerning vot ing rights, 
racial pro filing, English language education, and school resegre-
gation, the Roberts Court’s race cases seem to fit neatly into the 
pattern of Supreme Court hostility to racial minority interests 
that is becoming the hall mark of postra cial discrimination.
Part I of this Article discusses the Roberts Court’s recent 
Ricci decision, highlighting the Supreme Court voting blocs 
that have developed with respect to the issue of race. Part I.A 
describes the majority and concurring opinions of the conserva-
tive bloc Justices. Part I.B describes the dissenting opinion of the 
liberal bloc Jus tices. Part II describes the doctrinal difficulties 
that are entailed in try ing to defend the Court’s resolution of the 
case. Part II.A ex plains why the decision does not fit comfort-
ably within the dictates of preexisting title VII doctrine. Part II.B 
explains why the deci sion does not fit comfortably within the 
law governing summary judgment. Part III argues that the Ricci 
decision constitutes an ex ercise in postracial discrimina tion. 
Part III.A describes how the Court inverts the categories of per-
petrator and victim in a way that ultimately allows it to invert the 
categories of discrimination and equality. Part III.B argues that 
the Ricci postracial discrimina tion technique is simply the most 
recent in a long line of judicial strate gies that the Supreme Court 
has historically used to justify the op pression of racial minori ties. 
The article concludes that the poten tial effectiveness of genu-
ine antidiscrimination remedies, such as the Title VII reme dies 
that the Court dilutes	Ricci, may be pre cisely what attracts the 
Supreme Court to its prac tice of postracial discrimination.
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THE Ricci DEcISION
In Ricci	 v	 DeStefano,5 the Supreme Court held 5–4 
that the City of New Haven was required by the employment 
discrimina tion prohibitions contained in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to utilize the results of a written firefighter 
promotion exam that the City administered, even though the City 
chose to reject those results because of the racially disparate 
impact that the exam produced. Whites gen erally performed bet-
ter than blacks and Latinos on the exam, and the City feared that 
use of the exam would subject the City to poten tial lia bility for 
violating the dispa	rate-impact prohi bition of Title VII. However, 
seventeen white firefight ers and one Latino fire fighter—firefight-
ers who would have been eligible for immediate promotions if 
the exam results had been certi fied—threat ened to sue the City. 
They claimed that a deci sion to dis regard the exam results would 
be ra cially motivated in a way that would violate the disparate-
treatment prohibition of Title VII. The City, there fore, believed 
that it was on the horns of a di lemma. Whatever ac tion it took, it 
would be sub ject to a Title VII suit filed by unhappy firefight ers. 
The City chose not to certify the exam results, and the disap-
pointed white and Latino firefighters sued. The United States 
Dis trict Court for the District of Connecti cut entered sum mary 
judg ment for the City, and a panel of the Second Cir cuit—whose 
mem bers in cluded then-Judge Sonia So tomayor—summarily 
affirmed in a one-pa ragraph per curiam opi nion. The full Second 
Circuit denied re hearing en banc, by a vote of 7–6. The Supreme 
Court then reversed the lower courts, finding that the City’s 
actions vi olated the disparate-treat ment provision of Title VII. 
Although the disappointed firefighters also claimed that the City 
violated their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Pro tection rights, 
the Supreme Court saw no need to reach the consti tutional issue 
in light of its statutory disposition of the case.6
The majority opinion detected an internal ten sion 
between the disparate-impact and disparate-treatment pro vi sions 
of Title VII. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justices Scalia, Tho mas, and Alito, resolved that tension by giv-
ing primacy to the disparate-treatment provision, unless there 
was a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding that disparate-
treatment was necessary to avoid a disparate-impact violation.7 
Justice Scalia wrote a concur ring opinion, suggesting that the 
disparate-impact provision of Title VII was itself invalid, because 
it compelled the consid era tion of race in a way that violated 
the Equal Protection principle of the Constitution.8 Justice 
Alito wrote a concurring opi nion, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, arguing that the City’s stated desire to avoid a Title 
VII disparate-impact violation was a mere pretext for the City’s 
actual desire “to placate a politically important racial constitu-
ency.”9 Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent ing opinion, joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, arguing that Title VII per-
mitted disparate treatment as long as there was “good cause” to 
believe that such treatment was necessary to avoid a dis parate-
impact violation, and stating that there was good cause in Ricci 
because less discriminatory job-related alternatives were availa-
ble.10 It is noteworthy that the Justices in Ricci voted in ways that 
are so highly correlated with their votes in other race cases that 
the Su preme Court can fairly be said to consist of conservative 
and lib eral voting blocs on the issue of race.
a. ThE conSERvaTivE Bloc
The five Justices who joined Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opi n ion in Ricci vote so consistently against the minority inter-
ests pre sented in race cases that they have come to constitute a 
conserva tive Supreme Court voting bloc on the issue of race.11 
The mem bers of that vot ing bloc are Chief Justice Roberts, and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. None of those 
five Justices has ever voted in favor of the racial minority claim 
at issue in a constitutional affir mative action case, a majority-
minority redi stricting case, or a ra cial integration case while sit-
ting on the Su preme Court.12
1. Justice Kennedy’s MaJority opinion
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci, joined 
by the other mem bers of the conservative bloc, held that New 
Ha ven’s decision not to certify the results of its firefighter promo-
tion exam in order to avoid a potential Title VII disparate-impact 
vi olation had the ef fect of itself constituting a Title VII disparate-
treatment viola tion.13 The opinion began with a detailed recita-
tion of the facts as Justice Kennedy viewed them, because the 
major ity’s understanding of what it held to be undis puted facts 
was im portant to the majority’s holding that the case could be 
re solved on summary judg ment.14
According to Justice Kennedy, the New Haven City 
Charter required the City to fill vacancies in its classified civil 
service jobs through a merit-based system including the use of 
written ex aminations. The City hired an Illinois company to serve 
as an out side consultant, whom it asked to de sign job-related 
exams that could be used as part of the process of identifying the 
most quali fied applicants for promotion to lieute nant and captain. 
The con sultant designed multiple-choice exams after a lengthy 
process that was intended to ensure job-relatedness. That pro-
cess included an over sampling of minority input in order to guard 
against unintentional white bias. The consultant also de signed 
oral exams containing hypotheticals that were intended to test 
for qualities including fire fighting, leadership, and manage ment 
skills. According to the em ployment contract be tween the City 
and the firefighters union, the written exams were to account for 
60% of an ap plicant’s total eligibility score, and the oral exams 
were to account for the remaining 40%.15
When the written and oral exams were administered 
to promo tion candidates in Decem ber 2003, the written exams 
turned out to have a racially disparate impact. Although a num-
ber of whites, blacks and Latinos had taken the exams, all ten 
applicants who scored high enough to be eligible for “immediate 
promotion” to lieutenant were white. Of the nine appli cants who 
scored high enough to be eligible for immediate promotion to 
cap tain, seven were white and two were Latino.16
The City’s legal counsel believed that the results of the 
written firefighter promotion exams might constitute a violation 
of the dis parate-impact provision of Title VII, and that the need 
to avoid such a violation might authorize the use of race-con-
scious reme dies for the disparate impact produced by the exams. 
The legal counsel com municated those views to the New Haven 
Civil Ser vice Board, which was the municipal agency charged 
with certify ing the results of promotional exams for civil service 
positions.17 As a result, the Civil Service Board held a series of 
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meetings to determine whether it should certify the exam results 
in light of the disparate impact produced by the exams. At these 
meetings, some firefighters who took the exams defended the 
results. They included the named plaintiff Frank Ricci—a dys-
lexic firefighter who spent considerable time and money prepar-
ing for his written exam. Other firefighters who took the exams 
spoke against certifying the results, describing the exam ques-
tions as out dated and not relevant to firefighting practices in New 
Haven.18
The President of the New Haven firefighters union 
asked the Civil Service Board to conduct a validation study to 
determine whether the ex ams were job-related. Representatives 
of the Inter national Associ ation of Black Professional Firefight-
ers urged the Board to reject the exam results, arguing that the 
exam was “inhe rently unfair,” that a validation study for the exam 
was necessary, and that the exam results could be ad justed to 
avoid their racially disparate impact.19 The Illinois consultant 
who developed the ex ams testified that his company possessed 
substan tial experience developing similar exams in other cities, 
that it had taken precau tions to ensure that the exams were job-
related, and that the exams minimized the pos sibility of any racial 
bias.20 Another consultant, who sometimes competed with the 
consultant who designed the New Haven exams, testified that he 
was a bit sur prised by the de gree of dispa rate impact exhibited in 
the New Ha ven exams, but noted that whites generally perform 
better than minori ties on such written exams. The competing 
consultant also testified that an al ternative selec tion procedure, 
using “assessment centers” rather than written ex ams, could bet-
ter gauge a candidate’s reactions to real world fire fighting situa-
tions. He concluded, however, that the New Haven exam results 
could be certified as stemming from a “reasonably good test,” 
and that assessment centers might be used in the fu ture.21 A 
retired black fire captain, who was a fire program special ist at the 
De partment of Homeland Security, testified that the exam ques-
tions seemed relevant, and noted that whites gener ally perform 
better than minorities on written tests. A Boston Col lege profes-
sor of race and culture also testified that whites typi cally outper-
form mi norities on written tests, and further stated that the New 
Haven exams might have been developed in a subtly skewed way 
that could have favored white candidates.22
At the Civil Service Board’s final meeting on the issue, 
the City’s legal counsel argued that he now believed that federal 
law prohibited certification of the exam results because of their 
dispa rate impact, which was greater than the disparate impact 
exhibited in the City’s prior exams. He also thought that the 
testimony com piled by the Board showed that there were less 
discriminatory al ternatives to the New Haven exams that had 
produced the racially disparate impact. The City’s chief admin-
istrator, who spoke on behalf of Mayor DeStefano, also argued 
against certification be cause less discriminatory alternatives 
existed. In addition, the City’s human resources director argued 
against certification, fa voring the use of a less discriminatory 
alternative.23 However, other witnesses at this final meeting 
favored certification of the re sults. These included the President 
of the New Haven firefighters union, who emphasized the evi-
dence showing that the exams were fair and reasonable. The wit-
nesses favoring certification also in cluded plaintiff Ricci, who 
conceded that assessment centers might be a less discrimina tory 
alternative. However, Ricci emphasized that assess ment centers 
were not available for the 2003 round of promotions, and that 
assessment center protocols would take several years to develop. 
After this series of meetings, the Civil Service Board deadlocked 
2–2 on the certification question, meaning that the exam results 
were not certi fied.24
The disappointed firefighter pro motion candidates, who 
were plaintiffs in the District Court and petitioners in the Supreme 
Court, alleged that the City’s refusal to certify the exam results 
constituted unlawful discrimination that violated the disparate-
treatment provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Of the seventeen whites and two Latinos who were eligible for 
immediate promotions based on the contested exam results, all 
but one Latino sued New Haven officials to challenge the City’s 
re fusal to certify the exam results. They also alleged a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. The parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment, with the City arguing that it had good cause 
for any dis parate treatment in which it had engaged, because the 
City was trying to avoid a Title VII disparate-impact violation. 
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 
entered sum mary judgment for the City, finding that the desire to 
avoid dispa rate-impact liability did not establish the discrimina-
tory intent ne ces sary for a Title VII disparate-treatment violation, 
and that the City’s actions did not violate the Equal Protection 
rights of the plaintiffs. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Cir cuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opin-
ion that adopted the reasoning of the District Court, and denied 
rehearing en banc by a vote of 7–6 over two written dissents. 
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider what it 
viewed as a novel ques tion presented by the interaction between 
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title 
VII.25 The Solicitor Gen eral of the United States partici pated as 
amicus curiae, urging af firmance of the lower court decisions.26
Justice Kennedy’s legal analysis first addressed the Title 
VII statutory claim asserted by the petitioners, which was ulti-
mately resolved in a way that avoided the need to address the 
constitu tional Equal Protection claim.27 Justice Kennedy noted 
that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and that the Title VII 
prohibition applies to both intentional “disparate-treatment” dis-
crimination and unin tentional “disparate-impact” discrimination. 
As originally en acted in 1964, the language of Title VII prohib-
ited only in ten tional dis parate-treatment discrimination, but the 
1971 Supreme Court deci sion in Griggs	v.	Duke Power28 inter-
preted the statute to pro hi bit unintentional disparate-impact dis-
crimination as well. Under Griggs, an employment practice with 
a racially disparate impact constituted a Title VII violation unless 
the employer could estab lish that the practice was sufficiently job 
related to constitute a “business necessity.” In Albemarle	Paper	
Co.	v.	Moody,29 the Su preme Court further held that even a dem-
onstration of job-related business necessity would not suffice to 
avoid Title VII disparate-impact lia bility if the plaintiff could 
establish that a less dis crimi natory alternative practice would also 
serve the employer’s legiti mate business needs. The Griggs read-
ing of Title VII was formally codified by Congress in the Civil 
Rights Act ofAlthough the firefighter promotion exam results did 
establish a prima facie Title VII unintentional disparate-impact 
violation, the City’s race-based decision to remedy that prima 
facie violation by refusing to certify the exam results would also 
constitute a Title VII intentional disparate-treatment violation, 
unless the refusal to certify was adequately justified. The District 
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Court, and the United States as amicus curiae, believed that the 
motive of preventing a disparate-impact violation could not, as a 
matter of law, constitute a disparate-treatment violation, but Jus-
tice Kennedy concluded that this analysis was wrong because it 
applied the wrong legal stan dard. The fact that the City may have 
had a permissible objective in seeking to avoid disparate impact 
did not establish that race-based means of achieving that objec-
tive were permissible.31
Because Justice Kennedy found the disparate-treatment 
and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII to be in conflict, he 
consi dered possible ways of resolving that conflict while still 
advancing the ultimate purpose of Title VII, which was to provide 
a workplace “where race is not a barrier to opportunity.”32 He 
re jected the petitioners’ suggestion that unintentional disparate-
im pact discrimination could never justify intentional disparate-
treat ment discrimination, concluding that both statutory goals 
had to be accommodated if possible. He then rejected the peti-
tioner’s argu ment that disparate treatment should only be permis-
sible if it were first established that a disparate-impact violation 
actually existed. Justice Kennedy reasoned that such a holding 
would undermine the desire of Congress to promote voluntary 
compliance with Title VII, by forcing employers to address 
ambiguous disparate-im pact claims only at their peril.33
Justice Kennedy also rejected the suggestion made by 
the res pondent City, and by the United States, that intentional 
disparate-treatment should be permissible whenever an employer 
had a good-faith belief that such disparate treatment was nec-
essary to avoid a disparate-impact violation. Justice Kennedy 
concluded that this good-faith standard would ignore the “foun-
dational prohibi tion” of Title VII, which bars employers from tak-
ing adverse em ployment actions “because of…race.”34 It would 
“encourage race-based action at the slightest hint of disparate 
impact,” in a way that “amounted to a de	facto quota system” that 
focused unduly on sta tistics. “Even worse,” such reliance on sta-
tistical disparities would permit an employer to pursue a desired 
“racial balance” in viola tion of Title VII’s express disclaimer of 
any interpretation “calling for outright racial balancing.”35
Justice Kennedy borrowed what he believed to be the 
appropri ate compromise standard from prior Supreme Court 
affirmative action cases that addressed the tension between the 
goals of advancing prospective race neutrality and providing a 
remedy for past dis crimination. In the affirmative action context, 
the Court previously held that the Equal Protection clause pro-
hibits the use of race-based affirmative action remedies unless 
there is a “strong basis in evi dence” establishing that race-based 
remedies are neces sary.36 Even though the Title VII statutory 
constraints might not be paral lel in all respects to the constitu-
tional constraints, Justice Kennedy found that the constitutional 
principles still provided helpful guid ance in the statutory context. 
The “strong basis in evi dence” stan dard gave effect to both the 
disparate-treatment and disparate-im pact provisions of Title VII. 
It left ample room for voluntary em ployer compliance efforts, 
while appropriately con straining em ployer discretion in making 
race-based decisions.37
Justice Kennedy viewed the “strong basis in evidence” 
stan dard as consistent with the Title VII prohibition on making 
racial adjustments to employment-related test scores, and with 
the need to protect the “legitimate expectations” of those who 
would be burdened by the abandonment of such test scores solely 
because of race-based statistics. He reasoned that, if Title VII 
prohibited ad justing test scores, it also prohibited “the greater 
step of discarding the test altogether.”38 The “strong basis in evi-
dence” standard was also consistent with Title VII’s protection of 
bona fide promotional examinations.39 Because the Court would 
go on to hold that New Haven did not satisfy the “strong basis in 
evidence” standard, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion expressly 
declined to reach the question of whether the Title VII disparate-
impact provision itself would be constitutional in a case where 
the standard had been met.40 He did, however, emphasize that 
Title VII did not prohibit an employer from intentionally design-
ing a test or employment practice in a way that would provide a 
fair opportunity for all indi viduals to compete regardless of their 
race.41
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion went on to hold 
that New Haven’s decision not to certify the firefighter promo-
tion exam re sults violated the disparate-treatment provision 
of Title VII. What ever the City’s subjective motive, the record 
made it clear that there was no objectively strong basis in evi-
dence to support a dispa rate-impact violation.42 Moreover, the 
disappointed firefighter peti tioners were entitled to summary 
judgment, because this lack of a strong basis in evidence was 
established by undisputed facts. Even though summary judgment 
requires the facts to be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, here there was no “genuine” dispute about the 
pertinent facts, because no rational trier of fact looking at the 
record as a whole could conclude that there was a strong basis 
in evidence to fear that certification of the exam scores would 
amount to a disparate-impact violation.43
The exam pass rate for minorities, which was approxi-
mately 50% of the pass rate for whites, did establish a prima 
facie ra cially disparate impact that was well below the 80% stan-
dard used by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
to im plement the Title VII disparate-impact provision. That was 
espe cially true since no black candidates could have been consid-
ered for any of the available promotions if the exam scores were 
used. However, that threshold statistical disparity was “far from 
a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable 
under Title VII had it certified the results.”44 Despite the statisti-
cal discre pancy, the City would be liable for a disparate-impact 
violation only if its ex ams were not job related, or if there were 
a less dis criminatory al ternative, and neither condition could be 
satisfied under the “strong basis in evidence” standard.45
There was no genuine dispute concerning whether the 
exams were job-related and consistent with business necessity, 
because the City’s contrary assertions were “blatantly contra-
dicted by the record.”46 The consultant who designed the exams 
took great pains to ensure their job-relatedness, and most of the 
witnesses who tes tified before the Civil Service Board found the 
exams to be ade quate in this regard. Even the competitor consul-
tant, who had some criticisms of the examination design process, 
recommended certification after concluding that the exams were 
“reasonably good.”.47 The City did not even ask the consultant 
for the technical report to which it was entitled, and which could 
have explained any of the City’s job-relation concerns.48
There was also no strong basis in evidence for believ-
ing that an equally valid but less discriminatory alternative to 
the exams might exist. First, although the use of a 30/70 percent 
weighting of the written and oral exam scores might have reduced 
the racially dis parate impact that was produced by the 60/40 per-
cent weighting that was actually used, the 60/40 weighting was 
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the weighting spe cified in the firefighter union contract with the 
City. In addition, there was no evidence that the 60/40 weighting 
was arbitrary, or that a 30/70 weighting would produce an equally 
valid measure of the proper mix between job knowledge and situ-
ational skills.49 Second, although “banding” exam scores could 
have reduced dis parate im pact by ranking candidates along fewer 
categories of scores—and thereby producing more ties among 
candidates—a state court held that such banding violated the 
City Charter. Moreover, such banding, motivated by a desire to 
increase minor ity promotions, would have violated the Title VII 
prohibition against adjusting test results on the basis of race.50 
Third, although the competitor consul tant suggested that the use 
of assessment centers instead of written exams could provide a 
job-related selec tion method that would have less of a racially 
disparate impact, there was testimony that assessment centers 
could not have been used for the 2003 promo tions. In any case, 
the competitor consultant was primarily interested in marketing 
his own services—a strategy that proved successful, because 
New Haven did subsequently hire him as a consultant.51
Justice Kennedy’s opinion concluded by stressing that 
fear of litigation alone cannot constitute the strong basis in 
evidence re quired to permit intentional race-based disparate 
treatment under Title VII. He characterized the New Haven exam-
ination process as a fair and neutral way to determine which fire-
fighters were entitled to promotions based on their qualifications 
and experience. The City’s refusal to certify the results of that 
examination procedure imposed a burden 
on those who had participated in the test-
ing process—a burden that was aggravated 
by the City’s reliance on “raw racial statis-
tics.” Justice Kennedy went on to state that 
the Court’s deci sion should make it clear 
that, if the minority firefight ers now filed 
a disparate-impact suit against the City for 
certifying the exam re sults, the City would 
be able to avoid Title VII dispa rate-impact 
liability for its actions.52 The majority’s 
disposition of the case in favor of the dis-
appointed firefighters made it unneces sary 
to con sider the constitutional Equal Protec-
tion claims asserted by the petitioners.53
2. Justice scalia’s concurring opinion
Justice Scalia, alone in his concurring opinion, argued 
that the Court would even tually have to decide whether the dis-
parate-impact provision of Title VII was itself unconstitutional 
as a violation of the Equal Protection principle. Although he 
characterized the question as “not an easy one,” Justice Scalia 
seemed to embrace the argument that he outlined for finding the 
disparate-impact provision to be unconstitutional.54 Because the 
federal government cannot discri mi nate on the basis of race, it 
cannot by statute require public or private employers to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race.55 How ever, Title VII’s disparate-impact 
provision requires employers to “place a racial thumb on the 
scales” in assessing and remedying the sta tistical outcomes of 
their employment policies, and “that type of racial decisionmak-
ing is, as the Court explains, discrimi natory.”56
Justice Scalia believed that the Title VII disparate impact 
pro vision did not mandate the use of racial quotas, but that it did 
compel an employer to “intentionally design his hiring practices 
to achieve the same end.” As a result, Justice Scalia concluded 
that “[i]nten tion al discrimination is still occurring, just one step 
up the chain.”57 He also stated that it would not matter if Title 
VII re quired the “consideration of race on a wholesale, rather 
than a re tail, level,” because the Government “must treat citizens 
as indi viduals not as simply components of a racial, religious, 
sexual or national class.”58 He also stressed that “of course the 
purportedly benign motive for the disparate-impact provisions 
cannot save the statute.”59
Justice Scalia thought that it might be theoretically pos-
sible to defend a disparate-impact provision as simply an eviden-
tiary tool that could be used to “smoke out” intentional disparate 
treatment.60 However, such a theory could not save the consti-
tutionality of the Title VII disparate-impact provision, because 
it did not recognize an affirmative defense for good faith.61 
Although the majority’s disposition precluded the need to rule 
upon the constitutionality of the Title VII disparate-impact provi-
sion in Ricci, “the war between disparate impact and equal pro-
tection will be waged sooner or later.”62
3. Justice alito’s concurring opinion
Justice Alito’s concurrence stated that it was written to 
address omissions in the dissent’s recitation of the facts, and to 
establish that, even under the dissent’s view of the facts, there 
were factual disputes that precluded sum-
mary judg ment for the City.63 Justice Alito’s 
opinion was joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, but not by Chief Justice Ro berts 
or Justice Kennedy.
Justice Alito believed that an 
objective and a subjective ques tion had to 
be answered in order to determine whether 
an employer could avoid Title VII liability 
for a disparate-treatment claim such as that 
filed by the disappointed firefighters. The 
objective ques tion was whether the stated 
reason for the disparate treatment was 
a legitimate reason under Title VII. The 
subjective question, which implicated the 
employer’s actual intent, was whether the 
stated legitimate reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.64
The stated objective reason for New Haven’s race-based 
dispa rate-treatment in refusing to certify the firefighter promo-
tion exam results was the legitimate reason of avoiding dispa-
rate-impact lia bility. But as the majority held, no reasonable jury 
could find that there was a “substantial basis in evidence to find 
the tests inade quate.”65 That made any inquiry into actual subjec-
tive intent unne cessary.66 However, the dissent argued that the 
proper standard for resolving the objective question should be 
whether the evidence provided “good cause” for the City to fear 
disparate-impact liabil ity. Nevertheless, even the dissent would 
presumably concede the City’s disparate-treatment liability if 
the asserted disparate-impact concern were a mere pretext for 
intentional discrimination. As a result, the entry of summary 
judgment for the City by the lower courts could not be affirmed, 
because there was ample evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury 











actually a pretext for political placation of an impor tant racial 
constituency.67
Justice Alito offered several reasons, including appease-
ment of an important black political leader in New Haven, for 
believing that such political placation was the City’s actual motive. 
The record dem onstrated that City officials worked behind the 
scenes to avoid cer tification of the exam results, because certifi-
cation would have antagonized the black political leader whom 
Mayor DeStefano did not wish to antagonize. This local black 
leader had strong personal and political ties with the seven-term 
Mayor that stretched back for more than a decade, and the Mayor 
had previously selected the black leader to serve as Chair of the 
New Haven Board of Fire Commissioners. While serving in that 
capac ity, the black leader once created a political flap by stating 
that certain new recruits would not be hired because “they just 
have too many vowels in their name[s].”68
The City’s political motives did not stop with placation. 
The record suggested that members of the Mayor’s staff had tried 
to orchestrate the city’s response to the promotion exam contro-
versy in part by silencing the City’s Fire Chief and Assistant Fire 
Chief, both of whom favored certifying the exam results. The 
record further suggested that the Mayor made up his mind to 
oppose certification of the exam results, but wanted to conceal 
that fact from the public. In addition, during the Civil Service 
Board meetings held to resolve the certification issue, local black 
leaders with strong ties to the Mayor’s office tried to exploit racial 
ten sions by threat ening ramifications if the exam results were 
certi fied. They also accused white firefighters of cheating on the 
exam, although those accusations turned out to be baseless. In 
addition, the City relied heavily on testimony of the competitor 
consultant who offered some criti cism of the exams, using him 
as a conduit for the Mayor’s political views. The city, as a reward 
for his assistance, ultimately hired the competitor consultant. The 
Mayor decided to overrule the Civil Service Board even if the 
Board decided to certify the exam results, and after certification 
failed by a 2–2 vote, the Mayor took credit for scuttling the exam 
results.
Justice Alito concluded that these facts provided ample 
basis for a reasonable juror to conclude that the City’s stated 
dispa rate-impact justification was simply pretex tual. He noted 
that even the United States Solicitor General con ceded that the 
lower courts did not give adequate consideration to the pretext 
possibility.69 Justice Alito emphasized that he was not simply 
equating po litical considerations with unlawful discrimination. 
However, he did be lieve that unlawful discrimination was not a 
permissible way to win over a political constituency.70
Even if the Mayor’s decision to overrule any adverse rul-
ing by the Civil Service Board were over looked, and even if the 
Civil Service Board were viewed as having made the final cer-
tification decision, the Mayor’s improperly motivated in fluence 
could still taint the Civil Service Board’s decision. Al though the 
Supreme Court under Title VII never resolved the question of 
improper influence on a decisionmaker, the courts of appeals 
applied a variety of standards to the ques tion. In Ricci, a reason-
able jury could find that those lower court stan dards were met in 
a way that impermissibly tainted the Civil Service Board decision 
not to certify the exam results. In any event, it was the politically 
predisposed Mayor, and not the Civil Service Board, who had 
final decisionmaking authority.71 The peti tioners—such as dys-
lexic Frank Ricci who had to hire someone at his own expense 
to pre pare for the exam, and Latino Benjamin Vargas who had to 
give up his part time job to prepare for the exam—deserved more 
than sympathy. They had a right to even handed enforcement of 
Title VII’s prohibition against racial dis crimination—a right that 
the City’s refusal to certify denied them.72
a. ThE liBERal Bloc—Justice Ginsburg’s 
Dissenting Opinion
The four Justices who joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent-
ing opinion in Ricci vote so consistently in favor of the minority 
inter ests presented in race cases that they have come to constitute 
a lib eral Supreme Court voting bloc on the issue of race.73 The 
mem bers of that voting bloc are Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg and Breyer. With only mi nor deviations, those four Justices 
have al most always voted to uphold the racial minority claims at 
issue in constitutional affirma tive action cases, majority-minority 
redi stricting cases, and racial integration cases while sitting on 
the Su preme Court.74
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion argued that New 
Haven did not violate Title VII by seeking to avoid the racially 
disparate impact of its firefighter promotion exam. Justice Gins-
burg emphasized that New Haven had a long history of racial 
dis crimination in its fire department, and although blacks and 
Latinos made up almost 60 percent of the City’s population, 
minorities were still rare in fire department command positions. 
She conceded that the white firefighters who scored well on the 
promotion exams “understand ably attract this Court’s sympathy,” 
but “they had no vested right to promotion.” In holding that the 
City lacked a “strong basis in evidence” for its decision not to 
certify the exam results, the ma jority pretended that the City was 
motivated only by race. However, Justice Ginsburg concluded 
that there were mul tiple flaws in the exams that the City used, and 
that other cities used better selection procedures that yielded less 
racially skewed outcomes. One could not help but wonder why the 
City did not use one of the alternatives that would have produced 
less disparate results. Justice Gins burg stated that the majority 
“barely acknowledges the pathmark ing decision in Griggs,” and 
the centrality that the disparate-impact concept plays in Title VII 
enforcement. As a result, she believed that the majority’s decision 
in Ricci would not have staying power.75
Justice Ginsburg believed that the majority’s recitation 
of the facts omitted important details. Firefighting in general was 
associated with a long legacy of racial discrimination, which 
Congress recognized in 1972 when it extended Title VII coverage 
to state and municipal employ ment—where racial discrimination 
was even more prevalent than in the private sector. Employment 
decisions often abandoned merit in favor of nepotism or politi-
cal patronage, thereby entrenching preexisting racial hierarchies. 
New Haven illustrated the problem. In the early 1970s, minorities 
com prised 30% of the population, but only 3.6% of the City’s five 
hundred and two firefighters. Moreover, only one of the Depart-
ment’s one hundred and seven officers was a minority firefighter. 
It took a law suit and subsequent settlement before conditions in 
the New Haven fire department improved. However, by the time 
of the 2003 promotions at issue in Ricci, minorities still remained 
badly underrepresented in the senior officer ranks—where only 
one of the City’s twenty one fire cap tains was black.76
The City’s promotion exams produced the stark racial 
disparities that were at is sue in Ricci, where minority candidates 
32	 The Modern AMericAn
passed at about half the rate of blacks. In making its 2003 round 
of promotions, New Haven adhered to the testing regime outlined 
in the firefighters union contract that it had used for two decades, 
without closely considering what sort of practical examination 
would best measure fitness for promotion. Accordingly, when the 
City asked its consultant to de sign promotion exams, the consul-
tant was told to adhere to a 60% written component and a 40% 
oral component, with out ever considering other alternative selec-
tion regimes. Because those 50% racial disparities fell well below 
the 80% standard that the Equal Employment Oppor tunity Com-
mission used for Title VII enforcement, City officials were con-
cerned about the danger of incurring Title VII disparate-impact 
liability. As a result, the New Haven Civil Service Board held a 
series of public meetings designed to assess job-relatedness and 
the availability of less-discriminatory alternatives.77
At those meetings, some participants favored certifying 
the exam results, and some objected to certification. The evidence 
presented in favor of certification stressed the close relationship 
between the exams and the assigned study materials, as well as 
the consi derable time and expense that many applicants invested 
in pre paring for the exams. The evidence against certification 
included questions about the germaneness of the exam to New 
Haven prac tices and procedures, as well as racially-correlated 
un equal access to study materials that was traceable to the fact 
that white appli cants had relatives in the fire service from whom 
they could obtain materials and assistance.78
Other evidence showed that the nearby City of Bridge-
port previously used selection procedures similar to the proce-
dures used by New Haven, but reduced the racially-disparate 
impact of its selection process when it changed the relative 
weighting of its written and oral exams. The new weighting 
gave primary weight to the oral exam, which could better test 
responses to real-life scena rios. A competitor consultant stated 
that behavioral responses to hypothetical situations presented in 
“assessment centers” could test for pertinent skills—with less 
of a disparate impact—in a way that was more valid than mere 
written multiple choice exams. A Boston College professor of 
counseling psychology also noted that testing procedures such as 
those used by New Haven could have certain built-in biases that 
gave an advantage to white applicants. When the Civil Service 
Board’s 2–2 vote ultimately precluded certifica tion of the exam 
results, the two Board members who voted against certification 
stated that they did so because the evidence pre sented at the pub-
lic meetings convinced them that the exams were flawed, and that 
there were better alternatives.79
Justice Ginsburg noted that the disappointed firefighters 
who sued the City for failing to certify the exam results alleged 
that the City’s defense of trying to avoid a Title VII disparate-
impact vi olation was a mere pretext. However, when the District 
Court en tered summary judgment for the City, it merely followed 
Second Circuit precedent in holding that the intent to remedy 
disparate impact did not constitute intent to discriminate against 
nonminority applicants. The District Court also rejected the pre-
text argument, finding that the exam results were sufficiently 
skewed to make out a prima fa cie case of disparate-impact dis-
crimination, and that the City should not be forced to use racially 
skewed exam results that were presumptively invalid. Although 
the City was conscious of race, the District Court held that such 
race consciousness did not amount to racially disparate treatment. 
The City’s actions were race neutral in the sense that the exam 
results were discarded for all races, and the City’s actions were 
not analogous to a racial quo ta because everyone was treated uni-
formly without any individual preference. 80
Justice Ginsburg observed that when Title VII took effect 
in 1965, it did not create genuine equal opportunity, because sub-
tle and sometimes unconscious forms of discrimination simply 
re placed formerly undisguised discrimination. Accordingly, the 
Su preme Court’s 1971 unanimous decision in Griggs responded 
by holding that Title VII embodied a congressional intent to pro-
hibit discrimination through unintentional disparate impact—as 
well as through intentional disparate treatment—by focusing on 
the conse quences rather than the form of an employer’s actions. 
The Court’s 1975 unanimous decision in Albemarle	Paper then 
held that even a showing of job-related business necessity could 
not defeat a dispa rate-impact claim if the plaintiff could show the 
existence of an alternative job-related employment practice that 
had less of a ra cially disparate impact. Lower courts then began 
to enforce the Title VII disparate-impact provision in ways that 
invalidated em ployment practices, such as the firefighter promo-
tion exams at issue in Ricci, by carefully scrutinizing employer 
claims of business ne cessity. However, in its 1989 Wards	Cove 
decision, the Supreme Court began moving in a different direc-
tion. A bare majority of the Court adopted a new standard of 
proof for business necessity in Title VII disparate-impact cases 
that was more deferential to em ployers and less protective of 
employees seeking to avoid dis crimination. Congress responded 
to Wards	Cove, and other Su preme Court decisions that cut back 
on civil rights enforcement, by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which formally codified the disparate-impact reading of 
Title VII that was adopted in Griggs.81
Justice Ginsburg accused the majority of manufacturing 
a ten sion between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact 
provi sions of Title VII that simply did not exist. No previous 
Supreme Court decisions—including the now-discredited deci-
sion in Wards	 Cove—ever detected such a tension, and both 
provisions sought to promote the same objective of ending work-
place dis crimination by promoting genuine equal opportunity. 
Although the task of the Court should be to harmonize statutory 
provisions, the majority set the two provisions at odds with each 
other by charac terizing ac tions taken to avoid disparate-impact 
liability as actions taken “be cause of race.” By codifying Griggs 
and Albemarle	Pa	per, Con gress adopted a statutory design under 
which efforts to comply with the law by giving employees an 
equal opportunity to compete could not constitute a disparate-
treatment violation—subject to one condition. The employer 
taking a race-conscious remedial action must have “good cause” 
to believe that the racially disparate em ployment practice being 
remedied would not with stand scrutiny as a business necessity. 
Under the facts of Ricci, Justice Ginsburg thought that it was 
hard to see the “business ne cessity” for the par ticular exams and 
60/40 percent exam weight ings that the majority required the 
City to use.82
Justice Ginsburg also noted that the Equal Employment 
Op portunity Commission interpretive guidelines, which were 
entitled to judicial deference, would not turn efforts to avoid 
disparate-impact liability into violations of the very statute with 
which those ef forts were designed to comply. She emphasized 
that the Su preme Court’s own gender discrimination precedent 
in Johnson	 v.	Transportation	Agency	 held that voluntary affir-
mative action programs for women did not violate the Title VII 
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disparate-treat ment provision. Although Ricci was not an affir-
mative action case, the New Haven effort to avoid actual dis-
crimination would cer tainly be likewise immune from Title VII 
disparate-treatment lia bility.83
Justice Ginsburg thought that the “strong basis in evi-
dence” standard that the majority invoked to resolve the statu-
tory tension it invented was too enigmatic. The standard was 
drawn from “inapposite equal protection precedents,” and was 
not elaborated upon. Equal Protection precedents were inappo-
site because—unlike Title VII—the Equal Protection Clause was 
interpreted by Personnel Administrator	v.	Feeney and Washington	
v.	Davis as not having a disparate-impact component.84 Prior to 
Ricci, the Supreme Court never questioned the constitutionality 
of Title VII’s disparate-im pact provision, because that provision 
“calls for a ‘race-neutral means to increase minority…participa-
tion’—something this Court’s equal protection precedents also 
encourage.”85 “[O]nly a very uncompromising court would issue 
such a decision.”86 Justice Ginsburg also thought that the cases 
on which the majority relied most heavily were particularly inapt, 
because they involved abso lute racial preferences. In contrast, 
an employer’s effort to avoid Title VII disparate-impact liability 
involved no racial preference at all, but rather, involved an effort 
to rely on job-related qualifica tions that do not screen out can-
didates of any race. Even Title VII race- and gender-conscious 
affirmative action cases used a reasonableness standard, rather 
than the majority’s new “strong basis in evidence” standard.87
Although a dominant theme of Title VII has been to 
encourage voluntary employer compliance, Justice Ginsburg 
believed that the majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard 
made voluntary compliance hazardous. Ricci illustrated that dis-
carding a dubious selection process would subject an employer to 
costly disparate-treatment litigation, in which the outcome would 
be very uncertain. Moreover, under the majority’s standard, 
the showing that an em ployer would have to make in order to 
avoid disparate-treatment liability was virtually the same as the 
showing that would be re quired to establish an actual disparate-
impact violation—thereby undermining an employer’s incentive 
to engage in voluntary Title VII compliance efforts. Even those 
Equal Protection affirmative action cases from which the major-
ity borrowed its “strong basis in evidence” standard did not apply 
that standard as harshly as the majority did in Ricci. Those cases 
never suggested that anything more than a prima facie case of 
prior discrimination would be re quired to permit the use of race-
conscious affirmative action reme dies.88
Justice Ginsburg found that the majority’s desire to pro-
tect the “legitimate expectations” of the disappointed firefighters 
who scored well on the promotion exams was circular, and she 
proposed her own “good cause” standard. If, as the City feared, 
the exam failed to constitute the least discriminatory means of 
testing for pertinent promotion qualities, the disappointed fire-
fighters could have no legitimate expectation of profiting from 
the results of the exams. That was especially true in Ricci, 
because the prime objective of Title VII was to prevent exclu-
sionary practices from freezing the status quo. In addition, Jus-
tice Ginsburg viewed as unfounded the majority’s suggestion that 
the “strong basis in evi dence” standard was necessary to avoid 
de facto quotas that were intended to promote an employer’s 
desired racial balance. Justice Ginsburg believed that her pro-
posed “good cause” standard would guard against racial balance 
quotas by ensuring the presence of a credible disparate impact 
claim. Justice Ginsburg also failed to understand why the major-
ity departed from customary practice by refusing to remand the 
Ricci case for District Court application of the new standard that 
the majority announced. The failure to remand also deprived 
the City of an opportunity to invoke the sta tutorily recog nized 
defense of good faith compliance with the in terpretive guidelines 
adopted by the Equal Employment Opportu nity Com mission.89
Justice Ginsburg outlined several factors showing that 
the City satisfied her “good cause” standard for assessing volun-
tary efforts to avoid disparate-impact liability. All agree that the 
New Haven promo tion exams had a sufficiently striking dispa-
rate impact to establish a prima facie case of Title VII liability. 
Moreover, the nature of the exams that established this disparate 
impact was suspect, because the City gave no consideration to 
anything other than its customary 60/40 percent weighting—
even though that weighting pro duced racially disparate results 
in the past. Reliance on written ex ams to assess practical skills is 
a questionable practice, because such exams do not necessarily 
identify leadership abilities. In fact, skepticism about the utility 
of such written exams has been ex pressed not only by experts 
who testified at the New Haven Civil Service Board meetings, 
but by other published experts, by courts, and by the Title VII 
administrative guidelines as well. Mere pencil-and-paper knowl-
edge of the history and vocabulary of baseball would not qualify 
one to play for the Boston Red Sox.90
Accordingly, it is not surprising that most municipal 
employers do not evaluate their promotion candidates through 
written tests or by giving tests the same weight as New Haven 
did. Two-thirds of the municipalities included in a 1996 study 
used assessment center simulations rather than written exams 
to evaluate candidates, and the popularity of assessment centers 
seems to be increasing over time. Among the municipalities that 
continue to use written exams, the median weight assigned to 
those exams is 30%—half the weight that New Haven assigned 
to its written exams. Therefore, Justice Ginsburg concluded that 
the prevalence of the assessment-center and modified-weighting 
alter natives would have made it difficult for New Haven to argue 
that its selection process was a business necessity. The major-
ity re jected these alternatives, asserting that assessment centers 
were unavailable in 2003, and that Title VII prohibited the racial 
ad justment of test scores. However, the only evidence in the 
record that supported the unavailability of assessment centers in 
2003 was an offhand remark made by Frank Ricci—one of the 
disappointed firefighters—which was belied by the widespread 
use of assess ment centers at the time in other municipalities. And 
changing the weight of the written and oral exams would not 
constitute a prohibited racial altera tion of test scores, but would 
rather consti tute the substitution of a new selection procedure. 
Justice Ginsburg thought that the major ity’s dismissal of any sub-
stantial risk of dis parate impact liability was reminiscent of the 
deferential standard accorded employers under Wards	Cove, but 
Wards	Cove was overruled by Con gress in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991—precisely because it was too protective of employers.91
Justice Ginsburg also found the New Haven exams 
ques tionable because the City precluded its consultant from get-
ting expert feedback on potential questions from anyone in the 
New Haven fire department. The restriction was intended to pro-
tect the secu rity of the exam questions, but this “very critical” 
defect re sulted in exam questions that were sometimes confus-
ing, irrele vant, spotty in their coverage, and potentially bi ased 
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in favor of nonminority firefighters. In addition, the exams had 
technical de fects that undermined the validity of the exam score 
cutoffs, and the ensuing candidate rankings. Although the major-
ity criticized the City for not requesting a technical report to allay 
its concerns about job relatedness, the technical report would 
merely have summarized evidence that was produced at the Civil 
Service Board meetings, and would not have established the 
relia bility of the exam as an assessment tool. The many defects 
contained in the exams created at least a triable issue of fact that 
precluded sum mary judgment against the City, even under the 
majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard.92
In response to Justice Alito’s con curring opinion, Jus-
tice Ginsburg stated that she would not have opposed a remand 
to resolve the factual disputes revealed in the record, but the 
majority insisted on disposing of the case by sum mary judgment. 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion argued that the City’s as serted 
fear of disparate-impact liability was merely a pretext for the 
desire of certain officials in the mayor’s office to placate a politi-
cally powerful racial constituency, and that there was a sufficient 
fac tual dispute about this to vacate the lower court rulings of 
sum mary judgment for the City. Justice Ginsburg also noted that 
the facts on which Justice Alito drew to support his pretext claim 
were drawn from the self-serving statement of facts submitted 
by the petition ers. Moreover, many of those allegations were 
either misleading or entirely devoid of sup port in the record. The 
important point, how ever, was that the Civil Service Board—not 
the Mayor’s office—made the ultimate deci sion not to certify the 
exam results, and there was no evidence of political partisanship 
on the part of Civil Service Board members. In addition, the New 
Haven political forces favoring certification of the exam results 
attempted to exert just as much pressure on the Civil Service 
Board as did the politi cal forces opposing certifica tion.93
Justice Ginsburg went on to question the relevance of 
Justice Alito’s pretext argument, because political considerations 
alone could not be equated with unlawful discrimination. Politi-
cians commonly respond to racial considerations without engag-
ing in racial dis crimination. There is no reason to believe that the 
Mayor’s office wished to exclude white firefighters from promo-
tions, since white firefighters would also be promoted under a 
nondiscri mina tory selection procedure. The District Court found 
that the pres ence of political considerations did not negate the 
City’s ge nuine desire to avoid disparate-impact liability, and it 
found a total ab sence of discriminatory animus toward the peti-
tioners. Those findings were “entirely consistent with the record.” 
Moreo ver, as established by the Court’s recent post-9/11 racial 
profiling decision in Ashcroft	v.	Iqbal, a desire to please political 
constituents is not in consistent with a desire to avoid unlawful 
discrimination. 94
Jus tice Ginsburg concluded that the majority forced the 
City of New Haven to use a flawed promotion exam that would 
produce racially disparate results without identifying the best-
qualified can didates for promotion. The majority decision broke 
the promise of Griggs by denying equal opportunity through use 
of a test that was “fair in form, but discrimi natory in operation.”95
DOcTRINAL STRAIN
The outcome in Ricci did not flow naturally from pre-
existing Title VII doctrine. Rather, Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion constructed a previously undetected tension between the 
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII, 
and then resolved that tension in a way that strained against the 
overall anti discrimination ob jective that Title VII was enacted 
to advance. In addition, Justice Kennedy announced the Court’s 
modification of pre-existing Title VII doctrine in the process of 
granting summary judgment for the disappointed firefighter peti-
tioners, even though significant factual disputes almost certainly 
made summary judg ment for the petition ers improper. It appears 
that Justice Kennedy did both of these things knowingly, in order 
to convey the strength of the Court’s commitment to a new post-
racial conception of em ployment dis crimination law.
Title VIJustice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci 
adopted a novel reading of Title VII that rebalanced the compet-
ing interests be tween whites and racial minorities that are at stake 
in the allocation of limited societal resources. Moreover, it rebal-
anced those inter ests in a way that undermined the initial balance 
struck by Con gress in enacting and amending Title VII. The opin-
ion also failed to apply the standing limitations that the Supreme 
Court has in the past used to defeat minority claims of racial 
discrimination. In so doing, the Court yet again illustrated a will-
ingness to relax stand ing requirements for reverse discrimination 
claims asserted by whites that are strenuously enforced in cases 
asserting traditional discrimination against racial minorities.
1. Zero suM Balance
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion asserted that Ricci 
was a case of first impression concerning the divergence between 
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title 
VII.96 But Justice Ginsburg’s dissent pointed out that no such con-
flict existed, because both provisions of Title VII were designed 
to ad vance the same goal—the elimination of employment prac-
tices that had commonly produced workplace discrimination in 
the past.97
In one sense, Justice Ginsburg was certainly correct. 
There was no conflict under pre-existing law, because pre-exist-
ing law held that the consideration of race for the sincere purpose 
of avoiding disparate impact discrimination did not constitute the 
type of racial consideration that could amount to a Title VII dis-
parate-treatment violation. That is what the District Court held 
when it followed Second Cir cuit precedent; that is what the Sec-
ond Cir cuit panel held when it summarily affirmed the District 
Court in its brief per curiam opi nion; that is what the full Second 
Circuit held when it denied re hearing en banc; that is what the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission es tablished when 
it adopted its Title VII interpre tive guidelines; and that is what 
the Supreme Court itself es tablished in an analogous gender 
dis crimination case holding that the consideration of gender to 
prevent disparate impact did not amount to a Title VII disparate-
treatment violation.98
But Justice Kennedy also had a point. Even though 
Title VII law was settled at the time of the Ricci decision, there 
had long been undercurrents of discontent with that settlement. 
Individual conservative-bloc Justices in prior Title VII cases 
expressed the view that racial affirmative action could not be 
used to benefit minorities who were not themselves actual victims 
of partic u la rized discrimination, because such affirmative action 
imposed too great a burden on adversely affected whites.99 As 
Justice Ken nedy stressed in his Ricci opinion, several Supreme 
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Court consti tutional decisions struggled with the issue of when 
the Equal Protection Clause permitted affirmative action pro-
grams to benefit minorities at the expense of so-called innocent 
whites.100 Accor dingly, what Justice Kennedy was really doing 
in Ricci when he detected and resolved a novel tension between 
the disparate-treat ment and disparate-impact provisions of Title 
VII was changing the balance that the Supreme Court previously 
struck between the zero-sum interests of whites and racial minor-
ities in discrimi nation cases.101
In any alleged race discrimination or affirmative action 
case, a contested societal resource—such as the right to a fire-
fighter pro motion—has to be allocated to either a white person or 
to a racial minority. In order to make that allocation, some way 
has to be found to balance the competing interests underlying 
the white and minority claims of entitlement to that resource. 
Previously, the bal ance was struck so that close cases would be 
resolved in favor of racial minorities, in order to compensate for 
past discrimination or to promote prospective diversity. Ricci, 
however, re-struck the balance so that close cases would now be 
resolved in favor of whites. It did this by increasing, to a “strong 
basis in evidence,” the standard of proof that had to be met before 
a resource could be given to a racial minority.102
In other words, the five-Justice Ricci majority re-struck 
the balance between white and minority interests in Title VII 
cases, so that the new balance would mirror the balance that the 
Supreme Court previously struck in its constitutional af firmative 
action cases. That might initially appear to create a desir able doc-
trinal symmetry, but there is an important asymmetry that exists 
between Title VII and constitutional cases. In Title VII cases the 
appropriate balance is supposed to be struck by Congress—not 
by the Supreme Court. It is true that statutes are often ambigu-
ous, and the exercise of loosely constrained judicial discretion 
is often required for the Supreme Court to announce statutory 
meaning. But that is not the case with the disparate-impact provi-
sion of Title VII.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Justice Kennedy was 
not writing on a clean slate when he chose to strike a new Title 
VII balance in favor of whites. The Supreme Court previously 
tried to strike a similar balance in Wards	Cove and other deci-
sions that cut back on civil rights enforcement. However, Con-
gress responded by over ruling those cases in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991.103 Therefore, when Justice Kennedy rewrote Title VII 
in Ricci to correspond to the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection 
jurisprudence, he was usurping legislative policymaking power 
from Congress. Congress wanted the close cases to be resolved 
in favor of racial minorities, believing that to be the best way 
of reducing employ ment dis crimination. But Justice Kennedy 
wanted the close cases to be re solved in favor of whites, even if 
it meant allowing fire department officers to remain overwhelm-
ingly white.
The Supreme Court’s usurpation of legislative racial 
policymaking power in Ricci may be difficult to justify in separa-
tion-of-powers terms, but it is hardly unprecedented. As a matter 
of relative institu tional competence, it is difficult to see why a 
politically insulated Supreme Court would view itself as better 
able than a politically accountable national legislature to balance 
the subtle and complex competing interests that are necessarily 
entailed in trying to for mulate a coherent national race relations 
policy. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seems always to have 
thought that it could do a better job than Congress in mediating 
the nation’s racial tensions. When the Court invalidated congres-
sional efforts to limit the spread of sla very in Dred	Scott	v.	San-
ford,104 Congress overruled that decision by securing the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 The Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to shift the pre-Civil War federalism balance in 
matters involving race from the states to the federal government, 
by giving Congress the power to enforce the equality and antidis-
crimination provisions of the Amendment.106 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court decision in the Civil	 Rights	 Cases107 re-struck 
that balance in favor of state sovereignty by read ing a “state 
action” component into the Fourteenth Amend ment, even though 
Section Five expressly gave Congress the power to enforce the 
Amendment.108 If judicial activism is defined as the disregard of 
clearly ex pressed legislative policy judgments, then Ricci entails 
an exercise in conservative judicial activism.
Justice Kennedy used the new “strong basis in evi-
dence” stan dard as the doctrinal device that would accord his 
desired addi tional weight to the interests of whites in the Title VII 
balance. Like the lower courts and the Solicitor General, Justice 
Ginsburg thought that that any genuine desire to avoid a dispa-
rate-impact violation would suffice to prevent a disparate-treat-
ment violation. She insisted only on the presence of “good cause” 
to fear a dispa rate-impact violation, as a safeguard against frivo-
lous or pretextual disparate-impact claims.109 Justice Ginsburg 
also emphasized that the heightened “strong basis in evidence” 
standard would frustrate the Title VII preference for voluntary 
compliance, by making it hazardous for employers to implement 
voluntary remedies for dis parate impact. Only a disparate-impact 
showing that was strong enough to establish an actual Title VII 
violation would be suffi cient to immunize employers from poten-
tial disparate-treatment violations.110
The law governing contract modifications, as well as the 
law of accord and satisfac tion governing the settlement of legal 
disputes, supports Justice Ginsburg’s view. Reminiscent of Jus-
tice Kennedy’s approach, classical contract law would not rec-
ognize the presence of consideration supporting a modification or 
accord and satisfaction unless the underlying relinquished claim 
was in fact a meritorious one.111 However, such a rule made vol-
untary modifications and settlements largely worthless, because 
the underlying legal claim would still have to be adjudicated in 
order to establish the validity of the modification or settlement. 
After realizing this, modern contract doctrine dispensed with the 
need to establish the validity of the underlying claim. It insisted 
only on “good faith” motivation, and it did so precisely so that 
voluntary modifications and settlements could become legally 
en forceable.112
Utilization of the “strong basis in evidence” standard, 
therefore, constitutes another impor tant way in which the Ricci 
majority undermined the thrust of Title VII—by frustrating the 
congressional desire to rely heavily on voluntary rather than 
coerced compliance. Justice Kennedy’s adoption of a “strong 
basis in evidence” standard thrusts Title VII voluntary compli-
ance back to the days of classical contract law, and in so doing, 
undermines the Title VII preference for voluntary compliance. 
Moreover, the “strong basis in evidence” standard seems to apply 
in a way that benefits whites more than it benefits racial minori-
ties. Although there is ample reason to find a “strong basis in 
evidence” support ing the City’s fear of disparate-impact liabil-
ity,113 there is not a “strong basis in evidence” for the Court to 
have rejected the as sessment-center and modified-weighting 
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alternatives that the city wished to use in lieu of its racially 
skewed written exams.114 It seems unlikely that the effect of Jus-
tice Kennedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard on voluntary 
settlements went unnoticed—or was unintended. Without volun-
tary compliance to supplement formal enforcement of Title VII, 
there will simply be fewer occasions in which contested resources 
are given to racial minorities rather than to whites.
The unequal application of discrimination law to whites 
and racial minorities is illustrated even more clearly by Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion. Although Justice Kennedy’s major-
ity opinion expressly left open the question of whether the Title 
VII disparate-impact provision was constitutional,115 Justice Sca-
lia apparently believed that the provision did violate the Equal 
Protection prin ciple of the Constitution by forcing employers to 
engage in race-based decisionmaking in order to avoid disparate 
impact.116 Justice Scalia then suggested that the disparate-impact 
provision of Title VII might be saved if it were viewed as an evi-
dentiary tool to “smoke out” intentional discrimination, but that 
such a saving con struction would require recognition of a good 
faith defense to any disparate-impact claim.117 This is striking 
because Justice Scalia also emphasized that a benign motive on 
the part of Congress in enacting the disparate-impact provision 
could not save the consti tutionality of the provision.118 This rea-
soning creates a curious form of discrimination. When Congress 
acts to remedy disparate-impact discrimination, a benign motive 
will not save the constitu tional validity of its actions.But when 
an employer acts to create dispa rate-impact discrimination, a 
benign motive will save the va lidity of the employer’s actions. 
For Justice Scalia, therefore, a good faith, benign motive can be 
used to permit racial discrimina tion, but not to prevent it. A legal 
regime that would permit such an out come is indeed a notewor-
thy regime.
Justice Alito too wrote a curious concurrence. By argu-
ing that New Haven’s asserted concern with disparate impact was 
really a politically motivated desire to placate a minority con-
stituency,119 Justice Alito appears to believe that racial politics is 
somehow ille gitimate. Although he concedes that racial consid-
erations can sometimes play a permissible role in political bar-
gaining, he says that racial discrimination never can.120 However, 
the issue to be decided was whether the City’s decision to forego 
certification of the firefighter promotion exam results constituted 
permissible ra cial consideration or impermissible racial discrim-
ination. Justice Alito apparently believed that the City’s actions 
constituted a mere pretext for impermissible discrimination,121 
but his reasoning was circular. The only evidence that Justice 
Alito offered to support his discrimination conclusion was that 
the City considered race.122
Justice Alito could not have been pleased by his per-
ception of racial politics in New Haven. One of the black lead-
ers, whom Justice Alito viewed as having been placated by the 
Mayor’s administration, once objected to hiring firefighters who 
“just have too many vowels in their name[s],”123 an apparent ref-
erence to New Haven’s long history of hiring white Italian fire-
fighters instead of blacks.124 This suggests that “racial placa tion” 
had long been the norm rather than the exception in New Ha ven 
politics. If such ubiquitous racial politics were now to be recon-
ceptualized as unlawful racial discrimination, it is noteworthy 
that Justice Alito wished to effect that reconceptualization when 
the long history of New Haven racial politics began to benefit 
racial minorities rather than whites. It also makes one wonder 
whether Justice Alito believes that he can realistically exclude 
his own ra cial considerations from the adjudicatory process in 
the way that he apparently believes they should be excluded from 
the political process.125
2. standing
Although no Justice mentioned it, the disappointed New 
Haven firefighter petitioners may have lacked standing to chal-
lenge the City’s failure to certify the promotion exam results. 
They may have lacked standing because none of the petitioners 
could be sure of receiving the promotions they sought, even if 
the exam re sults had been certified. Under the City’s “rule of 
three,” the City Charter required that civil service positions be 
filled from among the top three exam performers for each posi-
tion.126 However, we cannot tell which of the top three candi-
dates would have been cho sen for any position. There were eight 
lieutenant vacan cies, so only eight of the top ten candidates who 
qualified for “imme diate promotion” to lieutenant under the rule 
of three would ac tually be promoted. Furthermore, there were 
seven captain vacan cies, so only seven of the top nine candidates 
who qualified for “im mediate promotion” to captain would be 
promoted.127 Collectively, we cannot know which of the eigh-
teen petitioners would have re ceived the fifteen available promo-
tions, but we do know that three of the petitioners would not have 
received any of the promotions at all.128
It may seem silly, but under the Supreme Court’s stand-
ing juri sprudence, such uncertainty about whether a favorable 
ruling will actually redress a plaintiff ’s alleged injury can deprive 
that plain tiff of standing. Moreover, a plaintiff ’s failure to estab-
lish a redres sable injury is not merely a prudential impediment 
to standing, but rather can amount to a constitutional defect that 
de prives the Court of jurisdiction under the case-or-controversy 
pro vision of Article III.129 On occasion the Supreme Court 
has applied this particula rized redressability requirement with 
remarkable stringency. For example, it denied environmental 
plaintiffs standing to enforce certain financial incentive provi-
sions of the Endangered Species Act, because those incentives 
might not ultimately result in protec tion of the endangered spe-
cies at issue.130 It also denied other environmentalists standing 
to challenge mining, oil, and natural gas exploitation of federal 
lands, because the plaintiffs did not show with sufficient partic-
ularity that they would use the precise tracts of land that were 
being opened up for exploitation.131 It even denied indigents 
standing to challenge preferential “charity” tax status for hos-
pitals that refused to provide certain charitable medi cal care to 
indigents, because the hospitals might continue to deny such care 
even if they were denied preferential tax status.132 In Ri	cci, no 
petitioner could be certain that a favorable ruling would redress 
his or her injury, because no petitioner could be certain of getting 
a promotion. Indeed, three petitioners could be certain that they 
would not get a promotion, although we do not know which three 
petitioners they would be.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court does not always enforce 
its standing redressability requirement with such stringency. 
Some times the Court grants standing despite serious redressabil-
ity prob lems, as it did when it granted the State of Massachusetts 
standing to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
refusal to re gulate certain greenhouse gas emissions even though 
such regu lation was not guaranteed to reduce the global warming 
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injuries that the State al leged.133 Because the law of standing is in 
notorious disarray, it is not surprising that Supreme Court stand-
ing decisions are often dif ficult to reconcile.134 The problem is 
that there is one overriding principle that does seem to reconcile 
many of the Court’s standing cases. The law of standing often 
protects the interests of whites more than it protects the inter ests 
of racial minorities.135
In the 1984 case of Allen	 v.	 Wright,136 the Supreme 
Court de nied standing to black parents who challenged the alleg-
edly unlaw ful grant of tax-exempt status to segregated private 
schools, be cause those schools might continue to deny admis-
sion to blacks even if the tax exempt status of the schools were 
revoked. In the 1975 case of Warth	 v.	 Seldin,137 the Supreme 
Court denied stand ing to black and Latino plaintiffs who chal-
lenged exclusionary zoning practices alleged to be intentionally 
discriminatory, because the low and moderate income housing 
developments that had sought zoning variances still might not 
ultimately be constructed even if the exclusionary zoning prac-
tices were invalidated. In four police and prosecutorial miscon-
duct cases decided between 1974 and 1983, the Supreme Court 
found that a lack of standing and other justiciability defects 
barred suits by black victims of al leg ed ly discriminatory police 
brutality and other official abuses, be cause prior official miscon-
duct was moot and the threat of future recur rences was too specu-
lative for injunctive relief to redress any cur rent injury.138
The Supreme Court has been fairly frequent in its denial 
of standing to minority plaintiffs who wished to challenge alleg-
edly discriminatory practices that harm racial minorities. How-
ever, the Court often grants standing in analogous cases to white 
plaintiffs who wish to challenge affirmative action or antidiscrim-
ination practices that benefit minorities. In Northeastern	Florida	
Chapter	 of	 the	 Associated	 General	 Contractors	 of	 America	 v.	
City	 of	 Jack	sonville,139 the Court granted standing to a white 
construction con tractor who challenged an affirmative action 
program designed to benefit minority contractors, even though 
the white contractor was unlikely to be awarded one of the con-
tracts at issue if the af firma tive action program were invalidated. 
Other Supreme Court cases have similarly granted standing to 
whites seeking to chal lenge af firmative action programs,140 or 
voter-redistricting pro grams de signed to benefit racial minori-
ties,141 without requiring the strong redressable injury showings 
that the Court has de manded of mi nority plaintiffs. Ricci is a 
case that falls on the per missive white-plaintiff side of the line. 
It tacitly recognizes the standing of at least three white plaintiffs 
to challenge an antidi scrimination law that benefits racial minori-
ties, even though they cannot possibly prove redressabiThe one 
final irony that should be noted in the Supreme Court’s tacit grant 
of standing to the Ricci plaintiffs is its effective issuance of an 
advisory opinion. The purpose of the Article III standing require-
ment is to help ensure that the federal courts do not issue advi-
sory opinions—opinions that make abstract pronouncements of 
law that are unnecessary to the resolu tion of a concrete “case” or 
“controversy” presented in an adver sary context.142 Because the 
Supreme Court disposed of the Ricci case by granting the motion 
for summary judgment filed by the peti tioners, the Court ended 
up making abstract pronouncements that were dependent on the 
resolution of factual issues that seem clearly to have been in dis-
pute. The Court even announced that minority firefighters could 
not win a hypothetical Title VII dispa rate-impact suit if they were 
subsequently to file one.143 Moreover, the Court did all of this 
without the vigorous adversary presenta tion that would have 
been available if the Court had followed the customary practice 
of remanding a case with contested facts for trial. The Court’s 
decision to grant the petitioners summary judg ment is therefore 
also quite curious.
SummaRy JudgmEnT
As Justice Kennedy noted, summary judgment is appro-
priate only where there is “no genuine issue as to any material 
fact,” and one party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”144 
His opi nion went on to hold that “there is no evidence—let alone 
the re quired strong basis in evidence—that the tests were flawed 
because they were not job-related or because other, equally valid 
and less discriminatory tests were available to the City.”145 The 
assertion that there is “no evidence” questioning job-relatedness 
or support ing the existence of less discriminatory alternatives is 
simply in correct. The assertion that there is no “strong basis in 
evidence” is the very legal issue that is under dispute.
1. no evidence
Justice Kennedy’s assertion that there was “no evidence” 
sup porting the City’s disparate impact fears does not withstand 
scru tiny. His opinion itself described evidence in the Civil Ser-
vice Board hearing record that both questioned the job-related-
ness of the City’s promotion exams and suggested the presence 
of less discriminatory alternatives. Some witnesses testified that 
the ex ams were outdated and not relevant to firefighting prac-
tices in New Haven.146 Others called for a validation study to 
determine job-relatedness, because the exams were “inherently 
unfair.”147 The competitor consultant testified that “assessment 
centers” were not only better at assessing job-relatedness, but 
that they would also constitute a less-discriminatory alternative 
selection device.148 A college professor with relevant expertise 
testified that the New Ha ven exams may have contained subtle 
racial biases that favored whites.149 The City’s legal counsel and 
officials in the Mayor’s administration also testified that there 
were less discriminatory alternatives to the exams.150
Justice Kennedy’s opinion ignored the additional perti-
nent evidence highlighted in Ginsburg’s dissent. She pointed to 
testimony establishing that most municipalities do not use pen-
cil-and-paper exams to evaluate promotion candidates because 
of questions about the sufficiency of those exams in assessing 
practical job-related skills. She also cited evidence in the record 
establishing that other municipalities use alternate weighting 
percentages that place more emphasis on prac tical skills than on 
written exam results.151 Far from containing “no evidence,” the 
record was replete with evidence of less discrimi natory alterna-
tives that posed fewer job-relatedness problems. Not only were 
alternate weightings of exam and practical skills a see mingly bet-
ter alternative, but the conclusion that assessment cen ters would 
have been a better alternative actually seems to have been uncon-
tested. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy rejected these evidentiary 
showings out of hand.
Justice Kennedy rejected the alternate weighting option 
be cause he viewed it as prohibited by the New Haven firefighter 
un ion contract, the New Haven City Charter, and the Title VII 
prohi bition against adjusting test scores “on the basis of race.” He 
also saw no evidence that the original New Haven exam weighting 
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was arbitrary.152 The union contract and City Charter were largely 
irrele vant, because they would simply be unlawful if they com-
pelled a degree of disparate impact that was prohibited by Title 
VII. Also, the fact that the original exam weighting may not have 
been arbitrary was simply nonresponsive to the claim that better 
alternatives existed. However, the question of whether alternate 
weightings would constitute prohibited race-based adjustment of 
test scores, as Justice Kennedy argued, or the mere substitution of 
an alternate selection procedure, as Justice Ginsburg argued,153 
is more serious. Ultimately, how ever, it simply begs the central 
question presented in the case. Proper legal characterization of a 
decision by the City to use an alternate weighting process would 
turn on whether the City was motivated by genuine disparate-
impact concerns when it declined to certify the exam results, or 
whether that decision was a mere pretext for racial bias. But the 
question of motive certainly seems like a disputed issue of fact 
that could have been better resolved by a trial on remand than by 
Justice Kennedy’s ex cathedra determi nation.154
Justice Kennedy rejected the assessment center alter-
native, even though no one seems to dispute the claim that 
assessment centers would have been more job-related and less 
discriminatory than written promotion exams. Justice Kennedy 
gave only one rea son for rejecting the assessment center alter-
native. He stated that assessment centers would not have been 
available for the 2003 firefighter promotions.155 However, that 
conclusion was based on a single offhand comment made by 
Frank Ricci—one of the very petitioners challenging the City’s 
failure to certify the exam results.156 Although Frank Ricci was a 
firefighter who worked hard to score well on his promotion exam, 
the record does not suggest that he had any expertise whatsoever 
in designing, im plementing, or evaluating promotion procedures. 
As Justice Gins burg pointed out, there was no particular reason to 
believe that as sessment centers—which were in widespread use 
in other municipalities at the time—were unavailable to the City 
of New Haven.157 Moreover, the record does not disclose any 
reason it was important for promotions to be made in 2003, rather 
than waiting until assessment center procedures could be estab-
lished. That is especially noteworthy since the Supreme Court 
did not fi nally order the promotion exam results to be certified 
until 2009. Although Justice Kennedy was unwilling to accord 
any deference to New Haven’s fear of potential disparate-impact 
liability, he was willing to accord total deference to Frank Ricci’s 
stated basis for opposition to assessment centers.
The racial politics of which Justice Alito apparently dis-
approved may well have been viewed by minorities as the only 
alternative available to counteract the more entrenched politics 
that had caused the City to use its de facto discriminatory promo-
tion procedures for the previous twenty years.158 In a political 
climate where a fire department would forego promotion assess-
ment alternatives that were more job-related and less discrimina-
tory than written multiple-choice exams, it is easy to understand 
how racial politics could become as salient as Justice Alito found 
them to be.159 Whether the City’s effort to deviate from its pre-
vious practices was genuine or pretextual seems at least to be 
a genuine issue of material fact. Justice Ginsburg notes that it 
is common practice for the Supreme Court to remand a case in 
which it has announced a new rule of law, so that the trial court 
can apply the new rule to the facts.160 That customary practice 
certainly seems compelling when factual disputes abound, as 
they did in Ricci, but it was not compelling enough to serve the 
purposes of the Ricci majority.
2. no strong Basis in evidence
Although it is difficult to defend Justice Kennedy’s 
assertion that there was “no evidence” of less discriminatory, 
job-related alternatives, Justice Kennedy also asserted that any 
evidence that might exist was not sufficient to satisfy the “strong 
basis in evi dence” standard that the Court was announcing as its 
new dispa rate-impact rule.161 It seems clear that there was sig-
nificant evi dence of less discriminatory, job-related alternatives 
contained in the Civil Service Board hearing record. It also seems 
clear that any suggestion that such alternatives were lacking was 
far from undis puted for summary judgment purposes. But Justice 
Kennedy knew all of this. My suspicion is that Justice Kennedy 
was not simply making an evidentiary or civil procedure mistake 
when he decided to enter summary judgment for the petitioners 
despite the existence of striking factual disputes. I suspect that 
Justice Kennedy was making a statement about the stringency of 
the new disparate-im pact rule that the Court was adopting.
By deeming a very strong factual showing of better 
alternatives to be insufficient even to defeat a motion for sum-
mary judgment, Justice Kennedy communicated that it would 
henceforth be very difficult to establish a disparate-impact dis-
crimination claim under Title VII, even when a prima facie case 
of disparate impact was statistically demonstrated. The Court 
was reinstituting an era of strong deference to employer dis-
cretion, in order to immun ize employers from disparate-impact 
claims. As Justice Ginsburg viewed it, the Court was reverting to 
the interpretation of Title VII that it had adopted in Wards	Cove, 
even though Congress had overruled Wards	 Cove by statutory 
amendment in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.162 I believe that Jus-
tice Kennedy was conveying the idea that disparate impact claims 
would now be as difficult to uphold under the Title VII “strong 
basis in evidence” standard as affirma tive action programs have 
been to uphold under the “strong ba sis in evidence” Equal Pro-
tection standard that Justice Kennedy borrowed.163
Since the conservative voting bloc took firm control of 
the Court in race cases after 1990, the Supreme Court has upheld 
the constitu tionality of a ra cial affirmative action program in only 
one case—and even that case seems doctrinally indistinguishable 
from another case in which the Court invalidated a similar pro-
gram on the same day.164 Justice Kennedy’s decision to grant the 
petitioners summary judgment in Ricci, despite the existence of 
important factual disputes suggests that we can expect outcomes 
in future Title VII disparate-impact cases that are similar to the 
out comes we have seen in affirmative action cases. Justice Ken-
nedy himself illustrates this with the “advisory opinion” that 
he issued to reject the hypothetical claim asserted by minority 
firefighters in the hy pothetical New Haven disparate-impact case 
that was never even filed.165 Even though such a hypothetical suit 
would be filed by different plaintiffs, using legal theories and evi-
dentiary presenta tions that had not yet been developed—let alone 
presented to a court—Justice Kennedy was still confident that 
the minority fire fighters would lose their case. He could not have 
known this unless he had already determined that the “strong basis 
in evidence” stan dard was so heavily tilted toward the interest of 
white firefighters that no hypothetical disparate impact would be 
sufficient to out weigh the harm to whites.166 This also suggests 
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that Justice Ginsburg was correct when she feared that Justice 
Ken nedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard would undermine 
the congres sional preference for voluntary compliance with Title 
VII.167 For Justice Kennedy, there appears to be very little gap 
left to fill between potential liability (under the “strong basis in 
evidence” standard) and actual liability (under the statutory Title 
VII standard) for vo luntary compliance to fill. He appears to be 
equally solicitous of white interests under both standards.
The stringency of Justice Kennedy’s “strong basis in evi-
dence” standard means that the scales are tipped in Title VII cases 
before the Court even begins its analysis. Because the Court has 
now de tected a conflict between the sta tute’s dispa rate-treatment 
and dis parate-impact provisions, the Court must balance compet-
ing inter ests to resolve that conflict. The “strong basis in evi-
dence” stan dard means that when unclear or disputed evi dence 
is in equipoise, the balance will be struck in favor of pro tecting 
the white interest in avoiding disparate-treatment discrimi nation, 
ra ther than in favor of the racial minority interest in avoiding 
dispa rate-impact dis crimination. It is unclear why a tie should 
go to the white interests under a statute that was enacted to pre-
vent discrimination against racial minorities—unless the Court 
believes that times have changed so much that whites are now the 
primary victims of racial discrimination.
POSTRAcIAL DIScRIMINATION
Postracial discrimination is discrimination against racial 
mi norities that purports to be merely a ban on discrimination 
against whites. It is premised on the belief that active discrimi-
nation against racial minorities has largely ceased to exist, and 
that the lingering effects of past discrimination have now largely 
dissi pated. As a result, a prospective commitment to colorblind 
race neutrality is now sufficient to promote racial equality, and 
any deviation from such neutrality will itself constitute unlawful 
dis crimination. Although versions of this view have been around 
since the era of official segregation,168 the claim that we now 
live in a postracial society has acquired enhanced plausibility 
from the success of prominent racial minorities in roles that were 
tradition ally reserved for whites. Those successes have ranged 
from the golfing achievements of mixed-race Tiger Woods in a 
traditionally white game,169 to the selec tion of black politician 
Michael Steele as head of the Republican Party,170 to the election 
of mixed-race Barack Obama as President of the United States.171
As recent events have indicated, however, the claim that 
we now live in a postracial society is quite premature. Black Har-
vard Professor Henry Louis Gates still believed that he was being 
ra cially profiled in 2009 when he was arrested by a white police 
of ficer after allegedly breaking into his own house.172 The subur-
ban Philadelphia Valley Swim Club still thought it was appropri-
ate to exclude black children from its swimming pool in 2009.173 
And the 2009 death of singer Michael Jackson reminded us that 
the “King of Pop” lived in a culture that caused him to think 
that he could increase his popular appeal by lightening the color 
of his skin.174 Because the culture that we live in is actually far 
from postracial in nature, supposed efforts to prevent whites from 
being victimized by racial minorities end up entailing nothing 
more than a new form of old fashioned discrimination.
The Supreme Court has played its part in this form of 
postra cial discrimination by inverting the traditional concepts of 
perpe trators and victims in a way that allows the Court ultimately 
to in vert the concepts of discrimination and equality themselves. 
Ricci serves as an example of such postracial discrimination, 
and other postracial discrimination decisions handed down by 
the Ro berts Court belie any suggestion that Ricci was merely an 
aberra tion. Moreover, the Roberts Court’s postracial discrimina-
tion deci sions are reminiscent of historical Supreme Court deci-
sions that were issued when the Court was openly hostile to racial 
minority rights, thereby further calling the legitimacy of those 
Roberts Court deci sions into question.
a. concEpTual invERSion
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her Ricci dissent,175 
when the City of New Haven decided to forego reliance on the 
racially disparate results of its firefighter promotion exams, it was 
not act ing in a vacuum. Rather, the decision was part of the City’s 
effort to counteract a long history of racial employment discrimi-
nation practiced by the New Haven fire department. Historically, 
whites were the perpetrators of discriminatory hiring and promo-
tion decisions, and racial minorities were the victims.176 Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci inverted the concepts of per-
petrator and victim in a way that treated minorities as if they 
were the perpetrators and whites as if they were the victims.177 
Jus tice Alito’s concurring opinion was even more emphatic in 
its depic tion of whites as the victims of partisan racial poli-
tics in New Ha ven.178 The Court’s inver sion of the distinction 
between perpetra tors and victims has, in turn, prompted a more 
fundamental inver sion in the core concepts of discrimination and 
equality them selves, so that contemporary racial discrimi nation 
has now come to be viewed as equal, while remedial equality has 
come to be viewed as discriminatory.179
1. perpetrators and victiMs
In a zero-sum resource allocation context, the roles of 
perpe tra tor and victim can be initially assigned and subsequently 
in verted simply by shifting the ana lytical baseline that is used 
to conduct a discrimina tion analysis. A baseline is the thing that 
sepa rates the propositions that are actively addressed in formu-
lating an ana lyt i cal argument from the propositions that are sim-
ply assumed to be true without any effort to justify their validity. 
When analyti cal attention is focused on the issues that lie above 
the baseline, tacit assumptions that lie beneath the baseline often 
slip through unno ticed, and are passively accepted without any 
analytical justi fica tion. Indeed, baseline shifting works best as a 
persuasive tech nique when its baseline assumptions are able to 
do their work in a way that is largely undetected.180
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci held that it 
was un fair to deny the disappointed petitioners the promotions to 
which they were entitled as a result of their superior performance 
on the written firefighter exams.181 That holding rested on the 
tacit base line assumption that those who perform well on pro-
motion exams are entitled to merit-based promotions. Therefore, 
the issue pre sented in Justice Kennedy’s opinion was whether a 
deviation from the merit-based promotions to which the petition-
ers were entitled was justified in order to advance the indepen-
dent goal of reducing the racially disparate impact produced by 
the promotion exams. Stated in this way, the claims of the disap-
pointed petitioners seem both strong and sympathetic, because it 
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is common to use promo tion exams for the purpose of assessing 
merit. As a result, the baseline assump tion—the assumption that 
those who scored well on their exams were entitled to promo-
tions—went largely unscru tinized. How ever, if the analytical 
baseline is shifted down, so that the baseline assumption is high-
lighted and actively scrutinized, the claim of the disappointed 
petitioners loses much of its force.
The assumption that the petitioners were entitled to pro-
motions because they had performed well on their written exams 
is not a valid assumption under Title VII. Title VII does not even 
require the use of written exams in awarding promotions. What 
Title VII does require is that promotions be awarded in a way that 
is not ra cially discriminatory, and disparate 
impact is an expressly prohi bited form of 
discrimination under Title VII. Accord-
ingly, even if the petitioners did perform 
well on their written exams, they still had 
no right to be promoted when their promo-
tions would produce a racially disparate 
impact. A non-validated promotion exam 
that produces a racially disparate impact is 
simply an unlawful em ployment practice—
especially in a case such as Ricci, where 
less-discriminatory, job-related alternatives 
exist.
The adoption of an analytical baseline necessarily 
entails a normative judgment. There is no “natural” baseline 
that can serve as the foundation for legal analysis, because the 
instrumental na ture of baselines means that they can always be 
contested by speci fying some different instrumental objective.182 
Justice Kennedy’s instrumental objective, reflected in the base-
line assumption un derlying his majority opinion, was to enforce 
the Title VII re quirement of race-neutral fairness to firefighters 
who performed well on their promotion exams.183 Justice Gins-
burg’s instrumental objective, reflected in 
the baseline assumption underlying her 
dis sent, was that Title VII requires an end 
to the historic practice of disparate-impact 
discrimination.184 There is no way to decide 
be tween these competing instrumental 
objectives without asserting a normative 
preference for one objective over the other. 
But the normative preference asserted 
by Justice Kennedy iIt seems reasonably 
clear that the enactment of Title VII’s pro-
hibitions on employment discrimination 
rested on the belief that racial and other 
minorities were the victims of widespread 
discri minatory practices being perpetrated 
against them by white em ployers and labor 
unions.185 The United States has had a long 
his tory of pervasive—and often violent—
white discrimination against racial minori-
ties, but racial discrimination against the white ma jority has 
never been a particular problem—at least not until now. Despite 
the racial history of the United States, Justice Kennedy chose to 
invert the Title VII concepts of perpetrators and victims, so that 
whites would be viewed as the victims in Ricci, and racial minori-
ties would be viewed as the perpetrators.186 There is nothing 
analyti cally impermissible about this doctrinal maneuver—the 
Le gal Realists have taught us that the job of lawyers and judges is 
to ma nipulate legal doctrine for instrumental purposes. However, 
one cannot help but wonder why Justice Kennedy and a majority 
of the Justices on the Supreme Court would view this inversion 
of the conventional Title VII understanding as nor matively desir-
able. It is likely that their actions in Ricci reflect a more funda-
mental inver sion of the concepts of discrimination and equality 
themselves.
2. discriMination and equality
The view that minorities have become the perpetrators 
and whites have become the victims of 
racial discrimination in the United States 
also inverts the conventional concepts of 
discrimina tion and equality by substituting 
for each the behavior and attitudes that we 
previously used to define the other. It used 
to be that the history of racial discrimina-
tion in the United States caused us to view 
existing distributional inequalities as the 
products of past and present discrimination, 
and to view racially redistributive efforts as 
remedial measures that were necessary to 
move us toward the goal of nondiscrimi-
natory equality. Now, however, we appear to view the existing 
racially-correlated distribution of resources as some thing that 
actually defines equality by honoring the individual dif ferences 
that exist between us, and we view racially-redistributive efforts 
as discriminatory rather than remedial. If there is no longer 
any appreciable level of discrimination against racial minori-
ties, race-conscious efforts to benefit racial minorities cannot be 
justi fied as remedial. Instead, they are simply a form of “reverse 
dis crimination,” that is inconsistent with the constitutional and 
statu tory principles of equality to which we 
claim an enduring com mitment. Inverting 
the concepts of discrimination and equality 
in this way might make sense if the United 
States is now a postracial culture, in which 
current racial equality has finally triumphed 
over our long history of prior inequality. If 
the United States has not yet achieved this 
postracial status, however, the con ceptual 
inversion simply becomes a new form of 
racial discrimina tion—one that insists on 
the preservation of existing inequalities in 
order to benefit whites.
It is hard to believe that someone 
could seriously contend that the problem of 
discrimination against racial minorities is 
a problem that is now behind us.187 Whites 
still have a significant advantage over racial 
minorities in the allocation of societal 
resources,188 and race obviously remains a salient social category 
that is often used to disadvantage minorities.189 However, the 
election of Barack Ob ama as President of the United States has 
nevertheless fueled cha racterization of the contemporary period 
as a postracial era in which minorities are able to compete suc-



















view, the real racial problem in the Untied States is the problem 
of minorities discriminating against whites.
A pertinent Comment appeared in The New	 Yorker, 
shortly after the 2009 Cambridge police arrest of Harvard Pro-
fessor Henry Louis Gates in his own home.191Staff writer Kelefa 
Sanneh high lighted a number of ways in which minorities have 
been blamed for racist attitudes toward whites: Obama’s former 
pastor, Reve rend Jeremiah Wright, was called racist and anti-
white for his ser mons; Obama himself was accused of insulting 
white people when he referred to his grandmother as a “typi-
cal white person;” then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s “wise Latina” 
remark was referred to as “racist;” and Obama’s claim that the 
Cambridge Police had “acted stupidly” in arresting Professor 
Gates was characterized as “racial self-aggrandizement,” which 
revealed a “deep-seated hatred for white people” that made 
Obama himself “a racist.”192 Even dis counting for the hyperbole 
that is often used to score rhetorical points, those accusations 
do seem to show that many whites have come to feel genuinely 
aggrieved by current racial politics.
Sanneh then went on to make an important point. He 
said that the accusations of “reverse racism” that are often used 
to combat affirmative action in the post-Civil Rights era have 
been so suc cessful that reverse racism against whites has now 
come to be viewed as systemic rather than personal. Whites like 
Frank Ricci do not simply feel that they are occasionally victim-
ized by the isolated deeds of bad actors. They feel as if the whole 
system is skewed in favor of racial minorities, and is therefore 
stacked against them.193 The irony here is striking. Title VII was 
rooted in the belief that racial equality could be achieved only 
by neutraliz ing the systemic discrimination that existed against 
racial minori ties, but the postracial Ricci view is that equality 
can be attained only by reinstituting the institutional practices 
that used to consti tute discrimination. Stated more concretely, 
under Title VII, a non-validated, multiple-choice exam that had 
a racially disparate impact used to be viewed as the very defini-
tion of systemic discrimina tion. Now reinstating the results of 
that exam is necessary to pre vent systemic discrimination against 
whites. Sanneh concluded that aggrieved whites have now com-
mandeered the term “racism”. Racial minorities can still talk 
about isolated issues that affect racial minority interests, but the 
term “racism” has now ac quired a cultural meaning that equates 
it with mistreatment of the white majority by racial minorities.194
The view that contemporary culture now entails this 
new form of systemic minority discrimination against whites, 
rather than the more traditional forms of white discrimination 
against minorities, would seem to be legally irrelevant even if 
true. The Supreme Court has insisted in its constitutional affir-
mative action decisions that the Equal Protection principle does 
not prohibit general “so cietal discrimination.” Particularized acts 
of identifiable discrimi nation are illegal, but the subtler forms 
of cultural behavior and attitudes that have systemically caused 
whites to do better than racial minorities in most social, politi-
cal and economic categories are not prohibited by the Court’s 
conception of Equal Protection.195 That Supreme Court holding 
has always been problematic,196 but it nevertheless remained the 
established law for as long as racial mi norities were the ones 
viewed as the victims of such societal discrimina tion. If the 
Supreme Court were to retreat from its refusal to recog nize the 
legal legitimacy of societal discrimination because it now viewed 
whites as the victims, the Supreme Court would be chang ing the 
rules in a racially motivated way. That would, of course, lend cre-
dence to the view that we continue to live in a cul ture that dis-
criminates against racial minorities.
The fact that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Ricci could be viewed as offering even a credible construction of 
Title VII shows that the Court’s inversion of the traditional dis-
crimination and equality concepts has a receptive audience. How-
ever, it is still diffi cult to take the postracial hypothesis on which 
that inver sion rests seriously. White discrimination against racial 
minorities remains a serious cultural problem, while minority 
discrimination against whites seems at best to be merely mar-
ginal. The continuing mal dis tri bu tion of societal resources along 
racial lines strongly rebuts the validity of any postracial-society 
claim that one might be in clined to assert. Minorities are dispro-
portionately burdened by high unemployment rates, high levels 
of poverty and low access to health care. Minority schools remain 
segregated and they offer educational opportunities that are sig-
nificantly worse than the op portunities offered in white schools. 
Minorities are still discrimi nated against in the job market, in real 
estate markets, and in con sumer transactions. Moreover, when 
minorities do get jobs they are paid less than whites with equiva-
lent levels of education. The bi ases that lead to these inequali-
ties are both conscious and uncons cious, and they show no signs 
of abating in the near future.197 Har vard sociologist William 
Julius Wilson has stated that we can not be considered a postra-
cial society as long as so many minorities are disproportionately 
concentrated at the low end of the socio-economic scale. When 
economic conditions dete riorate, minorities are always the ones 
who suffer as the targets of white frustra tions.198
It is true that the President of the United States is 
now black, but that does not mean that the society that elected 
him has become postracial. One could choose to character-
ize Obama’s election in different ways. One could characterize 
it as demonstrating that minorities can now com pete on a level 
playing field, without the need for affirmative action or serious 
antidiscri mination measures. Alternatively, one could character-
ize Obama’s election as de monstrat ing only that a mixed-race, 
multiple Ivy League graduate, with the intellectual and political 
skills to become President of the Harvard Law Review can suc-
cessfully navigate contem porary ra cial culture—thereby provid-
ing little evidence of how less-excep tional racial minority group 
members are likely to fare on a playing field that is far from 
level. As Professor Darren Hutchinson has noted, the “postracial” 
claim may simply illustrate the phenome non of “racial exhaus-
tion.” Whites have simply grown tired of having to deal with the 
discrimination claims asserted by racial minorities.199 As a result 
of this fatigue, whites may now have de cided to assert retaliatory 
discrimination claims of their own.
For me, the claim that our culture is now postracial is 
seriously undermined by the now-famous Henry Louis Gates 
arrest in 2009. Black Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates was 
arrested by white Cambridge Police Sergeant James Crowley 
after Professor Gates broke into his own home because the front 
door was stuck. A neighbor who feared that a criminal might be 
breaking into the house called the police. The events that fol-
lowed are dis puted, but Professor Gates ended up accusing Ser-
geant Crowley of racial profiling, and Sergeant Crowley ended up 
arresting Profes sor Gates. Because Sergeant Crowley knew that 
Professor Gates lived in the house at the time that the arrest was 
made, President Obama stated in response to a news conference 
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question that the police had “acted stupidly”—a comment that he 
later “recali brated.” These events attracted an enormous amount 
of media at tention, and things ultimately calmed down after Ser-
geant Crow ley, Professor Gates and President Obama all met for 
a beer to gether at the White House.200 I do not know what actu-
ally hap pened. I suspect that all parties probably “overreacted” 
in some sense, but that is my point. Racial tensions are still so 
high in even a northeastern university community that what 
might have been an innocuous non-event became a hot-button 
racial issue. Sergeant Crowley may well have thought that he was 
being ver bally abused simply for doing his job, and Professor 
Gates may well have thought that he was being arrested for act-
ing like an uppity nigger. An environment in which racial nerves 
are still that raw can hardly be viewed as an environment that is 
postracial.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the claim that we 
now live in a postracial society—a society where our most press-
ing dis crimination problem is the problem of racial discrimina-
tion against the white majority—comes from the Supreme Court 
itself. The current Supreme Court commonly rules in favor of 
whites and against racial minorities in contemporary race cases. 
Moreover, it rules this way even though it has had to strain prior 
antidiscrimi nation doctrine to do so. When the Supreme Court 
goes out of its way to favor white interests over the interests of 
racial minorities, the culture in which that Court operates can 
hardly be said to be postracial in any meaningful sense of the 
term. The Supreme Court favored the interests of whites over the 
interests of racial minorities in Ricci, and it has done so in a 
host of other race cases as well. When viewed in the context of 
these collective racial decisions, the Supreme Court emerges as 
an institution that facilitates discrimi nation against racial minori-
ties rather than an institution that pro motes equality.
B. conTExT
The Ricci decision did not occur in isolation. It was a 
5–4 deci sion handed down by the conservative voting bloc of 
the Roberts Court, which in its brief history has already issued 
a number of decisions that favored the interests of whites over 
the interests of racial minorities. Some of those decisions were 
issued the same Term as Ricci, and some were issued in prior 
Terms. But the racial tenor of all those decisions suggests a gen-
eral hostility to the en forcement of antidiscrimination laws and 
precedents that were in itially adopted to protect the interests of 
racial minorities from continued oppression by whites. Unfortu-
nately, the racial tenor of those Roberts Court decisions is also 
reminiscent of decisions is sued by the Supreme Court in earlier 
eras, when the Court was openly antagonistic to the rights of 
racial minorities. Consistent with the theory of postracial dis-
crimination, what emerges from the Roberts Court decisions is 
a Supreme Court that views its function to be that of protecting 
the white majority from discrimination claims asserted by racial 
minorities.
1. roBerts court discriMination
John Roberts was confirmed as Chief Justice of the 
United States in 2005.201 Since his confirmation, the Roberts 
Supreme Court has issued decisions that favored the interests 
of whites over the interests of racial minorities in a number of 
cases. In addition to Ricci, those cases include decisions that 
have rejected minority allegations of racial discrimination in the 
areas of voting rights, racial profiling, English language educa-
tion, and school resegrega tion.
a. Voting Rights.
Ricci was probably the most significant race case that 
the Ro berts Court decided during its 2008 Term, but another 
closely watched case was Northwest	 Austin	 Municipal	 Util-
ity	District	Number	One	v.	Holder.202 In Northwest	Austin, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 remained constitutional in light of the 
increased minority voting participation that has occurred since 
1965. Section 5 seeks to prevent future voting discrimination 
against racial mi norities by requiring jurisdictions with a history 
of prior voting discrimination to obtain federal preclearance from 
the Department of Justice or from a three-judge Federal District 
Court in the Dis trict of Columbia for any changes that they wish 
to make in their voting practices or procedures. In 2006, Con-
gress voted over whelmingly to reauthorize Section 5 for another 
twenty five years. This was the fourth time the Act had been 
reauthorized by Congress since 1965. However, the plaintiff util-
ity district argued that Sec tion 5 could not constitutionally be 
applied to it because there was no evidence that the utility district 
had ever engaged in voting dis crimination. A three-judge district 
court rejected the claim, but the Supreme Court avoided the con-
stitutional question by holding that the utility district could apply 
for a Section 5 waiver under the statute’s “bailout” provision.203
It might at first seem as if Northwest	Austin was decided 
in a way that was favorable to the interest of racial minority vot-
ers, because the Court declined to hold Section 5 unconstitu-
tional.204 However, the majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts 
left little doubt that he believed Section 5 to be unconstitutional 
in light of the increased minority participation in voting that 
occurred since the original adoption of the Voting Rights Act in 
1965. Dis cussing two potentially applicable constitutional stan-
dards, he con cluded that “[t]he Act’s preclearance requirements 
and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions 
under either test.”205
Northwest	 Austin and Ricci are alike in at least two 
important respects. First, in both cases the Court practiced pos-
tracial dis crimination by supplanting an unambiguous statutory 
effort to protect racial minorities with a dubious judicial effort 
to protect whites.206 In Northwest	Austin, Congress decided as 
recently as 2006 that minority voters still needed the voting 
rights protec tions of Section 5. It did so by a vote of 390-33 in 
the House and 98-0 in the Senate, after extensive legislative hear-
ings, and a vo luminous legislative record.207 In Ricci, Congress 
not only adopted Title VII in 1964 to protect racial minorities 
from employment discrimination at the hands of whites, but it 
amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in order to 
overrule prior Supreme Court decisions that proved excessively 
protective of white em ployer interests, and insufficiently protec-
tive of racial minority rights.208 Both cases, therefore, illustrate 
the Court’s propensity to undermine congressional antidiscrimi-
nation initiatives when the Court disagrees with the racial poli-
cies that they embody.
Second, both Northwest	 Austin and Ricci sought to 
engage in racial policymaking through the technique of regula-
tory “chill,” rather than through the process of direct adjudication. 
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Because the race relations issues that underlie the Voting Rights 
Act and Title VII are pure legislative policy issues, the Supreme 
Court was understandably reluctant to invalidate the two statutes 
di rectly. To have done so would have subjected the Court to a 
po tential political backlash, and to questions about the Court’s 
usur pation of legislative policymaking powers in a way that was 
incon sistent with separation of powers principles. In both cases, 
what the Court did instead was to issue in	terrorem dicta that was 
designed to advance the Court’s postracial policy agenda with-
out forcing the Court to internalize the attendant political costs. 
Therefore, in Northwest	Austin, the Court threatened to hold Sec-
tion 5 uncons titutional in the future, so that Congress might be 
chilled into adopting “saving” modifications of the statute that 
better protected the interests of the Court’s white constituents.209 
Similarly, in Ricci, the Court tacitly threatened to hold Title VII 
unconstitutional in the future, so that Congress might be chilled 
from once again overruling by statute the Court’s postracial 
administration of Title VII.210
It is not clear how successful these dictum threats will 
prove to be, but they will almost certainly contribute to a political 
climate in which the representative branches will have to con-
sider rejuve nated reverse discrimination claims that are asserted 
by whites. The problem is likely to be particularly acute in the 
voting rights context. If the Northwest	Austin decision causes 
the upcoming 2010 census to be followed by a plethora of Vot-
ing Rights Act redistricting challenges such as those that arose 
after the 1990 cen sus,211 racial minorities are likely to end up 
suffering new forms of vote dilution. After the 1990 census, the 
Justice Depart ment was able to negotiate redistricting plans that 
did not unduly dilute mi nority voting strength by threatening to 
withhold Section 5 pre clearance under the Voting Rights Act.212 
Now, however, the Su preme Court decision in Northwest	Austin 
may not only encour age whites to file redistricting challenges to 
efforts aimed at pro tecting minority voting strength, but it may 
also reduce the Justice De partment’s negotiating leverage to 
resist such challenges. If a cov ered jurisdiction wishes to engage 
in redistricting that will in crease relative white voting strength, 
by diluting minority voting strength, that jurisdiction can simply 
thumb its nose at Justice De partment threats to deny preclear-
ance. Defiant jurisdictions will now have every incentive to risk 
litigation, gambling that the Su preme Court will simply declare 
Section 5 to be unconstitutional the next time a Section 5 chal-
lenge is presented to the Court.
The Roberts Court also decided a second voting rights 
case during its 2008 Term. Bartlett	v.	Strickland,213 was itself a 
redis trict ing case, in which the conservative bloc held 5–4 that 
the Voting Rights Act prohibitions on minority vote dilution did 
not apply to so-called “crossover districts.” A crossover district 
is a district in which minorities do not comprise a majority of 
the vot ing population, but comprise a large enough percentage to 
elect a candidate of their choice by forming political coalitions 
with whites. The issue presented was whether splitting a cross-
over district in a way that deprived its minority voters of a realis-
tic chance to elect the candidate of their choice constituted vote 
dilution of minority voting strength that was prohibited by the 
Voting Rights Act.214 In announcing the judgment of the Court, 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion held that splitting the district 
did not violate the Voting Rights Act, because minorities had to 
comprise at least 50% of the voting population in a district in 
order to qualify for vote dilution protection under the Act.215
Justice Souter’s dissent not only disagreed with the 50% 
requirement, but argued that reading such a requirement into the 
Act perversely encouraged racial bloc voting rather than inter-
racial voting coalitions. Justice Souter believed that the majority 
pro vided an incentive for states to pack minority voters into fewer 
majority-minority voting districts. It also punished minorities 
who were able to form voting coalitions with whites, by denying 
them statutory protections from vote dilution.216 Justice Souter 
stressed that minority vote dilution could be accomplished not 
merely by minority vote dispersion, but also by the very minority 
vote pack ing that the Court’s holding encouraged.217
Although the Bartlett decision is in many respects tech-
nical, the ultimate effect of the decision is to increase white vot-
ing strength by decreasing minority voting strength. By denying 
stat u tory vote dilution protections to crossover districts, minori-
ties will have less influence in the electoral process than they 
would have had if crossover districts were protected, because 
minorities will be able to control the electoral outcome in fewer 
voting dis tricts. Once again, Justice Kennedy’s opinion argued 
that granting vote dilution protections to racial minorities that 
white voters did not have would discriminate against whites.218 
As in Ricci, he indi cated that reading the statute to compel such 
racial considerations might make the statute unconstitutional.219 
Also reminiscent of Ricci, he viewed the society as postracial, 
because the existence of crossover districts now showed that the 
Voting Rights Act had “by definition” been successful in reduc-
ing racial discrimination in voting.220 But as in Ricci as well, 
Justice Kennedy’s postracial opin ion seems to ignore the fact that 
it is racial minorities rather than whites who suffer the types of 
historical discrimination that the pertinent statutes were intended 
to remedy.221
b. Racial Profiling.
The Roberts Court conservative bloc issued another 
5–4 deci sion during its 2008 Term in the racial profiling case of 
Ashcroft	v.	Iqbal.222 In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
held that a Pakistani Muslim immigrant who was detained after 
the Sep tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks did not adequately state 
a cause of action when he claimed that high level Justice Depart-
ment offi cials, including the Attorney General and the Director of 
the FBI, singled him out for “harsh confinement” because of his 
reli gion and ethnicity.223 Iqbal’s complaint alleged that the defen-
dants “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject” Iqbal to harsh treatment, and that they did so 
“as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, 
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological inter-
est.” The complaint further alleged that the Attorney General was 
the “principal archi tect” of the policy, and the FBI Director was 
“instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementa-
tion.”224 Although the lower courts upheld the adequacy of the 
complaint,225 Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that the allegations 
in the complaint were too conclusory and insufficiently plausible. 
They were too con clusory because they did not contain specific 
factual allegations, but rather were nothing more than “a ‘formu-
laic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination 
claim.”226 They were insufficiently plausible because there were 
legitimate, nondi scri minatory reasons why law enforcement offi-
cials would have fo cused on Arab Muslims following a terrorist 
attack by Arab Mus lim hijackers.227 Moreover, because the high 
level Justice De part ment officials were not subject to vicarious 
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liability, any plausible misconduct by lower level officials would 
not prevent dismissal of Iqbal’s complaint against the high level 
officials.228
The Iqbal Court’s dissatisfaction with “conclusory” 
pleadings, and its insistence on a stringent “plausibility” stan-
dard, seem in consistent with the idea of notice pleading that was 
incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.229 The 
Court, however, also held “implausible” an Arab Muslim’s alle-
gation that discrimina tory racial profiling caused him to be tar-
geted for post-9-11 harsh confinement. To me, it is the Court’s 
holding that seems “im plausible.” Given the nation’s current 
anxieties and fears about Arab and Muslim terrorism, and the 
alleged involvement of high level federal officials in formulat-
ing United States torture pol icy,230 racial profiling seems more 
likely than not. As in Ricci, how ever, Justice Kennedy once again 
gave the benefit of the doubt to white claims of legitimacy rather 
than to racial minority claims of discrimination. As in Ricci, Jus-
tice Kennedy seemed intent on precluding any opportunity for 
an inquiry into the actual facts—entering summary judgment in 
Ricci and dismissing the complaint in Iqbal. And as in Ricci, Jus-
tice Kennedy had to strain the mean ing of existing law in order 
effectuate his inversion of the perpe trators and the victims.
c. English Language Education.
Yet another Roberts Court 2008 Term decision that 
disadvan taged racial minorities was Horne	 v.	 Flores.231 In an 
opinion by Justice Alito, the conservative bloc voted 5–4 to 
reverse the Dis trict Court and Court of Appeals holdings that Ari-
zona was violat ing the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 
1974 by failing to provide adequate educational opportunities for 
students with lim i ted English language proficiency. The Equal 
Educational Op por tunities Act is an antidiscrimination statute 
that prohibits the denial of “equal educational opportunity on 
account of race, color, sex or national origin.” It further prohibits 
“the failure by an edu cational agency to take appropriate action 
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by 
its students in its in structional programs.”232 In 1992, the plain-
tiffs filed a class action challenging the State’s alleged failure to 
provide adequate educa tional oppor tunities for minority at-risk 
and limited English profi cient children. Beginning in 2000, the 
lower courts began issuing a series of or ders that required the 
adoption of minimal educational standards and increased funding 
to comply with the Act. The State’s repeated failures to comply 
ultimately led to contempt cita tions. The lower courts also denied 
the State’s Rule 60(b)(5) mo tion for relief from the compliance 
order, which the State argued had become inequitable in light of 
changed circumstances.233
Justice Alito’s opinion reversed, stating that the lower 
courts should have been more flexible in ruling on the Rule 60(b)
(5) mo tion, because such motions perform a particularly impor-
tant func tion in “institutional reform litigation” where “sensi-
tive federalism concerns” are involved.234 Here the lower courts 
had been insuffi ciently flexible, because they focused too much 
attention on whether the prior funding orders had been com-
plied with, and not enough at tention on the question of whether 
changed circum stances brought the State into compliance with 
the Act in a way that made enforcement of the original order 
inequitable.235 Justice Alito there fore stated that a remand was 
necessary to de termine if changed circumstances were pro-
vided by factors in cluding new educational strategies adopted 
by the State, and con gressional enactment of the No Child Left 
Behind statute.236 Jus tice Breyer’s dissent argued that the lower 
courts adequately considered the factors relevant to a changed-
circumstances inquiry, and that adequate funding was essential 
to compliance with the Act.237 Justice Breyer concluded that the 
Court’s decision would hinder congressional efforts to ensure 
that Spanish-speaking stu dents will learn the English skills nec-
essary to participate in a so ciety where English is the predomi-
nant language.238
Commentators have viewed Horne as establishing a new 
Rule 60(B)(5) standard for relief from court orders in institu-
tional liti gation that will undermine finality by permitting liti-
gants to reopen remedial injunctions that have been issued to 
control their con duct.239 For present purposes, however, Justice 
Breyer’s concern that the decision will frustrate congressio-
nal efforts to provide equal educational opportunities to Span-
ish-speaking minorities is particularly pertinent. Among the 
allegations made by the plaintiffs was the claim that Arizona’s 
school finance scheme “is just suffi cient to let less distressed, 
predominantly Anglo districts impart State-mandated essential 
skills to their mainstream student bodies” without providing suf-
ficient funds for minority students to acquire the same skills.240 
Although this claim was first asserted in 1992, by 2009 the plain-
tiffs had still not received the relief they re quested. Despite lower 
court decisions and contempt citations or dering such relief, the 
Roberts Court simply remanded for yet another round of pro-
ceeding. Moreover, it did so in an opinion whose tone suggested 
that the Court disfavored granting any relief. Consistent with its 
postracial orientation, the Roberts Court again appears to believe 
that there is no longer any real discrimination problem to remedy, 
and that racial minorities are simply asking for more than they 
are entitled to receive. And again, it adopted this position despite 
the existence of a federal statute that seems de signed to remedy 
the precise problem of which the plaintiffs com plained.
d. Resegregation.
In its 2006 Term, the conservative bloc of the Rob-
erts Court is sued a 5–4 decision in the school Resegregation	
Cases.241 The ma jority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts 
invalidated vol un tary race-conscious efforts by the Seattle and 
Louisville school boards to prevent the resegregation of pub-
lic schools that was oc curring as a result of residential reseg-
regation.242 In previous years, both school districts eventually 
achieved integration after making stren uous efforts to comply 
with the Supreme Court deci sions in Brown.243 When population 
shifts began to produce resegre gation, the school boards became 
convinced that only race conscious stu dent assignment could 
preserve the integrated nature of the schools. Accordingly both 
school boards adopted narrow integra tion plans, affecting a small 
number of students, that consid ered race when a student’s desired 
school assignment would force a school’s racial makeup to fall 
outside of a predetermined integra tion range.244 White parents 
who did not receive their desired school assignments challenged 
the plans. 245 The Court then re versed the lower courts and held 
the plans to be unconstitutional because they were not narrowly 
tailored to advance the interest of the schools in promoting stu-
dent diversity.246
Although Brown was issued to desegregate public 
schools, Chief Justice Roberts read the Brown decision itself as 
invalidating the integration plans that were adopted to prevent 
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resegregation.247 He justified this conclusion by asserting that a 
school board was prohibited from considering race regardless of 
its benign motive.248 He concluded his opinion by stating that 
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discrimi nating on the basis of race.”249 Justice Breyer’s dissent 
argued that the Court’s decision was inconsistent with Brown, 
and with a range of other Supreme Court precedents. He stressed 
that because other race neu tral ways of addressing the problem 
proved inade quate, the Court’s decision left school districts with 
no effective way to pre vent resegregation.250
The Court’s decision in the Resegregation	Cases seems 
to epitomize the conceptual inversion of discrimination and 
equality that animates the Court’s postracial view of contempo-
rary cul ture.251 When the decision in the Resegregation	Cases is 
juxta posed to the 5–4 conservative bloc decision in 2009, denying 
a black defendant post-conviction access to evidence for DNA 
test ing,252 it appears that white parents have a stronger constitu-
tional right to send their children to segregated schools than post-
convic tion criminal defendants have to test the evidence offered 
against them in a way that could establish their innocence. It takes 
quite a stretch of the legal imagination to 
conclude that Brown	v.	Board	of	Educa-
tion requires the resegrega tion of public 
schools. Yet the aphorism with which 
Chief Justice Roberts ends his Resegrega-
tion opinion attests to his possession of 
such an im agination. The Chief Justice, 
and the other members of the Su preme 
Court conservative voting bloc on race, 
appear to be lieve that the nation’s racial 
prob lems can be solved by a mere commit-
ment to prospective race neutrality. The 
Roberts Court’s recent race decisions turn 
a blind eye to the continuing ef fects of 
prior discrimination, and to the structural 
forces that con tinue to perpetuate subtle forms of institutional 
discrimination. In cases ranging from firefighter pro motions to 
school resegregation, the Court seems to care very little about the 
interests of racial mi nori ties—and very much about the interests 
of the white majority. In equalities suffered by racial mi norities 
simply do not seem to count when the Court submits to the lure 
of postracial discrimina tion. Unfortunately, this aligns the Rob-
erts Court with prior Su preme Courts that were more transpa-
rently committed to the prac tice of racial minority oppression.
2. Historical discriMination
The postracial discriminatory decisions of the Rob-
erts Court are reminiscent of the overt discriminatory decisions 
issued by prior Supreme Courts. There is now a fairly stan-
dard litany of in famous decisions in which historical Supreme 
Courts have openly sacrificed the interests of racial minorities to 
advance the interests of white slave holders, segregationists, and 
other white suprema cists. Traces of those historical decisions can 
also be found in more re cent contemporary cases, including those 
that have imposed con stitutional limits on school desegregation, 
racial redistricting, and racial affirmative action. The Roberts 
Court’s postra cial discrimi nation cases can be easily aligned with 
those prior de cisions, in terms of both tone and out come. Accord-
ingly, one can not help but wonder why the Roberts Court has not 
felt a need to dis tance itself from those historical and contempo-
rary decisions, ra ther than risk being aligned with them. I fear 
that the reason may be that the con servative bloc Justices on the 
Roberts Court actually favor such an alignment.
The historical Supreme Court was no friend to racial 
minori ties. In the 1823 case of Johnson	 v.	 McIntosh,253 the 
Supreme Court upheld the seizure of indigenous Indian lands by 
the United States. In the 1857 case of Dred	Scott	v.	Sanford,254 
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Missouri Compro-
mise Act of 1820, which Congress enacted in an effort to limit 
the spread of slav ery in new United States territories. The Court 
not only held that the statute interfered with the property rights 
of white slave own ers, but it also held that blacks could not be 
citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution.255 
The Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred	 Scott256 after the 
Civil War, when other Reconstruction constitutional amendments 
and implementing legislation were also enacted to promote equal 
rights for former black slaves. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
began limiting the re medial scope of the amendments, and even 
invalidated some of their implementing legislation.257 In the 1896 
case of Plessy	v.	Fer	guson,258 the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutional ity of Jim 
Crow official segregation in public facili-
ties. Despite some formal minority victo-
ries, the Court commonly capitulated to 
South ern white supremacist attitudes. It 
acquiesced to Southern eva sion efforts to 
deny blacks the right to vote, to replace 
slavery with peonage, to preserve seg-
regated transportation, and to preserve 
housing segregation.259 The Court also 
often capitulated to South ern racism in 
the criminal justice system by permitting 
racial se gregation in the jury box and on 
the witness stand. It sometimes allowed 
apparently innocent black defendants to be imprisoned or even 
executed, rather than interfere with the procedural sov er eignty of 
Southern state courts.260
In the mid-Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court’s 
racial per for mance was little better. In the 1944 case of Kore-
matsu	v.	United	States,261 the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of a World War II order excluding Japanese-American citizens 
from their own homes on the West Coast, which led to the intern-
ment of Japanese-Ameri cans in detention centers. After the offi-
cial segregation doctrine of Plessy was invalidated by the 1954 
Brown school desegregation case,262 the Court still refused 
to order immediate desegregation. Instead, Brown	 II required 
desegregation “with all deliberate speed,” which permitted 
Brown to be evaded by massive Southern resistance for nearly 
a dec ade.263 Then, when the school desegrega tion effort moved 
out of the South, the Court articulated a distinc tion between de 
facto and de jure discrimination—a distinction that has permitted 
most schools in the United States to remain de facto segregated 
even today.264 The year after Brown was decided, the Su preme 
Court also declined to inva lidate a Virginia miscegena tion statute 
in Naim	v.	Naim,265 even though Brown almost certainly rendered 
the statute unconstitu tional. More recently, Brown has been read 
as establishing a color blind race-neutrality requirement that the 
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The tone and outcomes of the historical Court’s deci-
sions sometimes made the Court’s hostility to racial minority 
interests unmistakable. In frequently quoted language from his 
opinion in Dred	Scott, Chief Justice Taney described the fra mers’ 
view of black slaves. Not only could blacks not be citizens, but 
they were at the time considered as a subordi-
nate and inferior class of beings, who had been 
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to 
their au thority, and had no rights or privileges 
but such as those who held the power and the 
Government might choose to grant them.267
Chief Justice Taney went on to say that blacks “had for 
more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior 
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either 
in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect.”268 Hopefully, 
that is no longer a widely shared view of racial minorities, and it 
is certainly not a view that is often expressed in polite company. 
Nevertheless, the tone of Roberts Court race cases sometimes 
reflects a disregard of racial minority interests that strikes me as 
similarly callous.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci displays an under-
standably sincere concern for the interests of white firefighters 
who scored well on their promotion exams. However, it displays 
a near total lack of concern for the interests of racial minorities, 
who daily suf fer the relentless disparate-impact harms that Title 
VII was adopted and amended to prevent.269 Moreover, by adopt-
ing an unrealisti cally high standard for the avoidance of dispa-
rate-impact injuries, Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to place 
any meaningful remedy for such harms beyond the practical reach 
of Title VII, and perhaps beyond the reach of the Constitution as 
well.270 The position of the disappointed New Haven firefight-
ers seems to be that abandoning a resource allocation criterion 
that favors whites constitutes racial discrimination against the 
white majority, and that seems to be the way the Roberts Court 
views thinJustice Alito’s refusal to uphold equal educational 
funding in the Horne English Language Education case also 
seems unneces sar ily to disregard the interests of racial minority 
students. The seventeen years that elapsed between the time the 
plaintiffs filed their class action and the time the Supreme Court 
remanded with out a remedy for yet additional proceedings, has 
a disquieting si milarity to the long period of time that elapsed 
after Brown, when the Supreme Court first acquiesced in South-
ern evasion of the Brown desegregation mandate but ultimately 
refused to deseg regate Northern and Western schools.271 Horne 
has a disquiet ing similarity to the Roberts Court’s more recent 
refusal to permit voluntary efforts to maintain hard-won integra-
tion in the Resegregation	Cases.272
The dictum suggestion of Chief Justice Roberts in 
Northwest	Austin, that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act might 
be unconsti tutional despite its recent overwhelming reauthori-
zation by Con gress, suggests a similar callousness to the inter-
ests of racial minorities.273 By its terms, the Voting Rights Act 
applies only to jurisdictions that have a history of minority voter 
disenfranchise ment. And by its terms the Act permits those juris-
dictions to make any changes they desire to their voting practices 
and proce dures, provided they can first demonstrate that they are 
not perpet u ating the sorts of past discrimination that caused them 
to become cov ered jurisdictions.274 Rather than acquiesce in the 
need for sus pect jurisdictions to make that showing, however, 
Chief Justice Roberts preferred to subject racial minorities to the 
danger of con tinued voter discrimination. Moreover, he did so 
in a political cli mate involving recent presidential elections that 
were rife with allegations of politically-partisan, minority voter 
disenfranchise ment.275
The aphorism with which Chief Justice Roberts chose to 
end his opinion in the Resegregation	Cases—“[t]he way to stop 
dis crimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimi nating on 
the basis of race”276—conveys what is perhaps the most disturb-
ing tone of all of the Roberts Court’s post racial discrimination 
cases. Chief Justice Roberts appears to suggest that the problem 
of racial discrimination in the United States—a problem that has 
plag ued the nation for hundreds of years, since before the nation’s 
inception—is really not such a difficult problem after all. All we 
have to do to solve the pesky problem of racial discrimination 
is ignore the continuing legacy of past discrimination, and pro-
spectively behave in a colorblind, race neutral manner. Imagine 
how insulting it must be for racial minorities to be told that their 
problem can be solved in such a simple-minded manner.
There remains an enduring sense of white entitlement, 
hig h lighted by Cheryl Harris in Whiteness	As	Prop	erty,277 pursu-
ant to which whites have traditionally thought it natural to ex ploit 
racial minorities in order to advance white interests. Hillary Jor-
dan’s novel Mudbound278 illustrates this nicely. In the novel, 
post-sla very Southern white planters—who commonly cheated 
and abused their black workers—sat around vilifying the “nig-
gers” for moving North and leaving the planters with no one to 
harvest their crops, other than workers who would demand mar-
ket rates for their labor. The novel was set in the post-World War 
II era, but I fear that the attitude of entitlement that it captures is 
both less fictitious and less dated than one would hope.
I doubt that the conservative bloc members of the Rob-
erts Court share the racial sentiments expressed by Chief Jus-
tice Taney in Dred	Scott.279 Still, there is an aspect of Roberts 
Court postra cial discrimination that Dred	 Scott renders haunt-
ingly fa mil iar. Dred	Scott entailed the Supreme Court’s invalida-
tion of a con gres sional effort to solve a serious racial problem. 
As the subse quent Civil War indicates, the Court’s invalidation of 
that congres sional effort did not work out well. During Recon-
struction, the Supreme Court also engaged in efforts to limit or 
invalidate congressional efforts to solve our continuing racial 
problems. Again, the Supreme Court often chose to limit or 
invalidate those efforts. 280 Unfortunately, Roberts Court efforts 
to treat racial minorities as if they are no longer victims of dis-
crimination, in order to protect the interests of whites instead, 
share the hist orical Court’s propensity to marginalize or over-
rule congressional policies that have been adopted to help rem-
edy ra cial discrimina tion. The Roberts Court Justices certainly 
under stand this facet of Supreme Court history, but the conser-
vative bloc Justices have chosen to align themselves with those 
historical practices never theless. Separation of powers consider-
ations aside, it is simply not clear to me why the Roberts Court 
thinks it can do a better job of formulating race relations policy 
than the politically accountable, representative branches of gov-
ernment, or why the Roberts Court would want to align itself 
with the darker strands of Supreme Court racial history. I fear 
that the con servative bloc Justices on the Roberts Supreme Court 
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may actually consider themselves to be proud heirs of the racial 
atti tudes that they seem to have inherited from their predecessors.
cONcLuSION
The view that the Roberts Court seems to have of racial 
minor ities is disheartening. The Ricci firefighters decision sug-
gests that the Court’s conservative bloc majority favors the inter-
ests of whites over the interests of racial minorities. Moreover, 
the inten sity of that favoritism is strong enough to prompt the 
Court to cir cumvent statutory protections that Congress enacted 
precisely to prevent such racial favoritism. Because other Rob-
erts Court race decisions exhibit a similar favoritism, the Court’s 
preference for whites seems intentional and persistent, rather 
than inci dental or sporadic. The tone and outcome of the Court’s 
decisions are reminiscent of earlier Supreme Court decisions that 
were openly hostile to racial minority rights. This suggests that 
contem porary racial attitudes may be more firmly rooted in the 
past than we would like to admit. The Roberts Court’s race deci-
sions seem premised on the view that we now live in a postra-
cial culture, where discrimination against racial minorities has 
largely ceased to exist, and our most serious racial problem is the 
problem of minor ities discriminating against whites. The election 
of Barack Obama notwithstanding, the systemic disadvantages 
that minorities con tinue to suffer relative to whites makes the 
assertion of that view seem disingenuous. It is as if the Supreme 
Court were simply looking for a novel justification to continue its 
time-honored practice of sacri fic ing racial minority rights for the 
benefit of whites.
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uPDATE ON ASYLuM LAw: NEw HOPE fOR vIcTIMS Of 
DOMESTIc vIOLENcE
By 
Sandra A. Grossman and María Mañón*
i. mEETing “ana”
One afternoon not so long ago, we met “Ana,” a young 
woman from El Salvador. At the age of 14, Ana met and formed 
a “relationship” with a 43-year-old man who would later become 
the father of her two daughters. “He was nice in the beginning,” 
Ana recounted, but then one day he got jealous and beat her. In 
fact, he beat her several times that night. The beatings grew more 
vicious, continuing for more than a decade, and often occurring 
in the presence of their two young daughters. “You can never 
leave me,” he would tell her, “you belong to me.”
Ana sought the help of local police and the courts, but 
to no avail. Her family and friends knew of the abuse, but no one 
did anything to stop it. Ana knew she must leave or risk losing her 
life and the lives of her children. Ana decided to make the long 
and treacherous journey to the United States, and with our help, 
recently applied for asylum before the U.S. Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (EOIR) based on fear of continued perse-
cution and abuse if returned to El Salvador. Thanks to a recent 
change in policy by the Obama administration, Ana, and others 
like her, have a chance at obtaining asylum and rescuing them-
selves and their families from further abuse.
ii. domESTic violEncE-BaSEd aSylum claimS: oncE 
hopElESS, now hopEful?
Asylum is available to an alien physically present in the 
U.S. who can establish himself/herself to be a refugee accord-
ing to section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA).1 To qualify as a refugee, an applicant for asylum must 
show that he or she has suffered persecution in the past or has a 
well-founded fear of persecution in the future on account of at 
least one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.2 A 
request for asylum may be based on past persecution, as well as 
a well-founded fear of future persecution.3
The term “well-founded fear” was defined by the 
Supreme Court as containing an objective and a subjective com-
ponent referring to, respectively, the known country conditions 
and the applicant’s own beliefs.4 A foreign national “possesses 
a well-founded fear of persecution if a reasonable person in her 
circumstances would fear persecution if she were to be returned 
to her native country.”5 Quantitatively stated, an applicant’s fear 
is well-founded if there is as little as a 10 percent chance of the 
feared event happening.6 Yet, practically speaking, at least once 
before an immigration judge, applicants are often forced prove 
their cases beyond a shadow of a doubt.7 Asylum applicants must 
show that relocation within their own country is either not an 
option or would not protect them from persecution.8 Finally, the 
persecution must be by the government or by a persecutor which 
the government is unwilling or unable to control.9
Domestic violence victims seeking asylum in the U.S. 
often assert their fear of persecution on account of member-
ship in a social group. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
defined this ground as persecution “that is directed toward an 
individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom 
share a common, immutable characteristic…that the members 
of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to 
change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or 
consciences.”10 Subsequent BIA decisions further qualified the 
definition of social group, requiring that “the group have particu-
lar and well-defined boundaries, and that it possess a recognized 
level of social visibility.11 The “social visibility”12 and “particu-
larity” requirements further support the idea that to qualify for 
asylum, victims must show they are persecuted because of an 
immutable characteristic known to their persecutor.
Whether a battered woman may be a member of a cog-
nizable social group has been a subject of much contention, as 
reflected in the Department of Homeland Security’s nine year 
delay in producing regulations or an authoritative precedent on 
the issue.13 In Matter	of	R-A-,	first heard in 1996, the BIA ana-
lyzed an asylum claim	 involving a young woman from Guate-
mala, Rody Alvarado, who suffered horrific domestic abuse at 
the hands of her husband.14 Ms. Alvarado applied for asylum 
on account of her membership in a particular social group and 
political opinion, specifically, “Guatemalan women who have 
been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, 
who believe that women are to live under male domination.”15 
In 1999, the BIA denied Ms. Alvarado asylum, finding she was 
not a part of a cognizable social group and that her persecution 
was not on account of her political opinion.16 The BIA’s deci-
sion was subsequently reviewed by several attorney generals, and 
recently came before the BIA for entry of a new decision. This 
time, lawyers for the Department of Homeland Security have 
recommended asylum for this horribly abused woman, virtually 
guaranteeing the entry of a grant of asylum.17
iii. dEfining ana’S Social gRoup: ThE KEy To a 
SuccESSful aSylum claim
The decision to recommend asylum in Ms. Alvarado’s 
case came after the Department laid out its new stance on domes-
tic violence based claims in a related case involving an abused 
woman from Mexico, respondent in Matter	of	L-R-. In April of 
2009, DHS, now under Secretary Janet Napolitano, acknowledged 
the difficult issues and challenges presented by the application 
of asylum in the domestic violence context18 and recommended 
remand in Matter	of	L-R-.19 More importantly for immigration 
law practitioners and advocates, the brief provides a set of impor-
tant guidelines on what a successful domestic violence-based 
claim might look like.20 For the first time, the DHS’s brief opens 
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the door to the possibility that foreign domestic violence victims 
can qualify for asylum in the United States.21
According to DHS, a particular social group based on 
domestic violence “is best defined in light of the evidence about 
how the respondent’s abuser and her society perceive her role 
within the domestic relationship.”22 The key is identifying what 
characteristics the persecutor targeted in choosing his victim.23In 
Ana’s case, for example, it may have been her youth,24 her gen-
der, her economic disadvantage, and the fact that she was unpro-
tected and vulnerable. Ana was 14 years old when she met her 
abuser, who was both older and wealthier than she was, and even 
though family and friends knew of the abuse, nobody did any-
thing to stop it.
According to DHS, an applicant’s status within a domes-
tic relationship is immutable where the applicant is economically, 
socially, or physically unable to leave the abusive relationship, 
or where “the abuser would not recognize a divorce or separa-
tion as ending the abuser’s right to abuse the victim.”25 Ana, for 
example, because of her age, her financial dependence, and her 
fear of retaliation, was unable to leave the abusive relationship. 
Every time she tried to escape, her family would encourage her to 
return to her abuser because he was her only means of financial 
support and security. Even when she tried to end the relationship 
or relocate to a different city, her abuser would find her and force 
her to resume the relationship.
“Visibility,” another requirement for establishing asy-
lum based on social group, may be demonstrated by submitting 
evidence of country conditions related to the social perception 
of domestic violence.26 It is not surprising that Ana’s family and 
friends knew of the abuse, but did nothing to stop it, since 9 out 
of 10 women in El Salvador have suffered from domestic vio-
lence.27 The fact that Salvadoran society is accepting of relation-
ships between older men and younger women, even in cases of 
abuse, made Ana an easy target. Finally, according to DHS, the 
“particularity” requirement in social group assessments can be 
met with the use of the term “domestic relationship,” since the 
term itself suggests a certain level of specificity.28
We are tasked with showing that Ana and other victims 
of domestic violence were viewed and treated as property by 
their abusers, and that this behavior was deemed socially accept-
able. Importantly, DHS warns against “circularity,” or defining 
the social group by the persecution suffered or feared.39 In other 
words, practitioners should avoid defining the particular social 
group as “targeted for persecution because they belong to a group 
of individuals who are targeted for persecution.”30
iv. concluSion: yES wE can!
Victims of abuse, like all other asylum applicants, must 
meet their heavy burden of persuasion by providing testimony 
and evidence documenting their statutory eligibility for asylum. 
For Ana and others similarly situated there is no denying that the 
road ahead remains difficult and long, and that the United States 
has not traditionally accepted domestic violence based asylum 
claims, but careful and creative lawyering combined with a keen 
understanding of the law relating to social group-based asylum 
claims, may yet change the landscape of what is possible. 
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ANNOTATED bIbLIOGRAPHY: wHO cAN HELP? A HISTORY 
LESSON ON uRbAN RELATIONS
By 
Daniel A. Broughton
Detroit has inspired dozens of books and hundreds of 
articles exploring what happened after World War II and why the 
Motor City has fallen victim to drastic spatial inequalities and 
continuing racial segregation. From Joe T. Darden to Thomas 
Sugrue, numerous authors have taken their shot at explaining the 
declining of Detroit and what factors have had similar repercus-
sions in other parts of the United States. New literature is pub-
lished every year, and each new research design comes out with 
the latest findings and statistics, trying to top its slightly older 
counterparts. As urban policy expert Angela Glover Blackwell 
has noted, “Fortunately, if America really wants to solve the prob-
lem of racial and ethnic inequality, it has a history of programs, 
strategies, and policies to build upon”(116). I argue that before 
we dive into the latest hardcovers on our bookstores’ shelves, we 
must first look to the findings of past urban researchers to dis-
cover which policy schema have been tested, which have been 
successful, and what is still left uncovered.
The study of Detroit’s urban and race relations may 
be my particular field of interest, but the cornucopia of urban 
research designs that flourished throughout the second half of 
the twentieth century are applicable to sociologists, lawyers, and 
advocates in major cities throughout the United States. Again, 
before diving deeper into current theoretical analyses of and 
policy proposals for American cities, it is important to review 
what older research designs suggest for the varying perceptions 
of today’s urban crises. Through reevaluating the related litera-
ture of the past 20 years, case studies of different cities’ struggles 
over time may provide insight on effective solutions in light of 
the current economic recession:
Blackwell, Angela Glover, Stewart Kwoh, and Manuel Pastor. 
Searching for the Uncommon Common Ground: New 
Dimensions on Race in America. New York: The Ameri-
can Assembly, 2002.
Sifting through virtually all corners of urban America, 
Angela Glover Blackwell analyzes the constantly changing demo-
graphic of African Americans. With various maps and histograms 
complementing the text, Blackwell tackles racial tension/race 
relations as a challenge to the development of the United States 
at all levels. Her data suggest that “racial justice” is becom-
ing increasingly ambiguous and that multiculturalism must be 
viewed as a competitor with traditional black-white typologies. 
Blackwell’s examination helps to assess the national versus local 
responsibilities regarding urban race relations.
DeParle, Jason. American Dream: Three Women, Ten Kids, and 
a Nation’s Drive to End Welfare. New York: Penguin 
Group, 2004.
Jason DeParle’s American	Dream uses a narrative style, 
yet is lined with accurate depictions of the welfare state as they 
intersect with specific events in his story. The book reads as an 
oral history, capturing the conversation and tension of those deal-
ing with welfare while maintaining households in present-day 
Milwaukee. This micro-level chronicle allows readers to learn 
of personal disparities that may lead to poverty and how wel-
fare policies contain clauses that often discriminate against the 
impoverished who are the most dependent on them
Photo by: Christa Broughton
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Fortune. The Negro and the City. New York: Time, 1968.
This book presents a contextual perspective of American 
business in the fight against racism in cities. Set in the late 1960s, 
The	Negro	and	the	City was published by Fortune magazine and 
was devoted to corporate America’s search for a solution to the 
urban crisis. The project surveys African Americans as its central 
methodology, asking them to comment on inner-city conditions 
and their ability to find stable employment. In its conclusion, the 
book suggests that a constructive future lies not in new laws but 
in better attitudes supporting “colorblind” practices.
Gans, Herbert, et al. “Viewing the ‘Underclass’ and Ghetto from 
the Top Down.” Journal of Urban History. 25.4, 1999: 
583-593.
This review essay draws parallels and similarities among 
five contemporary pieces on the urban poor of America. As the 
title suggests, the articles in this journal approach the American 
city from the top down, looking the intellectual and social con-
texts within minority factions that have been stigmatized by out-
side perspectives. Gans’ article, in particular, attacks the current 
modes of urban planning, arguing that the working-class subcul-
ture cannot be neglected in today’s social policy considerations.
Gilbert, Dennis. The American Class Structure: In an Age of 
Growing Inequality. 6th ed. Belmont, California: Wad-
sworth, 2003.
Dennis Gilbert’s textbook is a good reference for the 
application of social theory to datasets and case studies. In par-
ticular, Gilbert introduces Karl Marx’s “class consciousness” and 
Maximiliam Carl Weber’s “status considerations” and integrates 
these principles into various American models and typologies of 
social hierarchy. Most importantly, Gilbert explains the implicit 
costs of class consciousness, such as prestige and association, 
and how these outside pressures can be used to further define 
status boundaries.
Jennings, James, ed. Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban Amer-
ica. Westport, Connecticut: Preager, 1994.
Blacks,	Latinos,	and	Asians	in	Urban	America examines 
the formation of ghettos in American cities, questioning how 
enclaves of ethnic minorities relate to one another politically. 
In considering social and fiscal monopolies in urban centers, 
Jennings describes how different power struggles can encour-
age ethnocentrism in minority communities, provoking rivalries 
among racial groups. The book appeals to an achievable “social 
justice,” yet it recognizes the functional steps of ethnic identity 
and acceptance.
Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid: 
Segregation and the making of the Underclass. Harvard 
University Press, 1994.
American	 Apartheid takes a public policy approach 
to examining the dynamics of private ghettoization of urban 
United States and the public regulation that legally advocated 
the segregation of cities. The Fair Housing Act presents a num-
ber of problems with law enforcement, including poor fund-
ing and narrow objectives. The book also takes a sociological 
stance, researching the isolating effects of the ghetto and how, as 
an urban microcosm, it is contained by both inside and outside 
pressures.
Mohl, Raymond A. “The Second Ghetto Thesis and the Power 
of History.” Journal of Urban History, 29.3, 2003: 
243-256.
The	Second	Ghetto	Thesis looks at the roles of govern-
ment and public policy in housing projects and other forms of 
urban renewal. As new resources and public housing communi-
ties are constructed, they take on the demographics of previous 
residential options. Efforts to renovate the American city are hol-
lowed out by the incapability to mobilize the urban racial com-
position. Mohl concludes that the model of a “second ghetto” 
movement should have a strong influence on today’s civil rights 
legislation.
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the 
United States. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 1994.
In Racial	Formation	in	the	United	States, Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant explore the aspects of nation and hegemony 
that encourage the collection of a common lifestyle and, con-
sequently, a definition of deviance. Hegemony promotes group 
mentalities, such as morality-based conservatism, that must 
maintain a system of ideas and practices; it advocates a “com-
mon sense.” The authors present five paradigms to answer how 
racism in America has changed and survived, stressing the fluid 
influences of class and gender interactions during different time 
periods.
Reed, Adolph. ed. Without Justice for All: The New Liberalism 
and Our Retreat from Racial Equality. Boulder, Colo-
rado: Westview, 1999.
With a unique and crucial study, Adolph Reed chal-
lenges the abilities and integrities of America’s progressive 
politics. Specifically critiquing the Democratic Party, this book 
explains the successes of Reaganism and social hegemony in the 
midst of a crumbling liberal movement. As progressivism opens 
its doors to a wide spectrum of issues, its strength is dispersed, 
and it loses power against a strong Republican coalition. African-
American advancement is especially vulnerable as it juggles the 
included obstacles of political and gender relations.
Stokes, Curtis and Theresa Meléndez. eds. Racial Liberalism and 
the Politics of Urban America. East Lansing, Michigan: 
Michigan State University, 2003.
In this collaboration, Stokes and Meléndez offer a set 
of scholarly essays to explore contemporary systems of privi-
lege and oppression in America’s urban centers through socio-
economic and political typologies. The essays concentrate on the 
entrapment of multicultural identity in the city, posing that fac-
tors of a “universal” social citizenship often conflict with “group 
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differentiated” citizenship, resulting, historically, in an Ameri-
can caste system. The essays also look at specific case studies, 
Detroit among them, to express the polarizing effects of metro-
politan politics.
Street, Paul. “Urban Race Relations: ‘Everything Changed?’” 
Hidden Continuities of Urban Racial Inequality Before 
and After 9/11.” Dissident Voice. September 18, 2003.
Sociologist Paul Street views the domestic racializing 
effects of 9/11 and how the downturns of the nation’s economy 
and the semi-permanent war on terror have shifted America’s 
policy focus to a hegemonic agenda. The article provides statis-
tics of incarceration rates and annual incomes by race in light of 
the 2001 terrorist attacks. Stree aims to expose the magnitude of 
contemporary urban race relations, exemplified by the economic 
recession felt after 9/11 that left many African Americans locked 
out of the workforce.
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and 
Inequality in Postwar Detroit. New Jersey: Princeton, 
1996.
Thomas Sugrue questions the conventional theories of 
twentieth-century urban racism by looking at the racial violence 
that flourished at the end of World War II, instead of attacking the 
welfare reform and social programs of the 1960s. Like Detroit, 
other major cities of the “rust belt” have also experienced post-
war conflict, and Sugrue concentrates on spatial and social struc-
tures to explain the economic and racial disparities that limit the 
freedom and mobility of urban minorities.
Taylor, Henry Louis and Walter Hill. eds. Historical Roots of the 
Urban Crisis: African Americans in the Industrial City, 
1900-1950. New York: Garland, 2000.
Historical	 Roots	 of	 the	 Urban	 Crisis very specifically 
exposes the history of the industrial city to explain modern urban 
dilemmas. As American cities enter a more information-based 
economy, African Americans need to play “catch up” in order 
to compete with the new market. The authors assembled a team 
of junior and senior colleagues to research different facets of 
African Amerincans’ dependence on the industrial city and how 
internal conflicts add to more widespread racism in preventing 
class mobility.
Wright, Nathan. Black Power and Urban Unrest: Creative Pos-
sibilities. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967.
In Black	Power	and	Urban	Unrest, Nathan Wright anal-
yses the Civil Rights movement shortly after its “completion.” He 
gives specific anecdotes and presents group dynamics of only a 
few years earlier, describing the Black Power struggle that chose 
to form in the cities. Black Power, Wright argues, was perceived 
as a new effort to “regain” a liberal democracy in the United 
States. The conclusions in this 1967 book take a more liberal 
stance than many of today’s platform: Black Power needs to sup-
port African American self-development and social citizenship. 
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By Rene Carballo
S. 21 “Prevention First Act of 2009” 
Introduced by Senator Harry Reid (D, NV)
The Prevention First Act seeks to improve women’s 
access to health care, specifically by increasing access to repro-
ductive health care services.1 Congress introduced this legisla-
tion to expand women’s access to these services by providing 
funds to states and other entities to invest in research, educa-
tion, and preventative programs regarding teen pregnancy and 
sexually transmitted diseases.2 The Act would require hospitals 
receiving federal funding to provide, upon request, emergency 
contraception to victims of sexual assault.3 In regard to health 
plans and their coverage, this Act would prohibit the exclusion or 
restriction of benefits related to prescription contraceptive drugs, 
devices, and outpatient services.4
Senator Harry Reid from Nevada introduced this Act on 
January 6, 2009 with 27 co-sponsors. After its introduction in 
the Senate, the Act was referred to the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions. The companion bill in the House 
of Representatives, the Unintended Pregnancy Reduction Act of 
2009, was referred to the committees on Energy and Commerce, 
Ways and Means, and Education and Labor.
S. 424 “Uniting American Families Act of 2009” 
Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy (D, VT)
The Uniting American Families Act (UAFA) was intro-
duced to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act5 to elimi-
nate discrimination by the following: 1) permitting permanent 
partners of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents 
to obtain lawful permanent resident status in the same man-
ner as spouses of citizens and lawful permanent residents and 
2) penalizing immigration fraud in connection with permanent 
partnerships.6
The Act defines the scope of a “permanent partner” as 
an individual 18 or older in a committed intimate relationship 
with another individual 18 or older in which both parties intend 
a lifelong commitment. The individual must be financially inter-
dependent with the other party and not married to, or in a per-
manent partnership with, any other person. The individual must 
be unable to contract with the other individual a marriage cog-
nizable under this Act and finally, the partners cannot be in first, 
second, or third degree blood relation to one another.7
Family reunification has been essential to U.S. immi-
gration policy for decades, but lesbian and gay families have 
been entirely excluded from discussion.8 By introducing this 
legislation, Congress intended to extend the U.S. Immigration 
and Nationality Act to same-sex partners of U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents. Under the current law, same–sex partners 
are not considered “spouses.” Consequently, the current law 
tears apart bi-national couples and their families. According to 
the most recent U.S. Census, there are nearly 36,000 gay and 
lesbian bi-national couples.9 As with opposite-sex couples, there 
are requirements such as providing proof of the relationship. 
Furthermore, this Act would impose harsh penalties for fraud, 
including up to five years in prison and as much as $250,000 in 
fines.
Senator Patrick Leahy from Vermont introduced this Act 
on February 12, 2009 with 20 co-sponsors. After its introduction, 
it was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Representative 
Jerrold Nadler from New York introduced its companion legis-
lation, H.R. 1024, in the House with 115 co-sponsors. After its 
introduction, it was referred on February 12, 2009 to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary and on March 16, 2009 to the Subcom-
mittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, 
and International Law.
S. 697 “Community Living Assistance 
Services and Supports (CLASS) Act of 2009” 
Introduced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy  
(D, MA)
This Act was introduced to amend the Public Health 
Service Act10 to help individuals with functional impairments 
and their families pay for the services and supports that they 
need to maximize their functionality and independence. The Act 
increases families’ options for community participation, educa-
tion, and employment. This legislation creates a new financing 
strategy for community living assistance services to allow these 
individuals to live in the community. It also supports the estab-
lishment of an infrastructure that will help address America’s 
community living assistance services and support need and alle-
viate burdens on family caregivers.11
Senator Ted Kennedy from Massachusetts introduced 
the CLASS Act on March 25, 2009 with five co-sponsors. It was 
referred to the Committee on Finance. Its companion legislation, 
H.R. 1721, was referred to the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce. It was referred to the House Committees on Ways and 
Means, Rules, and the Budget.
S. 909 “Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act 
of 2009”
Introduced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D, MA)
This Act was introduced to provide federal assistance to 
states, local jurisdictions, and Native American tribes to aid in the 
prosecution of hate crimes.12 The legislative intent is to expand 
the scope of the 1969 U.S. federal hate-crimes law13 to include 
bodily crimes motivated by a victim’s actual or perceived gender, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. Furthermore, it 
codifies and expands the funding and investigative capabilities of 
federal officials for aiding their local counterparts, particularly at 
the behest of the Attorney General.14
The legislation was named after Matthew Wayne 
Shepard, a student at the University of Wyoming who died after 
being tortured because of his sexual orientation. Due to the cir-
cumstances surrounding Spepard’s murder, the legislation also 
amends the Hate Crimes Statistics Act. Data collection and 
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reporting requirements would now include crimes manifesting 
prejudice based on gender and gender identity, as well as hate 
crimes committed by and against juveniles.
Senator Edward M. Kennedy from Massachusetts intro-
duced this Act in April 28, 2009 with 45 co-sponsors. After dying 
in committee when brought for a vote by Senator Kennedy in 
the 110th Congress, the Act was approved as an amendment to 
the Senate Defense Reauthorization bill. Due to staunch oppo-
sition, it was ultimately dropped from the Reauthorization, but 
President Obama indicated his goals to see the bill passed in its 
original language was signed into law on October 28, 2009. Its 
companion legislation, H.R. 1913, passed the House on April 29, 
2009.15
S. 931 “Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009” 
Introduced by Representative Henry Johnson 
(D, GA)
The Arbitration Fairness Act would amend Title 9 of the 
United States Code to prevent the enforcement of pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements that require arbitration of employment, 
consumer, franchise, or civil rights disputes.16 The purpose of the 
amendment is to alter mandatory arbitration because it lacks any 
meaningful judicial review of the arbitrators’ decisions, under-
mining the development of public law for civil rights and con-
sumer rights.17
Senator Russell Feingold from Wisconsin introduced 
this Act on April 29, 2009. It was referred to the Committee on 
the Judiciary. Representative Henry Johnson from Georgia intro-
duced its companion legislation, H.R. 1020, on February 12, 
2009 with 85 co-sponsors. It was referred to the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary and on March 16, 2009 to the Subcommittee 
on Commercial and Administrative Law.
H.R. 3017 “Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act of 2009” 
Introduced by Representative Barney Frank 
(D, MA)
This Act was introduced to prohibit employment dis-
crimination based on actual or perceived sexual orientation or 
gender identity.18 Specifically, the intent of the legislature is to 
address the history and widespread pattern of discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity by private sec-
tor employers and local, state, and federal government employ-
ers.19 It also seeks to provide comprehensive federal prohibition 
of employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
or gender identity and include meaningful and effective remedies 
for any such discrimination.
Because there is no federal law that consistently protects 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals from employ-
ment discrimination, Congress invokes the 14th Amendment of 
the Constitution,20 and Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,21 
granting it power to propose this legislation. However, this Act 
shall not apply to a corporation, association, educational institu-
tion, or society that is exempt from the discrimination provisions 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under Title VII, all 
employers excluding the four aforementioned exceptions are not 
only prohibited from being motivated by discriminatory intent, 
but must also not use a facially neutral employment practice that 
has an unjustified adverse impact on members of a protected 
class.22 By enacting the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 
Congress would extend the protected class under this disparate 
impact theory to include lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
people.
Representative Barney Frank from Massachusetts intro-
duced this Act on June 24, 2009 with 152 co-sponsors. After 
being introduced it was referred to the Committee of Education 
and Labor, which held the first of its hearings on the bill on Sep-
tember 23, 2009.
Healthcare Reform
The Affordable Health Care for Americans Act of 2009 
was introduced Representative John Dingell (D, MI) on October 
29, 2009. The Obama Administration pushed for the introduc-
tion of the Affordable Health Care for Americans Act of 2009 in 
response to the growing demand for healthcare reform.23 Earlier 
in the year, the House introduced H.R. 676, the United States 
National Health Care Act or the Expanded and Improved Medi-
care for All Act,24 to provide for comprehensive health insurance 
coverage for all United States residents, improved healthcare 
delivery, and for other purposes. This in turn led to the Afford-
able Health Care for Americans Act, seeking to expand health 
care coverage to the approximately 40 million Americans who 
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1 Prevention First Act of 2009, S. 21, 111th Cong. (2009).
2 Id. (putting into practice the goals of the At-Risk Communities Teen Preg-
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2009).
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6 Uniting American Families Act of 2009, S. 424, 111th Cong. (2009).
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8 Human Rights Campaign, Talking Points: The Uniting America Families Act, 
http://www.hrc.org/issues/int_rights_ immigration/13114.htm (last visited Nov. 
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10 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2008).
11 Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act of 2009, S. 697, 
111th Cong. (2009).
12 Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, S. 909, 111th Cong. 
(2009).
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13 Distinguished from the definition of “hate crime” as set forth in the Violent 
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14 S. 909.
15 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, H.R. 1913, 
111th Cong. (2009).
16 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
17 Id. (providing arbitrators near complete freedom to ignore the law or even 
their own rules in making decisions).
18 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. 
(2009).
19 See 42 U.S.C. §2000 (referring to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to define 
employees and employers for purposes of this legislation).
20 u.s. Const. amend. XIV ( “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law”).
21 u.s. Const. Art. 1, § 8 (ensuring a Congressional right to regulate interstate 
commerce to provide for the general welfare).
22 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000).
23 Affordable Health Care for American Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009).
24 National Health Care Act or the Expanded and Improved Medicare for All 
Act, H.R. 676, 111th Cong. (2009).
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are currently uninsured by lowering the cost of health care and 
making the system more efficient.
To successfully revamp the current health care system, 
the Act includes a new government-run insurance plan to com-
pete with companies in the private sector. It would require that 
all Americans have health insurance, and prohibit denying cov-
erage of those Americans with pre-existing conditions. In order 
to fund the project, there will be a surtax on households with 
an income above $500,000. The legislative intent behind the 
Act is to help low- and middle-income individuals and families 
purchase insurance. Despite mandating universal coverage and 
disallowing discriminatory practices for health status or gender, 
the premiums would still vary based on factors such as age, geog-
raphy, and family size.
Representative John Dingell from Michigan introduced 
this Act on October 29, 2009 with six co-sponsors. The bill 
passed on November 7, 2009. Due to the pressing nature of the 
issue, amendments and potentially new legislation is bound to 
arise in the Senate during Congress’ next session.
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Announcing
ProgreSSive	PeoPLe	oF	coLor	caucuS
n  Progressive People of Color Caucus is a new initiative founded by students of color 
interested in creating a supportive space for color-and-politics consciousness at WCL. 
n  We invite any WCL community member who self-identifies as a person of color and who 
is passionate about the politics of race and ethnicity to join PPOCC.
n  We intend to sponsor several informal and formal conversations about our guiding 
principles and future activities through semester’s end. 
n  As a self-governed group that depends on individual contributions rather than a chain of 
command we’ll need your involvement and input to sustain our vision.  
 
To	join	our	listserve,	please	contact	
ppocc.wcl@gmail.com
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